Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 22, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the status conference until October 27, 2015 at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between September 22, 2015, and October 27, 2015 at 9:15 a.m., under Local Code T4.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, JOSH F. SIGAL, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
MICHAEL PETRIK, Counsel for Defendant Rigoberto Cecena.
JENNIFER NOBLE, Counsel for Defendant Elisabet Perez.
DINA SANTOS, Counsel for Defendant Yusen Valenzuela-Herrera.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 164 pages of documents, including investigative reports and audio recordings. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. A plea agreement has been offered to one defendant, and the parties have discussed potential resolutions in the cases of the other two defendants.
b) In light of these discussions, counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, conduct investigation and research, review discovery, and to discuss potential resolutions with their clients.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 22, 2015 to October 27, 2015 at 9:15 a.m., inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.