Opinion
Criminal Action 05-563 Civil Action 16-3435
09-06-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JUAN COLON JUAN COLON v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MEMORANDUM
GERALD AUSTIN MCHUGH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Petitioner Juan Colon moves to correct his criminal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. No. 05-563, ECF 189. He argues that his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) must be vacated because his predicate offenses - Hobbs Act robberies - were not “crimes of violence” as defined by § 924(c). Because the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Stoney, 62 F.4th 108 (3d Cir. 2023) squarely forecloses this argument, I will deny the motion.
In 2006, Mr. Colon was convicted and sentenced on four counts of completed Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, id., and two counts of brandishing a firearm in the commission of those offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). No. 05563, ECF 133.
Section 924(c) applies to defendants who use or carry a firearm in the commission of a “crime of violence.” In 2016, Colon moved to vacate his § 924(c) convictions, arguing that completed Hobbs Act robbery is not a predicate crime of violence because it satisfies neither the “residual” nor the “element-of-force” clause of the statute.
Mr. Colon also argues that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence, but I need not address this issue. Colon does not dispute that his § 924(c) convictions were also predicated upon completed Hobbs Act robberies, see ECF 189 at 1, which the Third Circuit has now confirmed are crimes of violence.
Colon first argues that § 924(c)'s “residual clause” is unconstitutionally vague given the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). In 2019, while this motion was still pending, the Supreme Court adopted Colon's view and invalidated § 924(c)'s residual clause in United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019). Notably, however, Davis did not disturb § 924(c)'s “element-of-force” clause.
The residual clause defines a crime of violence as a felony “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B).
Next, Mr. Colon contends that the element-of-force clause is also inapplicable to Hobbs Act robbery. Under the element-of-force clause, a felony is considered a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).
In applying this clause, courts employ the “categorical approach,” by which “[t]he only relevant question is whether the federal felony at issue always requires the government to prove - beyond a reasonable doubt, as an element of its case - the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.” United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022). The facts of the case are irrelevant to this inquiry. Id.
Judge Dubois had stayed resolution of the motion pending further developments in the law. In September 2021, this case was transferred to me. At the request of the Government, I continued to withhold action on Colon's motion until the Third Circuit could issue guidance on whether Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under § 924(c). As the government notes in its responsive brief, ECF 212, the Third Circuit finally answered this question in United States v. Stoney, holding that “a completed Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A).” 62 F.4th 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2023). This decision undermines Mr. Colon's ability to argue that a completed Hobbs Act robbery cannot serve as a predicate crime of violence for a conviction under § 924(c). I therefore see no legal basis for Colon's requested relief and must deny his motion.
Mr. Colon is currently on supervised release under the jurisdiction of the District of Maryland.
An appropriate order follows.