ts charging conspiracies that lack a definite start date are nonetheless legally sufficient. See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 616 F.3d 929, 940-41 (9th Cir. 2010) (determining that "although an indictment cannot be completely open-ended, an indictment that specifies an end date is sufficient to apprise defendants of the charges and enable them to prepare a defense" (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Rawlins, 606 F.3d 73, 78-79 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding conspiracy charge running "from a time unknown and continuing to September[ ] 2004" sufficiently informed defendant of the charges he would face at trial); United States v. Hristov, 466 F.3d 949, 954 (11th Cir. 2006) (recognizing in dicta the sufficiency of an indictment that charged a conspiracy running from "an unknown date through September 9, 2003"); United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 943 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2001) (upholding indictment alleging a conspiracy "[f]rom an unknown date through on or about July 21, 1998"); United States v. Crosby, 2018 WL 3244071, at *2-3 (D. Me. July 3, 2018) (determining indictment's conspiracy charge "[b]eginning on a date unknown, but not later than May 1, 2015, and continuing until a date unknown, but not earlier than January 25, 2016" is sufficient). The Court finds that Count Three of the superseding indictment sets forth the elements of the offense charged, puts Pappas on fair notice of the charges against which he defends, and enables Pappas to assert a double jeopardy offense if he had been charged with the same offense previously.