Id. at 313. See also United States v. Chapman, 420 F.2d 925, 926 (5th Cir. 1969) (arrest and seizure of evidence by postal inspectors was valid Florida citizen's arrest because they acted on "credible information"). It is unclear whether Mullin challenges the introduction of evidence discovered in the searches performed by the Military Police (i.e., the search of Mullin when he was initially arrested, and the searches of Bronner's vehicle and apartment). At one point in his brief, Mullin states that the Military Police "did not have the authority to arrest, jail, question, and search [Mullin]".
In their pretrial motions the defendants sought to exclude the evidence discovered as a result of the purported arrest under this statute, on the ground that Agent Markonni was not a local peace officer entitled to enforce the statute. The magistrate acknowledged that federal officers are not law enforcement or peace officers for state statutory purposes, relying on United States v. Carter, 523 F.2d 476, 478 (8th Cir. 1975), and United States v. Chapman, 420 F.2d 925, 926 (5th Cir. 1969), but sua sponte took judicial notice, based on other cases in this circuit, see United States v. Ehlebracht, 693 F.2d 333, 337 n. 5 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151, 1155 (5th Cir. 1980), that Agent Markonni had been deputized as a local officer. The defendants objected, seeking a hearing on the factual issue whether the deputization extended to Clayton County, the location of the new airport, in addition to Fulton County, where Markonni had formerly worked.
This Circuit has repeatedly held that the decision whether or not to disclose part or all of a presentence report submitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(2) lies within the discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Arenas-Granada, 5 Cir., 1973, 487 F.2d 858, 859 (per curiam); United States v. Thomas, 5 Cir., 1970, 435 F.2d 1303 (per curiam); United States v. Chapman, 5 Cir., 1969, 420 F.2d 925, 926; Good v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 410 F.2d 1217, 1221; United States v. Bakewell, 5 Cir., 1970, 430 F.2d 721, 722 (per curiam). We have also held that even where some errors in the presentence report have come to light and been corrected, the trial judge may properly refuse to disclose the remainder of the report to the defendant for purposes of ascertaining whether further mistakes have been made.
See Moll v. United States, 413 F.2d 1233, 1236 (5th Cir. 1969); Plummer v. Johnson, 70 Wis. 131, 35 N.W. 334, 336-337 (1887); Bergeron v. Peyton, 106 Wis. 377, 82 N.W. 291, 293 (1900). See also Ward v. United States, 316 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 862, 84 S.Ct. 132, 11 L.Ed.2d 89; Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946, 84 S.Ct. 1354, 12 L.Ed.2d 309; Alexander v. United States, 390 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1968), and United States v. Chapman, 420 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1969). We do not think this conclusion is undermined by the fact that the Wisconsin statutory definition of a felony does not expressly encompass a federal crime.
Espinosa's only request on appeal is that we hold unconstitutional Rule 32(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as applied to grant the sentencing judge discretion whether to disclose the presentence report to the defendant. In light of our previous decisions in United States v. Lloyd, 425 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Chapman, 420 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1969), and Good v. United States, 410 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1969), we must decline the invitation. Arenas' sole contention is that a statement improperly volunteered by a government witness so prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury as to require a new trial.
Rule 32(c), (2), F.R.Crim.P., provides in part that "The court before imposing sentence may disclose to the defendant or his counsel all or part of the material contained in the report of the presentence investigation and afford an opportunity to the defendant or his counsel to comment thereon." This Court has consistently held that Rule 32 places the disclosure of the contents of the presentence report, or any part of it, within the sound discretion of the sentencing court. United States v. Rubin, 5 Cir. 1970, 433 F.2d 442; United States v. Bakewell, 5 Cir. 1970, 430 F.2d 721; United States v. Chapman, 5 Cir. 1969, 420 F.2d 925; Roeth v. United States, 5 Cir. 1967, 380 F.2d 755, cert. den'd 390 U.S. 1015, 88 S.Ct. 1266, 20 L. Ed.2d 165. Since Thomas has not shown that the district court abused its discretion, the judgment of the district court denying his motion for a copy of the presentence report is affirmed.
Moreover, the officers had every reason to believe from credible information that the food, in continuous view of the officers, was feloniously acquired, so, while there was a lawful seizure, there was no search. See United States v. Chapman, 420 F.2d 925, 5th Cir., 1969. The Motion must therefore be, and the same is hereby, in all things, denied, and it is so ordered.
Upon indictment, contending that a private citizen had no authority to effect a legal arrest for an offense against Federal Treasury laws, Goeden moved to suppress the evidence. The District Court correctly denied the motion, Moll v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 1233; United States v. Chapman, 5 Cir., 1969, 420 F.2d 925. In each of these cases involving arrests for federal offenses, it was held that Florida follows the common law with regard to arrests by private citizens and that the arrests in question were lawful.
Although the contents of a report may have a substantial bearing upon the length of the defendant's sentence, it is clear, both from the language of the Rule and from subsequent decisions by this court, that the trial judge is under no duty to disclose the results of the presentence investigation. United States v. Bakewell, 5 Cir., 1970, 430 F.2d 721; United States v. Chapman, 5 Cir., 1969, 420 F.2d 925; Good v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 410 F.2d 1217. Moreover, appellant's failure to request inspection of the report in the court below creates an additional ground for finding that no reversible error was committed.
This rule is not novel and has been applied many times. United States v. Chapman, 5th Cir. 1969, 420 F.2d 925; Good v. United States, 5th Cir. 1969, 410 F.2d 1217; Roeth v. United States, 5th Cir. 1967, 380 F.2d 755. The appellant's motion for a stay is moot and therefore is denied.