Opinion
Criminal Action No. 21-210 (RDM)
2023-11-01
UNITED STATES of America, v. James COLEMAN, Defendant.
Angela Nichole Buckner, Meredith Erin Mayer-Dempsey, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office DOJ/USAO, Washington, DC, for United States of America. Kevin Jesse McCants, McCants Firm, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Angela Nichole Buckner, Meredith Erin Mayer-Dempsey, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office DOJ/USAO, Washington, DC, for United States of America.
Kevin Jesse McCants, McCants Firm, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
RANDOLPH D. MOSS, United States District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant James Coleman's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. Dkt. 83. Because Coleman has not demonstrated any defect in his plea or provided any other cognizable ground for withdrawing it, the Court will DENY his motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Coleman is charged with numerous offenses related to his alleged—and, per his plea, now admitted—sex trafficking of a minor ("MV-1"). Dkt. 71 (Retyped Superseding Indictment). The operative indictment includes thirteen counts: Sex Trafficking Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), 1594(a), (c); Sex Trafficking of Children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); three counts of Production of Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); Possession of Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); Sex Trafficking by Force, Fraud, and Coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1); three counts of First Degree Child Sexual Abuse, in violation of D.C. Code § 22-3008; Kidnapping While Armed, in violation of D.C. Code §§ 22-2001, 22-4502; and two counts of Assault with a Dangerous Weapon, in violation of D.C. Code § 22-402. Dkt. 71.
The government initially charged, but later dropped, one count of Coercion and Enticement of Minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2442(b). Dkt. 33 at 3; Min. Order (May 6, 2022); Dkt. 71.
According to the factual proffer offered and approved at the plea hearing, Coleman and Taiwan William sex trafficked MV-1, then a fourteen-year-old girl who had recently "disappeared" from her home, over the course of several weeks in June and July 2020. Dkt. 73 at 4. Among other
things, Coleman worked with Williams to post commercial sex advertisements featuring MV-1, id. at 4, told her what name to use ("Brooke"), id. at 5, told her "to tell people that she was 21 years old," id., "instructed her to always use a condom when engaging in commercial sex," id., "gave her instructions about how much to charge for sexual services," id., and collected payment for MV-1's sexual services, id. at 5-6. Coleman also created pornographic photographs and video recordings of MV-1, including videos in which he engaged in sex acts with MV-1. Id. at 6-7. By the time that Coleman began trafficking MV-1, he had seen an online missing person flier that included her photo and date of birth. Id. at 6. Coleman discussed the flier with Williams, exchanging text messages that indicated their awareness that MV-1 was a minor, and, at one point, Coleman told Williams that he would no longer work with her. Id. But before long, he set aside any reservations and asked Williams to put the advertisements back online. Id.
On or about July 13, 2020, Coleman and MV-1 got into an argument after MV-1 refused to give Coleman the money she had received for engaging in commercial sex acts. Id. at 7. The dispute escalated, and Coleman punched MV-1 in the face, ripped off her clothes, and threw her out of the apartment in which they were living. Id. at 7-8. This was Coleman and MV-1's last interaction, although "[a] few days later" Coleman "had a general conversation" with Williams "about partnering as 'pimps,'" and "Williams then reached out to MV-1 and began trafficking her." Id. at 8.
On May 17, 2022, Coleman pleaded guilty to one count each of Conspiracy to Engage in Sex Trafficking of a Minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1594(c), 1591(a)(1); Production of Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2551(a); and First Degree Child Sexual Abuse, in violation of D.C. Code § 22-3008—Counts One, Four, and Eight of the retyped superseding indictment, respectively. Dkt. 72 at 1 (Plea Agreement). As part of the plea, he signed the government's proposed proffer of proof, which stated that "[h]ad the matter gone to trial, the government's evidence would have shown, beyond a reasonable doubt," all of the facts recounted in the proffer. Dkt. 73 at 3-4. He attested that he had read the proffer, had discussed it "fully with [his] attorney," "fully underst[ood] the proffer and ... acknowledge[d] its truthfulness" and "accept[ed] it without reservation," did so "voluntarily and of [his] own free will," and was not "under the influence of anything that could impede [his] ability to understand [the] proffer fully." Id. at 10.
Coleman's plea hearing occurred over the course of an entire day—from approximately 10:00 a.m. to approximately 5:30 p.m. Dkt. 82 at 1, 94 (Hrg. Tr.). Coleman was inquisitive and engaged throughout. When the government first described the terms of the plea offer, Coleman's attorney asked if the Court would explain to Coleman "how supervised release works." Id. at 3. The Court did so in detail, and Coleman affirmed that he understood. Id. at 6. Coleman then asked for additional time to confer with his attorney, so the Court adjourned the hearing for twenty-five minutes to ensure that "Mr. Coleman has the opportunity to make a really knowing and considered decision about how he wants to proceed." Id. at 7.
After these further discussions, Coleman —not his attorney—asked the Court about a pending motion to suppress evidence from his cell phone, inquiring specifically about what was necessary to support probable cause and what weight a judge could place on the statements of a victim in
assessing a warrant application. Id. at 8-9. The Court discussed these concepts with Coleman and then agreed to step off the bench to review the relevant caselaw and to hold a suppression hearing, so that Coleman could make his plea decision knowing whether evidence from his cell phone would be admitted at trial. Id. at 11. The Court held the hearing an hour later, ultimately denying Coleman's motion. Id. at 12-30. Only at this point did Coleman indicate that he wanted to plead guilty. Id. at 30-31.
Coleman remained highly attentive and engaged during the plea colloquy that followed. Through his attorney, he asked whether certain cell phones that the plea agreement required him to forfeit could be returned to his family instead. Id. at 36-37. Then, after the government read the proffer of proof into the record, Coleman objected that some of the recited facts were untrue. Id. at 54. To resolve Coleman's concerns, the parties spent ninety minutes reviewing and negotiating revised language, and Coleman signed off on several line edits to the proffer. Id. at 57-59. The government then read the entire revised proffer into the record a second time. Id. at 59-66. At that point, Coleman affirmed to the Court three separate times that he had "read carefully through the Government's proffer of proof" and that "everything [the government attorney] just said [was] true." Id. at 67-69.
And that was not the end of Coleman's active participation. When the Court described the potential sentence Coleman might face if he plead guilty, Coleman again asked whether it was necessary for the government to forfeit a cell phone that belonged to a relative, id. at 83-84; see also id. at 36-37, and also requested that the Court clarify what it meant for multiple sentences to "run concurrently," id. at 81.
Coleman's focus on the details of his case, the plea agreement, and the facts to which he was admitting was, based on the Court's experience, exceptional. And even apart from the exceptional, Coleman affirmed what every defendant who pleads guilty must: among other things, Coleman averred that he was "fully satisfied with the services" of his lawyer, id. at 40; that he had reviewed the plea agreement with his attorney and understood everything in it, id. at 69-70; that he understood the rights he was agreeing to waive, the available sentences, and the parties' preliminary assessment of how the sentencing guidelines would apply, id. at 40-45, 70-80; that he had not recently consumed any alcohol, drugs, or other medicines that could "affect [his] ability to understand what [he was] doing by pleading guilty," id. at 38; that no one had "promised or suggested" that he was "guaranteed a lighter sentence" "merely because [he was] pleading guilty," id. at 85; that no one had made "any promises to [him] in connection with [the] guilty plea other than those in the plea agreement itself," id. at 86; and that he was "entering th[e] plea of guilty voluntarily, of [his] own free will, because [he was] guilty and for no other reason," id. at 89.
Most significantly for present purposes, when the Court asked Coleman whether he had ever been treated for mental illness, Coleman responded that he had been treated for "bipolar, manic depression, ADHD, PTSD, and ADD" but that he had not taken his prescribed medications in approximately three months. Id. at 38-39. This exchange followed:
The Court: So let me ask you this: Because you have these conditions of bipolar, manic depression, ADHD, ADD, PTSD, would any of that affect your ability to make ... an informed and knowing and voluntary decision about whether to accept a plea or not?
Coleman: No.
The Court: And do you feel as though you're in a position today psychologically where you can make a judgment about something so important?
Coleman: Yes, sir.
The Court: Okay. Any follow up questions that either the government or defense counsel would like me to ask with respect to Mr. Coleman's mental conditions?
[The Government]: No, Your Honor, not from the government.
[Defense Counsel]: And not from the defense, Your Honor.
Id. at 39. Finding Coleman's assurances convincing, the Court continued with the hearing. Id. Coleman, after all, had already inquired about particular issues of probable cause and reserved his decision whether to plead guilty until after he knew the fate of his suppression motion—hardly the behavior of someone unable to make a knowing and intelligent decision about his case. Id. at 12-30.
It was nearly seven months later that Coleman first indicated that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea in a letter to the Court. Dkt. 81. Because he had undergone a psychosexual evaluation for purposes of sentencing and separately requested a continuance, he had not been (and still has not been) sentenced. Min. Order (Aug. 1, 2022); Min. Order (Sept. 21, 2022). At a hearing several days later, Coleman reiterated his desire to withdraw his plea. Dec. 13, 2022 Hrg. Tr. (Rough at 2). Coleman's attorney explained that the government had initially offered to allow Coleman to plead to a charge with a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence of incarceration, but that he had declined the offer. Id. The government's revised offer—which Coleman ultimately accepted—included a charge with a fifteen-year mandatory minimum, Production of Child Pornography. Id.; Dkt. 72; 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). According to Coleman's lawyer, Coleman regretted declining the initial plea offer and wished to be given an opportunity to accept that offer instead. Dec. 13, 2022 Hrg. Tr. (Rough at 2). The government responded that, even if Coleman were permitted to withdraw his guilty plea—which the government would oppose—it did not anticipate reviving the ten-year offer and might not even reoffer him the fifteen-year plea. Id. at 3. Undeterred, Coleman formally moved to withdraw his plea on January 13, 2023. Dkt. 83.
II. ANALYSIS
"A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing if he can 'show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.'" United States v. West, 392 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B)). Courts weigh three considerations when determining whether to permit a defendant to withdraw his plea: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a viable claim of innocence; (2) whether the delay between the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw has substantially prejudiced the government's ability to prosecute the case; and (3) whether the guilty plea was somehow tainted." United States v. Hanson, 339 F.3d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). The last factor is "the most important" of the three and "usually requires a showing that the taking of the plea did not conform to the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11." West, 392 F.3d at 455. "[A] defendant who fails to show some error under Rule 11 has to shoulder an extremely heavy burden if he is ultimately to prevail." United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1208 (D.C. Cir.
1995). So heavy, in fact, that the D.C. Circuit remarked some years ago that whether a defendant's plea was tainted had been "the determinative factor in all of [its plea withdrawal] decisions to date." Id. at 1208.
A. Whether Coleman's Guilty Plea was Tainted
Coleman's only argument on the paramount issue of taint is that his failure to take his mental-health medications impacted "his ability to make rational choices in his decision whether to" plead guilty or go to trial. Dkt. 83 at 4. As the Court understands it, Coleman essentially contends that at the time he pleaded guilty, he did not do so "competently and intelligently," as the law requires. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). Assessing a defendant's competency to plead guilty requires the same inquiry as does an assessment of whether the defendant is competent to stand trial: that is, an assessment of "whether the defendant has 'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and has 'a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'" Id. (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam)). The inquiry does not end there, however: "In addition to determining that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty ... is competent, a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary." Id. at 400, 113 S.Ct. 2680 (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992)). As explained below, the Court is unpersuaded that Coleman's guilty plea was "tainted" in either respect.
As recounted above, after Coleman informed the Court that he had not taken his medication, the Court questioned him and his counsel about whether he was nevertheless in a position to make a knowing and voluntary decision on a matter of such importance. Dkt. 82 at 39 (Hrg. Tr.). Coleman assured the Court that he was. Id. The Court then asked Coleman whether he felt that was in "position today psychologically where [he could] make a judgment about something so important" as entering a guilty plea. Id. Coleman, again, answered "yes." Id. And, when the Court asked Coleman's counsel and the government's counsel whether any further inquiry was warranted, they agreed that nothing further was required. Id. But, even more importantly, Coleman's conduct and demeanor throughout the lengthy hearing demonstrated that he was competent. He consulted freely and extensively with his lawyer and the Court. He demonstrated a rational understanding of the law, facts, the nature of the proceedings, his rights, and the consequences of the plea. Again and again, Coleman demonstrated his engagement with and comprehension of the issues, among them probable cause, forfeiture, and the minutiae of the facts to which he was admitting. Dkt. 82 at 8-30, 36-37, 57-67. He asked questions that led to an impromptu suppression hearing, id. at 8-30, took considerable time editing the proffer, id. at 46-57, asked about the government's proposed forfeiture order, id. at 36-37, 81-82, and, over the course of the day, spent hours conferring with his attorney. Neither Coleman nor his attorney ever suggested or even hinted, in words or otherwise, that he had any difficulty "consult[ing] with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" or that he lacked "a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788.
Coleman was not merely lucid, he was unusually attentive and diligent.
Nor does the Court have any doubt that Coleman made a knowing and voluntary decision to waive his constitutional and statutory rights and to enter a plea of guilty. See Parke, 506 U.S. at 28-29, 113 S.Ct. 517. Under the penalty of perjury, he repeatedly avowed that he understood his rights, and, when he had questions, he asked. See, e.g., 40-46. To take just one example, before agreeing to plead guilty, Coleman asked the Court whether "hearsay" was sufficient to establish probable cause or whether some form of corroboration was required. Dkt. 82 at 9; see also id. at 8 ("If I say—using my lawyer as an example, if I say he committed a crime, is that sufficient enough for a search warrant?"). When Coleman disagreed with factual assertions, moreover, he pushed back and requested changes to his written proffer. See, e.g., id. at 55.
In short, nothing about Coleman's conduct during the rest of the hearing raised any doubt about his Coleman capacity, understanding, or volition. So much so, that at the hearing's close the Court said to Coleman: "I appreciate your paying attention to what was going on here, and where you disagreed with something, letting us know and making sure you understood your rights .... I am glad that we took the time to make sure that you were comfortable with where we ended up." Id. at 94-95. Coleman has presented no evidence to the contrary. He called no witnesses at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, presented no evidence that mental illness or his failure to take prescribed medications rendered him unable to consult with his lawyer or to make a rational, knowing, and voluntary decision to plead guilty, and did not testify himself. See generally May 19, 2023 Hrg. Tr. It is his burden to demonstrate that his plea was flawed, and he has not carried that burden. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B).
Other courts have rejected motions to withdraw pleas in analogous circumstances, affirming that "[e]ven if suffering from a [mental health] disease, a defendant's plea is valid if the record demonstrates that he understood the charges against him, was not dissatisfied with the services rendered by his attorney, and entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily." United States v. Rollins, 552 F.3d 739, 741-42 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord United States v. Gauger, 534 F. App'x 758, 761 (10th Cir. 2013) ("The presence of some degree of mental disorder in the defendant does not necessarily mean that he is incompetent to knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea." (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In United States v. Alfadhili, 762 F. App'x 264 (6th Cir. 2019), for example, the defendant had been diagnosed with "bi-polar disorder, PTSD, and depression" and at his plea hearing said that he had not taken his medication for several days and, as a result, "was suffering from 'real bad anxiety' and insomnia." Id. at 268. The court accepted his plea all the same, and the Sixth Circuit found no error. Id. at 268-69. There, as here, in seeking to withdraw his plea, the defendant "d[id] not explain ... how [his] ailments affected his ability to consult with counsel, assist in his own defense, or understand the proceedings against him, nor d[id] the record reveal any such issues." Id. at 268. And there, as here, the defendant's "ability to answer questions correctly, his ability to read and understand his plea agreement, [and] his affirmance of competency" all demonstrated that his plea was not defective. Id. The level of engagement Coleman demonstrated was, if anything, a good deal more substantial than that which the Alfadhili court found sufficient. Many similar cases support the conclusion that where a defendant's conduct furnished no reason to doubt his competence at the time the court accepted his plea, a bare assertion of incompetence based on mental illness after the fact is not enough to establish that the plea was flawed. See e.g., Gauger, 534 F. App'x at 761-62 (rejecting request to withdraw guilty plea where defendant claimed that his mental health medications had not yet become "fully effective," because the defendant's conduct during the plea hearing gave "no indication that he was suffering from mental disorders or health conditions that would have prevented his plea from being knowingly and voluntarily entered"); United States v. Buckley, 847 F.2d 991, 998-1000 (1st Cir. 1988) (affirming denial of plea withdrawal motion based on asserted mental incompetence where record of plea hearing "suggest[ed] that [the defendant] had no trouble understanding the constitutional rights at issue and that he waived these rights by pleading guilty," because he asked questions of the court and engaged in a dialogue that was "quite sophisticated"); United States v. Murphy, 572 F.3d 563, 567, 569-70 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea where the defendant told the court that he had "anxiety and depression" and was currently not taking medication for those conditions when the defendant there "unequivocally stated (1) he was not on any medication, (2) nothing about his anxiety and depression interfered with his ability to understand the proceedings, (3) he was not under the influence of any drug or alcohol, (4) he fully understood what he was doing at the plea hearing, and (5) he was fully satisfied with his lawyer's representation"); cf. United States v. Caramadre, 807 F.3d 359, 368 (1st Cir. 2015) (explaining that a court "often may satisfy" its "duty to inquire into the effects of the medication" that defendant is taking when accepting a guilty plea by "quer[ying] a defendant about whether the medication... has impaired his ability to understand the proceedings").
Finally, although the Court will not recount the details of Coleman's post-plea psychosexual evaluation, that assessment was consistent with all of the above. It gives the Court no reason to revisit its conclusion—at the plea hearing and to this day—that Coleman competently, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pleaded guilty.
At the motion hearing, Coleman's counsel asserted—for the first time—that Coleman is schizophrenic. May 19, 2023, Hrg. Tr. (Rough at 5). But he offered no evidence whatsoever in support of that claim, and instead merely asserted that Coleman was diagnosed at D.C. Jail in 2019. Id. at 12. Coleman, for his part, mentioned no such thing at his plea colloquy (while under oath) or in his psychosexual evaluation. And the psychosexual evaluation, which contains a thorough discussion of Coleman's mental health conditions and was conducted in 2022, says nothing about a schizophrenia diagnosis. To the contrary, according to the evaluation, Coleman "denied any history of psychotic symptoms, such as hallucinations, delusions, or grossly disorganized thinking or behavior." Coleman Psychosexual Eval. at 5. Absent any evidence that Coleman is schizophrenic beyond the eleventh-hour say-so of his attorney, the Court cannot assume that Coleman is schizophrenic for purposes of resolving this motion. Finally, even if Coleman does suffer from schizophrenia, the Court's observation that he acted rationally, knowingly, and voluntarily at this plea hearing would remain unchanged.
B. Whether Coleman Has Asserted a Viable Claim of Innocence
To establish a viable claim of innocence in this context, a defendant must "affirmatively advance an objectively reasonable argument that he is innocent." West, 392 F.3d at 456 (quoting Cray, 47 F.3d at 1209). Coleman has not done so.
He presses two arguments for the proposition that he lacked the requisite mens rea to commit the offenses, but neither is persuasive.
Coleman's cardinal contention is that he "had not been taking his psychiatric medication previously prescribed for bipolar and depression mental health conditions for months before the crime was committed" and, as a result, his actions reflected "a lack of voluntary choices." Dkt. 83 at 1, 4. Most naturally understood, this argument amounts to an impermissible form of insanity defense.
As way of background, in Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 126 S.Ct. 2709, 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006), the Supreme Court catalogued various state and federal insanity defenses, counting several "strains" of "standards for when to absolve mentally ill defendants of criminal culpability." Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. 271, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1025, 206 L.Ed.2d 312 (2020) (quoting Clark, 548 U.S. at 749, 126 S.Ct. 2709). "The first strain asks about a defendant's 'cognitive capacity'—whether a mental illness left him 'unable to understand what he [was] doing' when he committed a crime." Id. (quoting Clark, 548 U.S. at 747, 749, 126 S.Ct. 2709). "The second examines his 'moral capacity'—whether his illness rendered him 'unable to understand that his action [was] wrong.'" Id. (quoting Clark, 548 U.S. at 749, 126 S.Ct. 2709). Congress adopted a third version, which combines "both ... cognitive incapacity and moral incapacity components" in the governing federal statute. Clark, 548 U.S. at 750, 126 S.Ct. 2709. Under 18 U.S.C. § 17(a):
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
Id. (emphasis added). The statute thus permits an insanity defense only when "as a result of a severe mental disease or defect," the defendant "was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts." 18 U.S.C. § 17(a).
There is, however, another form of the insanity defense that 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) does not recognize: the "volitional incapacity" strain, which asks "whether a defendant's mental illness made him subject to 'irresistible[ ] impulse[s]' or otherwise unable to 'control[ ] his actions.'" Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting Clark, 548 U.S. at 749, 126 S.Ct. 2709). It is that strain that Coleman seems to gesture at here when he argues that his actions reflected "a lack of voluntary choices." Dkt. 83 at 4.
That argument is unsupported by any evidence that Coleman, in fact, lacked the ability to control his actions. But, even disregarding that factual deficiency, the argument fails as a matter of law. "[I]t is clear" from the language of 18 U.S.C. § 17(a)—namely, that except as otherwise provided "[m]ental disease or defect does not ... constitute a defense"—"that Congress meant to eliminate any form of legal excuse based upon one's lack of volitional control," United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1061 (11th Cir. 1990). Lack of volition is distinct from an inability to "appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness" of one's actions, 18 U.S.C. § 17(a). See United States v. Eff, 524 F.3d 712, 719 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that Congress "sought to exclude" this kind of "legal excuse" and thus "deleted the volitional prong of the commonly accepted Model Penal Code approach which had permitted acquittal if the defendant as a result of mental disease or defect ...
lack[ed] substantial capacity ... to conform his conduct to the requirements of law" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Coleman's claim—that he was unable to make "voluntary choices"— constitutes an improper volitional argument.
Moreover, even if the Court were to reframe Coleman's argument as one about "diminished capacity"—i.e., as an argument that, at the time he committed the criminal acts, he lacked the specific intent required by statute because of his mental illness, see United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1995)—he has still failed to establish a viable claim of innocence. A threshold problem is that one of the crimes to which Coleman pleaded guilty, First Degree Child Sexual Abuse, in violation of D.C. Code § 22-3008, is a general-intent offense. See Childress, 58 F.3d at 707 ("In United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980), the Supreme Court ... observed that, '[i]n a general sense, "purpose" corresponds loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent,' ... [where] 'a person who causes a particular result is said to act purposefully if he consciously desires that result.'" (quoting Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404, 100 S.Ct. 624)). The statute states only that "[w]hoever, being at least 4 years older than a child, engages in a sexual act with that child or causes that child to engage in a sexual act" shall have committed the offense. D.C. Code § 22-3008. Diminished capacity evidence may not be used to negate the mens rea of a general-intent crime, see United States v. Rezaq, 918 F. Supp. 463, 469-70 (D.D.C. 1996) (collecting cases), so any claim by Coleman based on diminished capacity could not establish his innocence of First Degree Child Sexual Abuse.
A diminished capacity argument would also fail with respect to the two specific-intent offenses to which Coleman pleaded guilty: Conspiracy to Engage in the Trafficking of a Minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1594(c), 1591(a)(1), and Production of Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Coleman has presented no evidence regarding how his "bipolar [disorder], manic depression, ADHD, PTSD, and ADD," Dkt. 82 at 38-39, negated the specific intent required for these crimes, nor has he even suggested that he could present such evidence were this case to go to trial. Indeed, his entire argument regarding actual innocence occupies only a single sentence: "Coleman's claim of innocence is rooted in his mental health illness, left untreated, amounting to a lack of voluntary choice during the course of the crime spree." Dkt. 83 at 4; see also Dkt. 89 at 2 ("Mr. Coleman clearly has a viable claim of innocence based upon his lack of requisite mental capacity at the time of the offense"). And, at the hearing on Coleman's motion to withdraw his plea, Coleman did not call a single witness, much a witness who could cast doubt on his capacity to form the requisite specific intent to commit the offenses at issue. See generally May 19, 2023 Hrg. Tr.
Coleman's failure to develop this argument is dispositive. That is so not only because he bears the burden of establishing that his claim of innocence is viable, but also because "mental condition evidence" is only admissible to establish diminished capacity if "adequately keyed to the issue of whether [the defendant] entertained the mens rea required for proof of the crime." United States v. Davis, 863 F.3d 894, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Childress, 58 F.3d at 729). Put differently, courts require a defendant raising a diminished-capacity argument identify the "link or relationship between ... specific psychiatric evidence... and the mens rea at issue in the case."
Childress, 58 F.3d at 730 (internal quotation marks omitted). And for good reason: As the Eleventh Circuit explained in a case on which the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly relied, "[b]ecause psychiatric evidence" (1) "will only rarely negate specific intent," (2) "presents an inherent danger that it will distract the jury[ ] from focusing on the actual presence or absence of mens rea," and (3) "may easily slide into wider usage that opens up the jury to theories of defense more akin to justification, district courts must examine such psychiatric evidence carefully to ascertain whether it would, if believed, support a legally acceptable theory of lack of mens rea." Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1067 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Childress, 58 F.3d at 730 ("We share the concern that evidence of general mental capacity not be used to persuade a jury that a defendant is not responsible for his deliberate and purposeful activity—this usage exceeds the bounds of mens rea evidence.").
Coleman has not even attempted to draw this connection and, instead, offers nothing more than ipse dixit. He has presented no evidence or argument about how bipolar disorder, PTSD, or depression—or the failure to take medication for any of these afflictions—might even theoretically interfere with the ability to form the specific intent to conspire to engage in trafficking of minor or to produce child pornography. The Court can only assume that Coleman's diminished capacity showing is so cursory simply because he is not actually making a diminished capacity argument and, instead, is raising an insanity theory, which is improper for the reasons discussed above. But whatever the reason, and whatever the nature of the defense that Coleman might assert, the unsupported assertion that untreated mental illness affected his choices does not help him "shoulder [the] extremely heavy burden" he faces having failed to demonstrate that his plea was defective. Cray, 47 F.3d at 1208.
The government argues that Coleman must show not only that he has a viable claim of innocence as to the charges to which he pleaded guilty, but also as to the charges the government agreed to drop in connection with the plea. Dkt. 85 at 16. The Court need not and does not pass on this argument because Coleman has not shown that he has a viable claim of innocence even as to the charges to which he pleaded guilty.
Coleman does not resist any of these arguments and in fact appears to concede them. His reply brief acknowledges that "lack of psychosis medication may not be a complete defense" and is, rather, "a mitigating factor" more typically considered at sentencing. Dkt. 89 at 1. That too would seem to settle the issue. "[A] mitigating factor" does not amount to a viable claim of innocence. Coleman remains free, of course, to argue for a lighter sentence based on "mitigating factors," but that is an issue for another day.
At oral argument, Coleman offered the alternative theory that, as soon as he became aware that MV-1 was a minor, he cut off contact with her. See May 19, 2023 Hrg. Tr. (Rough at 6). But the government has presented extensive evidence to the contrary, evidence that Coleman has not even attempted to rebut or to undermine. As the government's brief explains, forensic evidence from Coleman's cell phone shows that he saw and photographed a missing person flier before June 30, 2020 that included MV-1's, name, picture, and date of birth. Dkt. 85 at 26-27. Text messages Coleman later exchanged with Williams show both that he and Williams were aware that MV-1 was a minor and that Coleman continued to conspire to engage in trafficking her after discussing her age. Id. at 25-26, 28-29. The government further proffers that Coleman took pornographic
photographs of MV-1 after he saw the missing person advertisement. Id. at 29-30. And, it proffers that Coleman used his cell phone to create at least one video of himself engaging in sex acts with MV-1 after Williams texted him: "be careful bro, I think she a minor." Id. Coleman's bald declaration of lack of knowledge, contradicted by substantial evidence, without any argument to why that evidence fails to prove what the government says it does, cannot provide the basis for an "objectively reasonable argument" that Coleman is innocent. West, 392 F.3d at 456 ("A general denial of guilt is not enough; [the defendant] 'must affirmatively advance an objectively reasonable argument that he is innocent.'" (quoting Cray, 47 F.3d at 1209)).
Beyond these difficulties, Coleman fails to address the relevant standards. "[M]istake of age" is not "a defense to a prosecution under [ ]§ 22-3008," the First Degree Child Sexual Abuse statute to which Coleman pleaded. D.C. Code § 22-3011(a). So Coleman cannot exculpate himself by contending that he abused MV-1 before he knew she was a minor. Nor has Coleman explained how he can escape liability for the Conspiracy to Engage in Trafficking a Minor charge. To obtain a conviction on the substantive offense of Sex Trafficking of a Minor, "the Government need not prove that the defendant knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that the [victim] had not attained the age of 18 years," so long as "the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe" the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c). Although the parties have not briefed the issue, the Court is skeptical that a different rule applies to the corresponding conspiracy offense. The Eleventh Circuit held as much on plain-error review in United States v. Whyte, 928 F.3d 1317, 1332 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 875, 205 L.Ed.2d 497 (2020), relying on United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 696, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975), which held that the charge of "conspiracy to commit assault on a federal officer" does not require knowledge that the victim was a federal officer, because the substantive offense also does not require such knowledge. "The objective of protecting juveniles as a class strongly indicates that Congress meant to impose on the [sex trafficker] the burden of inquiry and the risk of misjudgment." United States v. Chin, 981 F.2d 1275, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (declining to require knowledge of juvenile status for the crime of "using a juvenile to commit or conceal a drug offense" (citing Feola, 420 U.S. at 678-79, 95 S.Ct. 1255)). And Coleman does not contend that he lacked a reasonable opportunity to observe MV-1. Finally, with respect to the Production of Child Pornography charge, Coleman does not advance any legal argument for why he cannot be convicted of that offense (even if he was unaware of MV-1's age). See United States v. Humphrey, 608 F.3d 955, 960 (6th Cir. 2010) (reaching the same conclusion as "all of the federal courts of appeals that have considered the issue of scienter under § 2251(a)" and holding "that a defendant's knowledge of the minor's age is not an element of the offense [of Production of Child Pornography]"). Regardless, as explained above, the Court discerns no viable claim of innocence with respect to any of the charges to which Coleman pleaded guilty, given the evidence the government has proffered and Coleman's complete absence of a response to that evidence.
For all these reasons, the Court finds that Coleman has failed to carry his burden of showing that he has a viable claim of innocence. And, in any event, whatever argument he does have falls well short of overcoming the fact that his guilty plea complied with both Rule 11 and the Constitution, thus tipping the balance of considerations in the government's favor. C. Whether the Delay Between Coleman's Guilty Plea and Motion to Withdraw It Has Substantially Prejudiced the Government's Ability to Prosecute the Case
The seven-month delay between Coleman's plea and his initial request to withdraw his plea has not substantially prejudiced the government's ability to prosecute the case. The forensic evidence is presumably intact, and the government has not suggested that any of its witnesses are no longer available.
Still, permitting Coleman to withdraw his plea would work another kind of prejudice: prejudice to MV-1, who would need to testify and to relive traumatic events after it appeared that she would not have to do so given Coleman's guilty plea. Presumably, MV-1 (who is still a minor) has been attempting to recover from the abuse to which she was subjected as a child, and her recovery would likely suffer a significant setback if she were required to relive that abuse at trial after having received assurances that the case was resolved. Other courts have considered prejudice to a victim in this context, particularly when the victim is a minor and particularly when the offenses involved sexual abuse. See United States v. Lineback, 330 F.3d 441, 443-44 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Morrison, 967 F.2d 264, 269 (8th Cir. 1992). Although neither the D.C Circuit nor the Supreme Court has had occasion to consider this question, this Court is persuaded that harm to a victim, although not dispositive, is a relevant consideration. Put most starkly, in a case in which the Court might ordinarily conclude that the plea was proper but that, "if the defendant wants a trial, what's the harm?", the potential trauma to a minor victim answers that question.
The Court hastens to add, however, that although prejudice to MV-1 is relevant, it is not necessary to the Court's conclusion that Coleman has failed to establish a "fair and just" reason for withdrawing his plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). That decision rests on the lack of any taint in Coleman's plea and the weakness of his posited theories of innocence. So, even if the Court were to discount prejudice to MV-1 entirely, the Court's decision would remain the same.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is ORDERED that Coleman's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, Dkt. 83, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.