Opinion
87 Cr. 249 (PGG)
07-26-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JAMES COONAN, Defendant.
ORDER
PAUL G. GARDEPHE, U.S.D.J.
Defendant James Coonan was convicted at trial on racketeering charges, and on May 11, 1988, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 75 years' imprisonment. On August 17, 2023, Coonan - who is now 77 years old - filed a motion for compassionate release or a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (Dkt. No. 308) The Government contends that Coonan is not eligible for relief under Section 3582(c)(1)(A) because (1) his offense conduct occurred before the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984; and (2) the Bureau of Prisons has not made a motion for a sentence reduction on his behalf, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g). (Govt. Opp. (Dkt. No. 317) at 1).
For the reasons stated below, Coonan's motion for compassionate release or a sentence reduction will be denied.
BACKGROUND
At Coonan's 1988 trial, the Government offered evidence that from the mid-1960s until the mid-1980s, Coonan was the leader of a gang known as the “Westies,” which operated in the Hell's Kitchen neighborhood of Manhattan's West Side. (1988 Presentence Report, Govt. Ex. A (“PSR”) at 11-12)
Under Coonan's leadership, the Westies engaged in “murder, kidnapping, extortion, loansharking, drug trafficking, gambling, counterfeiting, fraud and stolen property offenses.” (Id. at 11) The gang “established and traded upon a reputation for extreme violence,” and was “responsible for at least eight murders.” (Id.) The Westies “dismembered the bodies of their victims and dumped their body parts in the East River.” (Id.) As the leader of the Westies, Coonan committed multiple acts of murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, extortion, fraud, illegal gambling, and tax fraud between 1966 and the mid-1980s. (Id. at 4-7)
In a 1987 indictment, Coonan and nine co-defendants were charged with seventeen counts of racketeering and related offenses arising out of their participation in the Westies. See United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1555 (2d Cir. 1991). In February 1988, a jury convicted Coonan on ten counts, including racketeering, violent crimes in aid of racketeering, extortion, and tax fraud. (Mirigliano Deci., Ex. 1 (Judgment and Commitment Order) (Dkt. No. 309) at 1) On May 11, 1988, Judge Whitman Knapp sentenced Coonan to an aggregate term of 75 years' imprisonment and a fine of $1 million. (Id.)
According to the Bureau of Prisons, Coonan has a mandatory release date of June 1, 2030. (Mirigliano Deci., Ex. 2A (Coonan BOP Data Sheet) (Dkt. No. 309-2) at 4)
Coonan filed the instant motion for compassionate release or a sentence reduction on August 18, 2023. (Dkt. No. 308) The case was reassigned to this Court on September 22, 2023. (Dkt. No. 312)
The Government filed an opposition brief on November 27, 2023. (Dkt. No. 317) Coonan filed a reply brief on January 2, 2024. (Dkt. No. 320)
DISCUSSION
In arguing that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant [compassionate release or a sentence reduction],” Coonan cites, inter alia, his advanced age, health issues, the length of time he has already served, his comparative lack of disciplinary infractions over the three-and-a-half decades he has spent in prison, his commitment to bettering himself and mentoring other inmates while incarcerated, and the harsh conditions of confinement that he experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic. (Def Br. (Dkt. No. 308) at 3, 17-30)
In opposing Coonan's motion, the Government argues that he is not eligible for compassionate release or a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), because that provision does not apply to inmates whose sentences were imposed for criminal conduct that occurred prior to November 1, 1987. (Govt. Opp. (Dkt. No. 317) at 5) According to the Government, Coonan's application is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g), which requires that the Bureau of Prisons has moved for a sentence reduction on the inmate's behalf. (Id. at 6) Because the Bureau of Prisons has not made any such motion on Coonan's behalf, the Government contends that he is not eligible for compassionate release or a sentence reduction. (Ick at 7)
Coonan does not dispute that his offense conduct took place prior to November 1, 1987. (See Def. Reply (Dkt. No. 320)) Nor is there any dispute that (1) the Bureau of Prisons has not moved for a sentence reduction on Coonan's behalf; and (2) such a motion is a prerequisite for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g). Accordingly, the threshold issue before the Court is whether Coonan is eligible for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), given that his offense conduct took place prior to November 1, 1987.
As a general matter, courts have no power to modify a previously imposed term of imprisonment. Such a modification can only take place when authorized by statute. See Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011); United States v, Shakur, No. 82 CR 312 (CSH), 2022 WL 3910581, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2022).
Prior to passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the only vehicle for a compassionate release sentence reduction was 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g), which made such relief contingent on a motion filed by the Bureau of Prisons: “At any time upon motion of the Bureau of Prisons, the court may reduce any minimum term to the time the defendant has served.” 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g).
Although Section 4205(g) was repealed as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, its replacement - 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) - “empowered only the BOP to bring a compassionate release motion on a defendant's behalf.” Shakur, 2022 WL 3910581, at *3. As originally enacted, Section 3582(c)(1)(A) provided that a court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that, (1) in any case,
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. ...Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a), 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). Over the next more than thirty years, a BOP motion remained a prerequisite for any reduction in sentence. United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 2020). As the Second Circuit has observed, “BOP used this power sparingly, to say the least.” Id.
In 2018, however, the First Step Act amended the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to allow defendants - in addition to the BOP - to bring compassionate release motions pursuant to Section 3582(c)(1)(A), after exhausting their administrative remedies. See Pub. L. No. 115 391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). As amended in 2018, Section 3582(c)(1)(A) provides that a 5 court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that
(1) in any case-
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that-
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction. ..
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission18U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
Noting that the amended Section 3582(c)(1) grants courts power to reduce a sentence “in any case,” Coonan contends that this power extends to cases in which the defendant's offense conduct occurred prior to November 1, 1987. (Def. Reply (Dkt. No. 320) at 2) According to Coonan, this result follows from (1) the “expansive meaning” of the word “any,” as interpreted by the Supreme Court in cases such as Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008), and (2) the remedial purposes of the First Step Act, in which “Congress explicitly recognized longstanding problems with relying on the BOP to bring compassionate release motions on behalf of defendants,” United States v. Johnson, 671 F.Supp.3d 265, 276 (E.D.N.Y. 2023). (Def. Reply (Dkt. No. 320) at 2-4)
The difficulty with Coonan's argument is that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended in 1987, states that the Act's provisions apply only to offenses committed after the Act's effective date of November 1, 1987.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 - as enacted on October 12, 1984 - provided that it would “take effect on the first day of the first calendar month beginning twenty-four months after the date of enactment.” Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). A year later, Congress extended the effective date to thirty-six months after the date of enactment. Pub. L. No. 99-217, § 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985). Accordingly, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 took effect on November 1, 1987. On December 7, 1987, the Act was further amended to provide that it “shall apply only to offenses committed after the taking effect of this chapter” - i.e, November 1, 1987. Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 2(a), 101 Stat. 1266 (1987).
As a result, courts have uniformly ruled that inmates whose crimes were committed prior to November 1, 1987, may not obtain relief under the First Step Act's amendments to Section 3582(c)(1)(A). In rejecting the argument that Coonan makes here, the Seventh Circuit noted that the
“in any case” [language] has been part of § 3582(c)(1) since its enactment in 1984 by the Sentencing Reform Act.. . . If “in any case” had been added to § 3582 in 2018, perhaps it would be best to understand the First Step Act as repealing the old § 3582 and enacting a new version. A “new” § 3582 would be free of the grip of the transition language. But Jackson does not contend that the 2018 Act swept away the old § 3582 and brought in a new one. Nor would such an argument be tenable. The First Step Act provides that § 3582(c)(1)(A) is being amended, not that § 3582 as a whole is being repealed and a new statute with the same section number enacted. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239, § 603(b)(1) (Dec. 21, 2018). Doubtless the Congress that enacted the 2018 Act wanted to make compassionate release easier. But it did not modify the transition language from 1984 and 1987.United States v. Jackson, 991 F.3d 851, 853 (7th Cir. 2021). The Jackson court went on to hold that defendants “whose crimes predate November 1, 1987” are not eligible for relief under Section 3582(c)(1)(A). Id. at 852-54.
In United States v. King, 24 F.4th 1226 (9th Cir. 2022), the Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion, citing the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Jackson. Id. at 1230.
The Second Circuit has cited Jackson and King in summary orders affirming district court denials of compassionate release motions brought by defendants who committed their crimes prior to November 1, 1987. See United States v. Rivera-Rios, No. 20-1773, 2022 WL 14206094, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 2022) (summary order) (affirming denial of compassionate release motion because Section 3582(c)(1)(A) “applie[s] only to prisoners [whose offenses occurred] on or after November 1, 1987”); United States v. Borelli, No. 21-1506, 2022 WL 6831650, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 12, 2022) (summary order) (same).
Multiple district courts in this Circuit have reached the same result. See, e.g., Shakur, 2022 WL 3910581, at *5) (“[T]he statute [defendant] relies upon to authorize this Court to consider his motion for compassionate release does not apply to him, given that his crimes of conviction antedated November 1, 1987.”); United States v. Rios, No. 70 Cr. 592 (BMC), 2020 WL 2522069, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2020) (“[C]ourts have uniformly held that the current compassionate release statute, § 3582, does not apply to individuals whose criminal conduct occurred before November 1, 1987.”); United States v. Rivera, No. 86 Cr. 1124 (JFK), 2020 WL 2094094, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2020) (“[T]he provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), which became effective on November 1, 1987, do not apply to [defendant's] term of incarceration, which was imposed for criminal conduct that occurred prior to that date.”).
In the face of this authority, Coonan has cited no case in which a court has held that the First Step Act's 2018 amendments to Section 3582(c)(1) apply to inmates whose crimes were committed prior to November 1, 1987. Coonan instead cites two compassionate release cases - United States v. Fisher, 493 F.Supp.3d 231, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), and United States v. Rice, No. 83 CR. 150-3 (LGS), 2020 WL 4505813 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2020) - in which courts did not address the issue. (See Def. Reply (Dkt. No. 320) at 1-2) Assuming arguendo that the defendants in those cases committed their crimes prior to November 1, 1987, these decisions are not persuasive here, because they do not address the November 1, 1987 effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act, much less the precedent discussed above. See Shakur, 2022 WL 3910581, at *4 (stating that Fisher “cannot [be] regard[ed] as reasoned authority for the proposition that First Step Act privileges apply to [defendants who committed their crimes prior to November 1, 1987]”).
Because (1) Coonan's offense conduct took place prior to November 1, 1987, and (2) BOP has not brought a compassionate release or sentence reduction motion on his behalf, Coonan is not eligible for reliefunder 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Coonan's motion for compassionate release or a sentence reduction (Dkt. No. 308) is denied.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion (Dkt. No. 308).
SO ORDERED.