Opinion
3:23-cr-00069-TMB-KFR
02-14-2024
United States of America v. Samson Costigan
PROCEEDINGS: ORDER FROM CHAMBERS
Honorable Timothy M. Burgess, United States District Judge.
The matter comes before the Court on the Magistrate Judge's Final Report and Recommendation (“Final R&R”) recommending the Court deny Defendant Samson Costigan's Motion and Memorandum to Dismiss, Pursuant to New York Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen (the “Motion”). Costigan objects to the Final R&R “in its entirety” and lodges one specific objection.Pursuant to statute, the Court has conducted a de novo review of the record and applicable law.Based on that review, the Court ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the Final R&R at Docket 29 for the reasons discussed below. Accordingly, the Motion at Docket 24 is DENIED.
Dkt. 29 (Final Report and Recommendation).
Dkt. 24 (Motion to Dismiss).
Dkt. 30 (Objection) at 1-2.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (“Within fourteen days after being served with a copy [of the magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations], any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”).
On August 17, 2023, Costigan was indicted by grand jury on one count of Felon in Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). The Indictment alleges that on or about June 5, 2023, Costigan possessed three firearms and two types of ammunition, knowing that he had a 2022 state conviction for manslaughter, “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” Costigan was therefore barred from possessing firearms pursuant to § 922(g)(1), which prohibits individuals “who ha[ve] been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm or ammunition.
Dkt. 2 (Indictment).
Id. at 1-2; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
On December 4, 2023, Costigan moved to dismiss the Indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) is “unconstitutional both facially and as applied” pursuant to the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, as construed by the United States Supreme Court in 2022 in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen. In the Motion, Costigan argued that pre-Bruen Ninth Circuit precedent is “no longer good law” and does not control § 922(g)(1)'s constitutionality.Therefore, he argued, Ninth Circuit precedent consistently upholding the validity of that statute no longer supports the Indictment. In particular, he argued that Bruen overruled the Ninth Circuit's 2010 opinion in United States v. Vongxay because it “relied on a line of cases upholding felon disarmament laws under means-end scrutiny” and is thus “incompatible with Bruen.” As Bruen articulated a different test for the Second Amendment constitutionality of firearm regulations, Costigan argued, “Bruen has abolished any reliance” on cases like Vongxay that employ meansend scrutiny.
Dkt. 24 at 1-33 (citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)).
Id. at 9.
594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at.
The Government opposed the Motion, noting that “courts across the country have addressed similar challenges” and “have issued over 150 decisions declining to overturn § 922(g)(1) pursuant to the framework articulated in Bruen.”
Dkt. 25 at 1-2.
In the Final R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommended denying the Motion “[b]ecause the Court is bound by Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the statute under which [Costigan] has been charged is constitutional.” In particular, the Final R&R provided in-depth analysis of the relationship between Vongxay and Bruen and the parties' arguments on that point. It “disagree[d] with [Costigan] that Vongxay . . . [is] incompatible with Bruen,” and “instead join[ed] the large number of district courts within the Ninth Circuit, including in the District of Alaska, in determining that Bruen did not overturn Vongxay's holding that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment.” First, it concluded that Costigan “has not shown that Vongxay's recognition of § 922(g)(1)'s constitutionality is clearly irreconcilable with Bruen.” Next, it found that even if “Vongxay does not follow the precise analysis articulated in Bruen, this inconsistency does not demonstrate that the two cases are clearly irreconcilable.” Therefore, it reasoned, “the Court remains bound by Vongxay because it is possible to apply that case's reasoning consistently with Bruen” and “Vongxay commands a ruling that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional.”
Dkt. 29 at 1.
Id. at 3-8.
Id. at 4, 6.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Costigan objects to the Final R&R “in its entirety” due to one specific objection: that the Final R&R errs in concluding that Vongxay is still good law because the United States Supreme Court “overturned the circuit cases like Vongxay” and “explicitly rejected” their “mode of analysis” in Bruen. Costigan argues that the Final R&R incorrectly characterizes the relationship between Vongxay and Bruen as one of “limited tension,” reiterating his position that “the holding of Vongxay is plainly irreconcilable with the demanding historical standard required under Bruen.”
Dkt. 30 at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
The Government replies that the Final R&R correctly applied Vongxay because “neither the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc [n]or the Supreme Court have overruled [Vongxay].” Moreover, the Government reminds the Court that Costigan “does not raise any argument or authority that has not already been addressed by the parties,” as Costigan's objection regarding Vongxay reiterates arguments already made and responded to by the Magistrate Judge.
Dkt. 31 (Reply) at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
The matter is now before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), which provides that a district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge” and shall review objections de novo. For topics on which no objections are filed, “[n]either the Constitution nor [28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)] requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.”
United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate's factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings.”); United States v. Ramos, 65 F.4th 427, 434 (9th Cir. 2023) (articulating that “the district court ha[s] no obligation to provide individualized analysis of each objection.”).
Having reviewed de novo the parties' initial and supplemental briefing, the Final R&R, Costigan's objection, and considerable Second Amendment case law before and since Bruen, the Court concludes that Costigan's objection lacks merit. The Court agrees with and adopts the analysis thoroughly laid out in the Final R&R and observes that Costigan's objection provides no new arguments or additional support for his position.
Accordingly, the Court ACCEPTS AND ADOPTS the Final R&R at Docket 29 and DENIES the Motion at Docket 24.