Because of this threshold determination, we easily dispose of Johnson's claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).See, e.g., United States v. Castro, 413 F.2d 891, 894-895 n. 7 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 950, 90 S.Ct. 974, 25 L.Ed.2d 132 (1970); United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1154-155 (5th Cir. 1993); Rogers v. McMackin, 884 F.2d 252, 255-257 (6th Cir. 1989); United States ex rel. Faulisi v. Pinkney, 611 F.2d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1979); Cockrell v. Oberhauser, 413 F.2d 256, 257-258 (9th Cir. 1969); see also 21A Charles A. Wright Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice Procedure § 5064.2, at 290 n. 5 (2d ed. 2005 Supp. 2007). To establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show both that counsel's performance was so unreasonably deficient "that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment," and that this deficient performance was so prejudicial "as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."

In Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 88 S.Ct. 722, 19 L.Ed.2d 923 (1968), the Supreme Court held that a conviction for possession of an unregistered firearm was in essence a conviction for failure to register, and that a conviction for failing to make such incriminating disclosures was unconstitutional in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Haynes therefore makes clear that our first task is to determine the "perimeter of the offense" made punishable by § 4755(b), that is, whether a conviction for violation of § 4755(b) is in fact a conviction for failure to register as required by 26 U.S.C. § 4753 and for failure to pay the special tax required by 26 U.S.C. § 4751. If the answer is in the affirmative, we must then determine whether compliance with §§ 4751-4753 would involve substantial hazards of incrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The above analysis was articulated by the 1st Circuit in United States v. Castro, 413 F.2d 891, 893 (1st Cir. 1969), which held that a conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) for purchasing cocaine not in the original stamped package did not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, notwithstanding his claim that he could only establish his innocence by proof that he had satisfied the registration and occupational tax provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 4721-22, because the Narcotics Act permits registration only by those involved in legitimate narcotics activity and the defendant thus would not have been permitted to register even had he desired to do so. Section 4755(b) is independent of registration § 4753, which, as but one of seven exceptions to the proscription, does not control the entire thrust of the proscribed activity.

At sentencing, the district court clearly stated that it was not considering any allegations in the letter from Slaby's former girlfriend that were not also either contained in Slaby's presentence report ("PSR") or already presented to the court during argument on Slaby's motion for pretrial bond. A sentencing court is entitled to a presumption that it is capable of disregarding evidence that it deems unsupported or improper. See United States v. Fay, 668 F.2d 375, 380 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that a sentencing court "will not be presumed to have considered something [it] explicitly disregarded"); see also United States v. Castro, 413 F.2d 891, 895 n.7 (1st Cir. 1969) ("A jury may have difficulty in disregarding extrajudicial statements implicating a defendant. We will not presume that a judge suffers from the same disability. Indeed, the presumption is to the contrary.").

Government of the Canal Zone v. Jimenez G., 580 F.2d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v. Impson, 562 F.2d 970, 971 (5th Cir. 1977)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 990, 99 S.Ct. 590, 58 L.Ed.2d 664 (1979); United States v. Masri, 547 F.2d 932, 936 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932, 97 S.Ct. 2640, 53 L.Ed.2d 249, and cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 309, 54 L.Ed.2d 195 (1977); United States v. Dillon, 436 F.2d 1093, 1095 (5th Cir. 1971). Other circuits that have addressed the applicability of Bruton to a bench trial have determined that Bruton does not apply. See, e.g., Rogers v. McMackin, 884 F.2d 252, 255-57 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1061, 110 S.Ct. 877, 107 L.Ed.2d 960 (1990); United States ex rel. Faulisi v. Pinkney, 611 F.2d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Castro, 413 F.2d 891, 894-95 n. 7 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 950, 90 S.Ct. 974, 25 L.Ed.2d 132 (1970); Cockrell v. Oberhauser, 413 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir. 1969); see also 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5064, at 321 (1977) ("The Bruton rule does not, of course, apply in nonjury trials."). In making its decision, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986), made Bruton applicable to non-jury trials.

In light of Bruton's emphasis on the limitations of the jury system, it is not surprising that at least three courts of appeals subsequently held Bruton to be inapplicable to bench trials. United States ex rel. Faulisi v. Pinkney, 611 F.2d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1979) (the Bruton "holding is simply inapplicable in the case of a bench trial"); United States v. Castro, 413 F.2d 891, 894-95 n. 7 (1st Cir. 1969) ("A jury may have difficulty in disregarding extrajudicial statements implicating a defendant. We will not presume that a judge suffers from the same disability. Indeed, the presumption is to the contrary.") cert. denied, 397 U.S. 950, 90 S.Ct. 974, 25 L.Ed.2d 132 (1970); Cockrell v. Oberhauser, 413 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir. 1969) (same).

Even assuming a ruling excluding the testimony was in order, the error was clearly harmless. See United States v. Castro, 413 F.2d 891, 894-95 n. 7 (1st Cir. 1969). Other testimony by Dubois placed MacLeod as present with Nardi at various times when aspects of the conspiracy were discussed, and included remarks by MacLeod indicating knowledge that Nardi was a co-conspirator.

While the practice should be used with considerable caution, especially when the sanitized confession is relayed through a live witness, we do not believe it to be per se impermissible. Cf. United States v. Castro, 413 F.2d 891, 894-95 (1st Cir. 1969) ( Bruton inapposite when prosecutor referred to codefendant's guilty plea implicating only himself, in trial before judge). When the device of tailoring evidence is employed effectively in lieu of severance to avoid a Bruton problem, the standard of review on appeal is whether appellants have made the "strong showing of prejudice" required to overturn a trial court's decision to proceed with a joint trial.

The cases rejecting Smith's Fifth Amendment contention are so numerous that the contention must now be regarded as entirely without merit. See, e.g., Morales v. United States, 5 Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 475; Wilson v. United States, 3 Cir. 1970, 426 F.2d 246, 247; United States v. Clark, 3 Cir. 1970, 425 F.2d 827, 829-830; United States v. Mosby, 8 Cir. 1970, 422 F.2d 72, 75-76; McClain v. United States, 9 Cir. 1969, 417 F.2d 489, 493-494; United States v. Walker, 5 Cir. 1969, 414 F.2d 876, 878-879; United States v. Castro, 1 Cir. 1969, 413 F.2d 891, 892-894; cf. Turner v. United States, 1970, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610; Minor v. United States, 1969, 396 U.S. 87, 90 S.Ct. 284, 24 L. Ed.2d 283. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A number of courts of appeals have upheld convictions under § 4704(a) and in so doing rejected the claim of violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Walker, 5 Cir., 414 F.2d 876; United States v. Castro, 1 Cir., 413 F.2d 891. This court has also so held. United States v. Williams, 8 Cir., 421 F.2d 529; United States v. Crockett, 8 Cir., 421 F.2d 649. IV.

McCormick, Evidence, § 60 at 138 (Cleary ed. 1972); Levin and Cohen, The Exclusionary Rule in Nonjury Criminal Cases, 119 U.Pa. L.Rev. 905 (1971); Davis, Hearsay in Nonjury Cases, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1362 (1970); Note, Improper Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Basis for Reversal, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 407 (1965); Note, Incompetent Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Ought We Presume That It Has No Effect?, 29 Ind.L.J. 446 (1954). See United States v. Castro, 413 F.2d 891 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 950, 90 S.Ct. 974, 25 L.Ed.2d 132 (1970); United States v. Olsen, 453 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 927, 92 S.Ct. 1801, 32 L.Ed.2d 128 (1972); United States v. Bolles, 528 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Nicolson, 492 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. McCarthy, 470 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Ford v. Pate, 425 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 843, 91 S.Ct. 86, 27 L.Ed.2d 78 (1970); United States v. Cummings, 507 F.2d 324 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. DeBetham, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907, 93 S.Ct. 2299, 36 L.Ed.2d 972 (1973); Havelock v. United States, 427 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 252, 27 L.Ed.2d 251 (1970); Fennel v. United States, 320 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1963); United States v. Harris, 381 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D.Pa. 1974). In the instant case, the trial judge expressly noted in his opinion that he gave no effect to t