Therefore, Amendment 782 applied to all grouped counts, whether—viewed independently and in isolation from the other counts—they were drug offenses or firearm offenses. See United States v. Collazo-Santiago , 637 F. App'x 951, 952 (7th Cir. 2016) (firearm sentence eligible for reduction because firearm conviction under Section 922(g)(1) grouped with drug conviction under § 3D1.4 and therefore was "based on" guideline range that was subsequently lowered); United States v. Alvira-Sanchez , 804 F.3d 488, 491 n.1, 495–96 (1st Cir. 2015) (Amendment 782 reduced sentencing range on drug counts and grouped firearm count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(4) which required consecutive sentence but did not require term of imprisonment); see also United States v. Torres , 856 F.3d 1095, 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 2017) (after grouping under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c), "the money-laundering offense level was entirely dependent on the drug-trafficking" offense level; because " Section 3582(c)(2) refers specifically to sentencing range, not any given offense," "[i]f a reduction was appropriate for the drug-trafficking offense levels [under Amendment 782], then it was appropriate for [the] money-laundering [offense] as well"). In its brief, even the government con
Again, Crayton faces the problem that criminal judgments are generally final and non-retroactive. Accord United States v. Diaz, 838 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2016) 9 (“When a state grants post-conviction relief to a defendant with respect to his state felony conviction, we do not generally apply those changes retroactively for purposes of determining whether a federal sentencing statute’s requirements are met.”); United States v. Collazo-Santiago, 637 F. App’x 951, 953 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[Defendant] also argues that the district court should have vacated his firearm conviction because the state felony on which it was based was reduced to a misdemeanor before sentencing. But this argument is inappropriate in a § 3582(c) proceeding, which does not permit a full resentencing, let alone a redetermination of guilt.”); see also United States v. Aguilar-Cortez, No. 2:95-CR-20-01 WBS, 2021 WL 492876, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2021), reconsideration denied, No. 2:95-CR-20 WBS, 2021 WL 949632 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2021) (“California’s reclassification of the crime of which defendant was convicted from a felony to a misdemeanor, long after his state and federal convictions became final, does not amount to an extraordinary and compelling reason to warrant reduction of defendant’s sentence under the compassionate release statute.”
Other than an appeal, "the only source of authority to fix a substantive error in reducing a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) is Rule 35(a), which permits action only within 14 days." United States v. Collazo-Santiago, 637 F. App'x 951, 953 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Newman, 794 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 2015)); see also United States v. Lebron, 598 F. App'x 817, 818 (3d Cir. 2015). "This time limit is a 'strict' jurisdictional requirement, ...'such that a district court lacks authority to act under the Rule outside this period.'"
His two drug convictions were grouped together for offense level calculation, so both sentences are likely eligible for a reduction. United States v. Collazo-Santiago, 637 F. App'x 951, 952 (7th Cir. 2016). Based on the drug tables in Section 2D1.1 of the Guidelines at the time of Hines' sentencing and an adjustment not at issue, Hines had an offense level of 16 and an advisory range of 46 to 57 months for each count. Under the friendlier version of the Guidelines now in force, Hines would have an offense level of 14 and an advisory range of 37 to 46 months for each count. If all things were equal, then, Hines would be entitled to some reduction in his sentences.