Opinion
CRIMINAL NO. 3:98cr223 (RNC)
December 23, 1999.
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE
Pending before the court is the defendant's Motion for Pretrial Release (doc. #30). The defendant's motion is DENIED for the reasons that follow.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The defendant was indicted by a grand jury on November 17, 1998 and charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1) and 924 (a)(2) (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon). An arrest warrant was lodged as a detainer because the defendant was incarcerated by the State of Connecticut for state charges arising from the same incident which gave rise to the federal charges.
On December 22, 1998, the defendant was presented and arraigned. The government filed a motion requesting pretrial detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142. The defendant indicated that he was being held in state custody and asked that the detention hearing be continued until after January 12, 1999, when he expected to be released from state custody. The hearing was scheduled for January 13, 1999. On January 13, 1999, the defendant asked for another continuance, this time for an indefinite period of time because the state charges against him had not been nolled and he expected to remain in state custody. In accordance with the defendant's request, the hearing on the government's motion for pretrial detention was deferred until the defendant's release from state custody was imminent. In the meantime, he was detained. See United States v. Coonan, 826 F.2d 1180, 1185 (2d Cir. 1987)
At the December 2, 1999 detention hearing, it was discovered that the government's written motion filed in open court on December 22, 1998 had not been docketed. The written motion has since been docketed.
On November 8, 1999, the defendant filed a motion for pretrial release because he was about to be released from state custody. In his brief in support of the motion, the defendant argued that he was not eligible for pretrial detention. See doc. #30. More specifically, he asserted that the government failed to specify one of the statutory grounds that is a necessary prerequisite to pretrial detention. Consequently, he argued, the government's motion was deficient and the court lacked jurisdiction to hold a hearing.
A detention hearing was held before the undersigned on November 22, 1999 and was scheduled to continue on November 29, 1999. On November 29, 1999, to respond to certain questions raised at the November 22 hearing, the government filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Pretrial Detention Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142.See doc. #35. In its memorandum, the government argued that the defendant is eligible for pretrial detention because he is charged with a crime of violence (one of the statutory prerequisites discussed in the defendant's memorandum) and because there is a serious risk that he may obstruct justice by threatening or attempting to threaten a witness. See id. On November 29, 1999, a defense motion for a continuance of the detention hearing was granted and the hearing was continued until December 2, 1999. See doc. #36.
the time between the two court dates, the court ordered the pretrial services officer to look further into the defendant's circumstances, to make a home visit and to issue an updated report. The updated report was issued on December 2, 1999.
II. FACTS
At the December 2, 1999 detention hearing, government witnesses testified to the following.
On October 29, 1998, the Woodbridge Police Department received a complaint of gunshots being fired in the area of the defendant's residence. Sergeant Frank Cappiello responded. He was familiar with the defendant through past incidents and arrests; he had been present on two prior occasions when the defendant was arrested and charged with firearms violations.
See infra, "History and Characteristics of the Defendant."
Sergeant Cappiello and at least two other officers stopped near the defendant's home. Before long, they heard more gunshots. The officers observed a man leave the defendant's residence and get into a car. As the car left the driveway, the officers stopped the driver, Lester Richie, who said that he had been visiting the defendant. Upon questioning, Richie told the police that the defendant had fired two weapons from inside the house. Richie said the defendant fired the guns through a window toward the area behind the house.
Behind the defendant's house are other homes. Although the defendant makes much of the fact that his house is on a large lot and the area behind the house is wooded, testimony made clear that neighbors' homes are visible through the woods. More to the point, the neighbors' homes are within reach of gunfire.
A few minutes after police heard the shots, they saw the defendant walk from his front door to his mailbox. As the officers approached him, the defendant retreated into the house and locked the door behind him. Through a window, the defendant told the officers that he had no intention of leaving the residence.
The defendant was steadfast in refusing to surrender. He remained locked in his home for about four hours. During that time — mid to late afternoon — the officers contacted neighborhood schools and directed them to keep busses and school children from the neighborhood. A roadblock was established to keep cars and pedestrians from the area. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF"), the state police and a SWAT team were called to the scene.
At some time during the siege, the Chief of the Woodbridge Police Department telephoned the defendant and asked him to surrender. The defendant refused. He told the officers that he would "take [them] out" if they came onto his property. Eventually, however, the defendant surrendered.
After obtaining a search warrant, police searched the defendant's home. They found ten firearms. The firearms were located in various places around the residence, and some were hidden behind a wall. In addition to several hunting guns, the police recovered a .45 caliber handgun and a number of firearms classified as assault weapons. Sergeant Cappiello testified that firearms classified as assault weapons are banned to the public. The assault weapons seized included a Norinco military rifle, an Uzi machine gun, an M-1 carbine .30 caliber gun and a Mossberg shotgun.
ATF Special Agent John Fretts, who assisted in the search of the defendant's home, testified about some of the guns. He said that the Norinco rifle, which is manufactured in China, is of the same caliber as those weapons used in the armed forces and is similar to the American-made M-16 rifle. It has a range of up to 300 meters and, if fired straight up in the air, can shoot a distance of about 2 miles. As to the Uzi 9mm carbine, Special Agent Fretts testified that it had been altered so it was capable of machine gun fire. The M-1 carbine is a replica of a World War II military weapon. The Mossberg was equipped with a pistol grip, a feature which substantially shortens the length of the firearm and allows it to be easily concealed and quickly maneuvered.
III. DISCUSSION
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (f), the government may seek pretrial detention if the circumstances of a particular case involve (1) a crime of violence; (2) a maximum sentence of life imprisonment or death; (3) a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more in certain drug offenses; (4) two or more felony offenses which fit the foregoing criteria; (5) a risk of flight or (6) a serious risk of obstruction of justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (f)(1) and (2)
When the government moves for pretrial detention, the court must first determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the defendant is eligible for pretrial detention. To do this, the court must inquire whether one of the six circumstances described above exists. See United States v. Campbell, 28 F. Supp.2d 805, 706 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). If one of these grounds does not exist, the court does not have the authority to hold a detention hearing.See United States v. Carter, 996 F. Supp. 260, 261 (W.D.N Y 1998). If any of these conditions do exist, the court must hold a hearing and determine whether any condition or combination of conditions will serve to protect the safety of the community and/or reasonably assure that the defendant appears for trial.See id.; see also United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1988)
In this case, the government claims that the defendant is eligible for pretrial detention because he is charged with a crime of violence. The government further contends that, in light of the defendant's particular characteristics, there is no condition or combination of conditions that will ensure the safety of the community if he is released.
The defendant's opposition to the government's motion is threefold. First, he asserts that the government cannot seek his pretrial detention because when the government made its initial motion, it did not specify which of the six statutory grounds enumerated in 3142(f) renders him eligible for detention. Second, he contends that the crime for which he is charged, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1) (possession of a weapon by a convicted felon), is not a crime of violence and therefore, as a matter of law, he is not eligible for detention. Finally, he claims that the government failed to establish that he presents a danger to the community. Each of the defendant's claims will be addressed in turn.
A. Timeliness of the Government's Motion
At the time of the defendant's initial presentment, the government filed a written motion for pretrial detention claiming only that the defendant presented a danger to the community. The government did not specify under which of the six statutory grounds for detention the defendant was eligible for detention. The defendant now claims the government's failure deprives this court of jurisdiction to hold a detention hearing.
In its brief filed on November 29, 1999, the government amended its motion for detention and asserted that detention is warranted because the defendant is charged with a crime of violence; see 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (f)(1)(A); and because he is a danger to the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (f). The government cites United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 993 (2d Cir. 1986), for the proposition that it may amend its motion to include the requisite allegations with specificity and, in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, its initial failure to do so does not deprive this court of authority to conduct a detention hearing.
the November 22, 1999 detention hearing, the government claimed it sought detention because there was a serious risk that the defendant would obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice by threatening, injuring or intimidating a prospective witness. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (f)(2)(B). The government abandoned this claim at the December 2, 1999 hearing.
In Melendez-Carrion, the Second Circuit declined to reverse an order of pretrial detention where the government failed to identify with specificity the grounds under which it sought detention because the defendants were able to challenge fully the government's general motion for detention by disputing its evidence of dangerousness and risk of flight. See id.
Similarly, in the instant case, the defendant was able to challenge fully the government's request for detention. The court cannot credit the defendant's claim that he was not given adequate notice of the basis of the government's request for detention; the defendant anticipated that the basis of the government's request was that he was charged with a crime of violence. He fully researched and argued the issue in the memorandum submitted in support of his motion for pretrial release. See doc. #30. The court is not persuaded that the government's initial failure to specify this ground has caused the defendant to suffer any prejudice in arguing for his release.
In addition to having the opportunity to fully brief the legal issues presented by the government's motion for detention, the defendant also had the opportunity to contest the government's factual contentions. His attorney was adept at cross-examining the government's witnesses and made an articulate and sound argument that the defendant's conduct did not render him a danger to the community.
Moreover, the defendant was unable to point to, nor can the court imagine, any specific instance of prejudice that he suffered from the government's failure to specify that it sought detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (f)(1)(A). Because the defendant has not suffered any prejudice, the government's amended motion will be considered by the court.
B. Crime of Violence
The court now turns to the issue of whether the defendant is charged with conduct that makes him eligible for pretrial detention; in other words, the court must determine whether the defendant is charged with one of the statutory grounds enumerated in § 3142(f). Here, the government argues that the defendant is eligible for detention because he is charged with a "crime of violence." The defendant maintains that the offense with which he is charged is not a crime of violence. Therefore, he argues, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the government's motion. The court disagrees.
The Second Circuit has yet to rule on the issue of whether the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm is a crime of violence within the meaning of the Bail Reform Act. There is a split of authority among the courts that have ruled. The only reported circuit court decision, United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1999), holds that a felon in possession charge is not a crime of violence as that term is defined in the Bail Reform Act. On the other hand, there are a number of district court cases which conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1) is a crime of violence. See e.g. United States v. Campbell, 28 F. Supp.2d 805 (felon in possession is a crime of violence); United States v. Johnson, 704 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (same);United States v. Butler, 165 F.R.D. 68 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (same);United States v. Sloan, 820 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (same); United States v. Aiken, 775 F. Supp. 855 (D. Md. 1991) (same)
In order to reach the issue, the court must first determine the meaning of the term "crime of violence" as it is used in the Bail Reform Act. A "crime of violence" is defined in the Act as:
(A) an offense that has an element of the offense the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,
(B) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. . .18 U.S.C. § 3156 (a)(4). Subsection (B) is the provision at issue here.
A reading of Subsection (B) raises the question of whether the "nature" of the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm is one that carries a "substantial risk" of violence "in the course of committing the offense." There are different methodologies that have been employed to make this analysis. Courts that have ruled on this issue have applied either a "categorical" or "case-by-case" approach. Under the "categorical approach," a court looks only to the intrinsic nature of the offense as it is defined by statute and does not consider any of the facts surrounding the particular alleged offense. See United States v. Carter, 996 F. Supp. 260, 263 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). On the other hand, under the "case-by-case" approach, courts look to the defendant's actual conduct to determine whether the charged offense is a crime of violence. See id.
The court is persuaded that the categorical approach is the appropriate one. Most courts that have encountered this issue prefer the categorical approach. See id. (collecting cases).
The categorical methodology is
consistent with the statutory scheme. For one thing, § 3156(a)(4) refers to "the element[s] of the offense" and whether the offense "by its nature" involves a risk of physical force. Those terms suggest that the court should look to the statutory definition of the offense rather than the particular facts of the case.United States v. Campbell, 28 F. Supp.2d 805, 807 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)
Among those courts that apply the categorical approach, there is a difference of opinion as to whether being a felon in possession of a firearm is a crime of violence within the meaning of the Bail Reform Act. See e.g., United States v. Singleton, 198 F.3d 7 (holding that felon in possession is not a crime of violence); United States v. Gloster, 969 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1997) (same); United States v. Powell, 813 F. Supp. 903 (D. Mass. 1992) (same); cf. United States v. Campbell, 28 F. Supp.2d 805 (felon in possession is a crime of violence); United States v. Johnson, 704 F. Supp. 1398 (same); United States v. Butler, 165 F.R.D. 68 (same); United States v. Sloan, 820 F. Supp. 1133 (same); United States v. Aiken, 775 F. Supp. 855 (same).
There are many district court cases that address this issue, both reported and unreported; this list is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all reported decisions but is only illustrative of the split of authority.
There is only one reported decision at the circuit court level. In United States v. Singleton, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that "the plain meaning of the Bail Reform Act excludes felon-in-possession offenses from the category of violent crimes that trigger detention hearings." 182 F.3d at 9. The Singleton court, applying the "categorical approach," concluded that "nothing inherent in a § 922(g) offense creates a "substantial risk' of violence warranting pretrial detention." Id. at 15. The court rejected the government's argument that convicted felons who possess firearms are prone to violence and would be inclined to use a firearm during a violent incident. See id. at 14. The court also rejected the government's contention that the legislative histories of sections 3142 and 922(g) support a finding that being a felon in possession of a firearm is a crime of violence. See id. at 15.
By contrast, in United States v. Campbell, 28 F. Supp.2d 805, Chief Judge Larimer concluded that being a felon in possession of a firearm is a crime of violence. In reaching that conclusion, the court reasoned:
Although simple possession of a firearm may not be violent in a literal sense, the court must look to the statutory definition of "crime of violence." The statute does not require actual violence in the commonly understood sense of the word. Instead, it requires only that the offense be a felony that, "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force" may be used. 18 U.S.C. § 3156 (a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). For a number of reasons, I find that the unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon inherently poses such a risk.
First, this conclusion is consonant with Congress's intent, for "[t]he history of the firearm laws reveals the strong congressional conviction that an armed felon poses a substantial threat to all members of society". United States v. O'Neal, 937 F.2d 1369, 1375 (9th Cir. 1990); [ United States v. Philips, 732 F. Supp. [255], 264 [(D. Mass. 1990)] ("Congress prohibited the possession of firearms by felons because it believed that possession of a firearm is particularly dangerous when it is by a convicted felon"). The passage of the Bail Reform Act likewise indicates Congress's belief in this regard. Congress sought to "address the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on release [.]" S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3187. Congress also found that "there is a small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants as to whom neither the imposition . . . of stringent release conditions nor the prospect of revocation of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or other persons." Id. at 6-7, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3189. Congress "concluded that pretrial detention is a necessary and constitutional mechanism for incapacitating, pending trial, a reasonably identifiable group of defendants who would pose a serious risk to the safety of others if released." Id. at 10; reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3192-93. See also United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 890 (8th Cir. 1985) ("The Bail Reform Act of 1984 . . . was a legislative response to growing public concern over increased crime and defendants released on bail"); [ United States v.] Johnson, 704 F. Supp. [1398,] 1400 (E.D. Mich. 1988)] ("Congressional intent to expand the "crime of violence' concept . . . is clearly evident in the legislative history")
It is certainly reasonable to conclude that a felon who is unlawfully possessing a firearm poses a significant risk to others in the community. For one thing, felons will generally have been made aware by the courts, parole officers and others that it is unlawful for them to possess firearms. "Thus, when a felon chooses to possess a firearm, it must be presumed he does so in conscious disregard of the law." [ United States v.] Washington, 907 F. Supp. [476,] 485 [(D. D.C. 1995)]; see also [ United States v.]Jones, 651 F. Supp. [1309,] 1310 [E.D. Mich. 1987)] ("the court assumes that most convicted felons are aware of the law forbidding them from possessing firearms. There is accordingly good reason to fear that such a person would be likely to disregard laws prohibiting crimes of violence as well.
It is equally reasonable to infer that a person who has been convicted of a felony, yet is in unlawful possession of a firearm, is more likely to use that firearm in the course of committing a crime. The combination of the fact that the person has committed a felony in the past, and that he is knowingly violating the law by possessing a firearm, is some indication that the person is criminally inclined. The logical inference to draw from his possession of a firearm, then, is that he contemplates using it at some point.Id. at 808-09 (footnote omitted)
This court is persuaded that Campbell is correct in holding that the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm is a crime of violence as that term is defined in the Bail Reform Act. By its nature, the offense poses a substantial risk that physical force may be used. The court is persuaded that a substantial risk of physical force exists when a felon unlawfully possesses a firearm because it is likely that he will use the firearm. See United States v. Aiken, 775 F. Supp. 855, 856-57 (D. Md. 1991) ("there is an increased risk that a criminally-inclined individual will be more likely to use a firearm already in his possession to commit another crime.") This conclusion is bolstered by the Congressional intent behind both the firearm laws and the Bail Reform Act. See Campbell, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
The court now turns to the issue of whether the government has demonstrated that the defendant is a danger to the community.
IV. DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY
The government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is a danger to the community. See United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405-06 (2d Cir. 1985). In determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the safety of the community, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (g) requires the court to take into account available information concerning (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence; (2) the weight of evidence; (3) the defendant's history and characteristics, including his character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, record of appearance at court proceedings and whether at the time of the current offense or arrest, the defendant was on probation on parole or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under federal, state, or local law; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (g).
The court finds that the information introduced at the detention hearing in this case establishes the following facts by clear and convincing evidence.
1. Nature and Circumstances of Offense Charged
The defendant is charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1). As explained above, the court determines that the defendant is charged with a crime of violence.
2. Weight of Evidence Against the Defendant
The case against the defendant is very strong. The government has shown that-there is an eyewitness who observed the defendant firing at least two of the seized weapons on the day in question. In addition, numerous police officers observed many of the events giving rise to these charges. Further, the weapons were seized from the defendant's residence.
3. History and Characteristics of the Defendant
The defendant, age 50, has lived in Connecticut his entire life. He now resides with his 81 year old mother at her home in Woodbridge, Connecticut. He has three siblings who reside in Connecticut. The defendant's mother appeared at the detention hearing but none of his other family members were present. The defendant's mother offered cash for a bond but would not pledge her home as security for a bond. None of the defendant's other family members offered to sign a bond.
The defendant has been married and divorced twice and has two or three children. The defendant is currently engaged to a woman known only as "Sue." "Sue" did not appear at the hearing, nor did she offer to sign a bond.
There is some confusion as to the number of the defendant's children. The defendant has two adult children by his first marriage. Those children were raised by the defendant's siblings. A third child was born during the defendant's second marriage. The Updated Pretrial Services Report states that the parentage of the defendant's third child is uncertain. See Updated Pretrial Services Report, December 2, 1999, p. 2.
The defendant reports that he operates his late father's remodeling business, but the pretrial services officer was unable to confirm whether the business is active. The defendant also said that he is employed as a "researcher" and that he spends a considerable amount of time researching various legal issues for himself as well as for others. See doc. #22, pp. 5-11. He lacks any significant financial resources.
The defendant denies any history of drug or alcohol abuse. His mother, however, reported to the pretrial services officer that the defendant sometimes abuses alcohol. She added that he is "fine when he is not drinking." Updated Pretrial Services Report, December 2, 1999, p. 1.
The defendant has a lengthy history of involvement with law enforcement authorities. His many arrests date back thirty years. The government offered evidence, through proffer, of the defendant's criminal history.
In 1970, the defendant was arrested for aggravated assault after he grabbed a woman by the throat. (The outcome of these charges is unknown.) In 1977, he was convicted of larceny. In 1980, he was convicted of carrying a loaded weapon in his car. In 1968, 1981, 1988 and 1989, he was arrested for breach of the peace. In 1992, the defendant was indicted by a federal grand jury in Connecticut and charged with seven firearms offenses. See Docket No. 92CR38 (WWE). He pleaded guilty to two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g). He was sentenced to an effective sentence of 33 months in jail and 3 years of supervised release. At the time of the incidents which form the basis of this indictment, the defendant had been free from his term of supervised release for less than 10 months.
A review of the 1992 indictment reflects that in addition to the convictions mentioned above, the defendant also was convicted in state court in 1989 of felony possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle. In addition, the government represented at the detention hearing that during the time that the defendant was awaiting trial in federal court in the 1992 prosecution, he was held in pretrial detention.
On two prior occasions, the defendant engaged in behavior that is strikingly similar to that in the instant offense. Details of these prior incidents were introduced at the detention hearing. A summary follows.
On October 14, 1988 the Woodbridge Police Department received a report of gunshots being fired on Penny Lane in Woodbridge. Sergeant Cappiello responded to the scene and found the defendant in his vehicle. He approached the defendant and smelled alcohol on his breath and observed him staggering. Upon searching the defendant's vehicle, the officers found a .44 magnum handgun, ammunition, Ku Klux Klan regalia and documents, and a false ID bearing the defendant's picture. At least one spent shell casing was found in the immediate area surrounding the vehicle. The defendant admitted to firing his weapon into a nearby wooded area. He was charged with driving under the influence, unlawful possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle, unlawful discharge of a weapon and refusal to be fingerprinted.
The defendant was arrested again on June 10, 1989. On that date, the Woodbridge Police were called to the defendant's neighborhood to investigate a complaint that gunshots were fired on the defendant's street. While the responding officers were investigating the complaint, they heard shots fired from the Connolly home. Upon approaching the residence, the officers heard a gun being cocked and called out to the defendant to put down his weapon. The defendant did not respond and instead, fired his weapon again several more times. The defendant was arrested a short time later and the house was searched. Four guns were found. The arresting officers noted that there were several homes in the direction where the shots were fired. The defendant was charged with reckless endangerment, breach of peace and the unlawful discharge of a firearm.
In addition to having a long criminal history, the defendant has demonstrated a lack of respect for the criminal justice system. At his initial appearance, in open court, the defendant declared that this court did not have jurisdiction over him. He explained, "some time ago, she] rescinded all rights, benefits and citizenship from the United States." Doc. #19, p 7. Therefore, he believed, the government could not charge him with a crime, nor could this court maintain jurisdiction over him. See id. It is apparent that a court order setting forth conditions of release will have little or no meaning to him.
4. Nature and Seriousness of Danger
The defendant is charged with committing a serious offense. Over the course of the last 19 years, the defendant has been arrested at least five times for the misuse or illegal possession of firearms. In 1992, he pleaded guilty to two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm — the same charge he faces in the instant case.
The defendant's criminal conduct and lack of respect for authority appears to be escalating with each incident. During the 1980 and 1988 incidents, it appears that the police recovered only one weapon. During the 1989 incident, police seized four firearms. After his final arrest, a search of the defendant's home revealed that he possessed ten weapons, several of which were assault weapons. Moreover, at the time of this last arrest, the defendant locked himself in his house, refused to surrender for a number of hours and threatened the lives of police officers.
It is evident that the defendant is unwilling and/or unable to comply with the laws that forbid his possession of firearms, that he lacks respect for authority, and that he acts recklessly and impulsively. He has little regard for the safety of those in his community. The court concludes that he presents a danger to the community.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on all the above, the court finds that there is no condition or combination of conditions that will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community. He shall be detained pending trial.
SO ORDERED.
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut this 23rd day of December, 1999.