Opinion
Case No. 1:12-cr-2520-WJ-1
06-03-2022
UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, v. James CASAUS, Defendant.
Presiliano Torrez, Louis E. Valencia, United States Attorneys Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.
Presiliano Torrez, Louis E. Valencia, United States Attorneys Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
WILLIAM P. JOHNSON, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant James Casaus’ Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 68). Defendant seeks reconsideration of the Court's prior order (Doc. 67), which held that because Judge Black had not specified whether Defendant's federal and state sentences were to run concurrently or consecutively, they should run consecutively pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and the applicable law, the Court finds that Defendant's arguments are not well-taken and therefore DENIES the motion to reconsider.
BACKGROUND
On October 10, 2012, Defendant was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Doc. 1. His case was randomly assigned to U.S. District Judge Christina Armijo. At the time Defendant was federally indicted, he was in state custody because committing the present crime had violated the terms of his probation. Doc. 65 at 3. He was brought into federal custody on a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Prosequendum. Doc. 6. Two years later, on October 23, 2014, U.S. District Judge Bruce Black sentenced Defendant to a 96-month term of incarceration on the indicted charge of felon in possession of a firearm. Doc. 55. Both Judges Armijo and Black have retired, so Defendant's case has been randomly assigned to the undersigned judge.
At the time Judge Black imposed the 96-month sentence in October 2014, Defendant was not serving any other sentence to which the 96-month federal sentence could be expected to run concurrently or consecutively. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the transcript of the sentencing hearing before Judge Black and the Judgment and Commitment Order on the 96-month sentence are both silent as to whether the federal sentence and a possible future state sentence should be concurrent or consecutive to one another. See Doc. 65 (transcript); Doc. 55 (Judgment and Commitment Order).
After the federal sentencing, Defendant was returned to state authorities. On December 11, 2014, the State of New Mexico sentenced Defendant to a seven-year term of imprisonment which the state judge intended to run concurrently with the federal sentence. Doc. 57 at 2. On August 14, 2017, Defendant satisfied his state obligation and was released to federal custody to commence service of his federal sentence. Id.
On February 17, 2022, the Federal Bureau of Prisons sent a letter to the undersigned judge, informing him that Defendant requested credit for time spent in service of a state sentence, effectively making his federal sentence concurrent with his state sentence. If the sentences were ordered to run concurrently, Defendant would have satisfied his federal sentence and would be released from custody. Id. If the federal and state sentences were ordered to run consecutively, Defendant's projected release date would be November 16, 2024. Id. The Bureau of Prisons sought guidance from the Court on how to proceed.
After seeking briefing from the parties and reviewing their arguments, the Court ruled that Defendant's federal and state sentences were to run consecutively, meaning that Defendant still had time left to serve on his federal sentence. Doc. 67. Defendant has now moved for reconsideration of this order. Doc. 68.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for reconsideration may be granted when the Court has misapprehended a party's position, the facts, or the law. Servants of the Paraclete v. Does , 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). "Specific situations where circumstances may warrant reconsideration include (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." United States v. Huff , 782 F.3d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The decision to reconsider is left to the district court's discretion. United States v. Randall , 666 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011). DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the Court must correct clear error to prevent manifest injustice, the third of the options for reconsideration listed above. Defendant lists three errors; the Court considers each in turn.
I. Factual inaccuracy of Defendant being "in state custody awaiting trial"
Defendant points out that the Court incorrectly stated that Defendant was "in state custody awaiting trial" when the Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum brought him into federal custody. Doc. 68 at 2 (citing Doc. 67 at 1). Defendant is correct: the transcript states that Defendant was in state custody due to a probation violation, not necessarily because he was awaiting trial, and the Court misstated this information.
However, this misstatement was harmless. The reason Defendant brings up this error is because "Judge Black could not have intended for the sentences to run consecutively because he was not considering that Mr. Casaus had any time left to serve for his state convictions at all." Id. The Court's order came to the same conclusion:
The sentencing transcript of the sentencing hearing before Judge Black and the Judgment and Commitment Order on the 96-month sentence for [felon in possession] are both silent on whether the federal sentence and a possible future state sentence should be concurrent or consecutive to one another. This comes as no surprise to the undersigned judge because at the time Judge Black imposed the 96-month sentence, Defendant was not serving any sentence to which the 96-month federal sentence could be imposed to run concurrently or consecutively.
Doc. 67 at 1–2 (citations omitted). The Court therefore acknowledged that Judge Black likely did not manifest any intent one way or another on the issue of whether the sentences should run consecutively or concurrently because the state sentence was not yet in play. Therefore, although the Court did make a misstatement and appreciates Defendant's diligence in identifying this error, the error was not harmful and therefore does not justify reconsideration. See United States v. Warren , 22 F.4th 917, 929–30 (10th Cir. 2022) (district court abused discretion by refusing to consider defendant's argument, but because error was harmless, Tenth Circuit affirmed district court's denial of motion for reconsideration).
II. Purpose of Judge Black's downward variance
Defendant next argues that the Court treated Judge Black's 24-month downward variance as accounting for the time Defendant would serve on his later-imposed state sentence, when really Judge Black's reduction was due to Defendant's loss of good-time credits. Doc. 68 at 2. Defendant emphasizes that Judge Black's intent was for Defendant to serve a total of ten years from his 2012 arrest. Id. at 3.
Again, it is correct that the purpose of the reduction was to grant Defendant the good-time credit he would have earned if he had not been serving his state parole time. See Doc. 65 at 3–4. The Court characterized the downward variance as "amount[ing] to giving Defendant presentence credit for the time Defendant was in federal custody while state charges were still pending against him." Doc. 67 at 2. While the actual intent was to compensate Defendant for the good-time credit he was unable to earn rather than to provide him presentence credit, the result is the same either way: Defendant received a downward variance. The Court's focus in the paragraph at issue was that Defendant had an extensive criminal history score that did not make for the sympathetic case that would typically receive a downward variance, yet Defendant received one anyway based on the logistics of his presentence confinement. This point remains true even if the Court made a small error in describing the details of the variance.
As for Defendant's argument that Judge Black's intent was for Defendant to serve a total of ten years, this logic is somewhat flawed. As described in the previous section, Judge Black manifested no intent at all regarding a state sentence. At the time Judge Black sentenced Defendant, Defendant had not yet been sentenced in state court, and there was no discussion of a possible future state sentence at the federal sentencing. Therefore, there is no indication that Judge Black intended Defendant's combined federal and state sentence to total ten years; he addressed only the federal sentence.
III. Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)
The final portion of Defendant's argument relies on other circuits’ interpretations of the Supreme Court case Setser v. United States , 566 U.S. 231, 132 S.Ct. 1463, 182 L.Ed.2d 455 (2012). The Court expresses some doubt about the merits of this argument for reconsideration because "[a] motion to reconsider should not be used to revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have been made earlier." Huff , 782 F.3d at 1224 (citation omitted). Defendant already addressed this argument in his original briefing. See generally Doc. 64. Therefore, reconsideration is improper here. However, because this argument makes up a significant portion of Defendant's motion to reconsider and because the Court did not discuss it extensively in its original order, the Court will provide more detail for its decision here.
18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) states the following:
If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time, or if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively, except that the terms may not run consecutively for an attempt and for another offense that was the sole objective of the attempt. Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the court orders or the statute mandates that the terms are to run consecutively. Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.
Setser , which interpreted the above provision, involved a defendant who was on probation when he was indicted on federal drug charges. 566 U.S. at 233, 132 S.Ct. 1463. The federal judge sentenced him, knowing there would be a state drug charge and a state probation violation charge coming later but not knowing what those sentences would be. Id. The federal judge ordered Setser's federal sentence to run consecutively to the state probation violation sentence, but concurrently with the state drug sentence. Id. Later, the state court sentenced Setser on both the probation violation and the drug charge, and the state court ordered both those sentences to run concurrently with the federal charge—contravening what the federal judge had ordered. Id. The Supreme Court held that the federal judge has the discretion to decide whether the federal sentence runs consecutively or concurrently to a not-yet-imposed state sentence. Id. at 237, 132 S.Ct. 1463. Setser ’s interpretation of the statutory language was as follows:
The first subsection of [ § 3584(a) ], which says when concurrent and consecutive sentences may be imposed, and specifies which of those dispositions will be assumed in the absence of indication by the sentencing judge ... addresses only ‘multiple terms of imprisonment ... imposed ... at the same time’ and ‘a term of imprisonment ... imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment.’ Here the state sentence is not imposed at the same time as the federal sentence, and the defendant was not already subject to that state sentence [at the time of the federal sentencing]."
Id. at 234–35, 132 S.Ct. 1463. This approach has led to disagreement about whether § 3584(a) applies at all in circumstances where a federal sentence precedes a state sentence to which the defendant is not yet subject. Defendant highlights the Fourth and Seventh Circuits. Mangum v. Hallembaek interprets Setser as holding § 3584(a) inapplicable to circumstances outside the two scenarios it lists. 824 F.3d 98 (4th Cir. 2016) Similarly, Pope v. Perdue involved a presumption of sentences running consecutively when the federal judge was silent, and the Seventh Circuit cited Setser when stating that "[t]he Supreme Court has explicitly prohibited the BOP from drawing this inference for defendants who—like Pope—had not yet received their state sentence when their federal sentence was imposed." 889 F.3d 410, 417 (7th Cir. 2018). Defendant urges the Court to follow this approach.
However, the Tenth Circuit has considered the matter differently. Newman v. Cozza-Rhodes , 526 F. App'x 818, 822 (10th Cir. 2013) is an unpublished case that explicitly addresses silence from the federal sentencing judge after Setser : "When a federal sentence is silent on the matter [of concurrent or consecutive sentencing], a statutory presumption is triggered; multiple sentences imposed at different times—even as between state and federal sentences—run consecutively." Other unpublished Tenth Circuit cases follow Newman . See United States v. Foy , 672 F. App'x 784, 786 (10th Cir. 2016) ; Beers v. Maye , 611 F. App'x 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.). Defendant argues that Newman and Foy are inapplicable because the federal judges in those cases knew that a state sentence would subsequently be imposed. Doc. 64 at 6. But Defendant fails to explain why this distinction matters. Knowing that the state plans to impose a sentence in the future and saying nothing about it, as opposed to not knowing at all and saying nothing about it, does not appear to change the fact of the federal judge's silence. While these unpublished dispositions are not mandatory authority, they are persuasive: they demonstrate a consistent trend in the Tenth Circuit to presume that a federal sentence that does not address a potential state sentence will run consecutively with that state sentence. The Tenth Circuit's approach does not directly contradict Setser . Setser is not a case in which a federal judge was silent and a state judge later made a decision that did not align with the presumptions listed in § 3584(a). Rather, Setser involved a federal judge who ordered one thing and a subsequent state judge who ordered another. The Supreme Court addressed whether the federal judge had the authority to decide, before any state sentence was issued, whether the federal and state sentences would run consecutively or concurrently. Therefore, when the Setser court examined the language in § 3584(a), it was seeking to determine a federal judge's authority to make such an order before the state sentence came into being, not seeking to determine the meaning of a federal judge's silence. Certainly, language in Setser suggests that § 3584(a) only applies to the circumstances listed. See 566 U.S. at 240, 132 S.Ct. 1463 ("And the last two sentences of § 3584(a) say what will be assumed in those two common situations if the court does not specify that the sentence is concurrent or consecutive." (emphasis added)). But Setser itself does not squarely address the issue before the Court today, and the Tenth Circuit has interpreted § 3584(a) to apply when a federal judge is silent as to whether a sentence will run consecutively or concurrently with a possible future state sentence. The Court therefore follows the interpretation the Tenth Circuit has provided in Newman and its progeny.
The parties also discuss United States v. Eccleston , 521 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2008). Eccleston predates Setser and deals with a slightly different issue: there, the defendant sought to argue that his federal and state sentences were imposed at the same time (and therefore that a presumption existed for them to run concurrently under § 3584(a) ). Id. at 1254. The Tenth Circuit found that the sentences were imposed a few hours apart, not at the same time, and therefore that no such presumption was warranted under § 3584(a). Id. Defendant mischaracterizes Eccleston when he states that it holds § 3584(a) inapplicable to cases where the state sentence was imposed after a federal sentence; indeed, Newman more accurately interprets Eccleston as assuming § 3584(a) is applicable to such cases. See Newman , 526 F. App'x at 822.
Defendant points out that United States v. Ramon , 958 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 2020) contained an interpretation of the § 3584(a) language similar to that in Setser . Doc. 64 at 7. But Ramon dealt with two federal sentences, not a federal sentence followed by a state sentence. 958 F.3d at 924–25. Ramon notes that Setser recognized an arguable difference between those circumstances. Id. Therefore, Ramon ’s interpretation of the § 3584(a) language does not necessarily apply with equal force to the context in this case.
CONCLUSION
Defendant makes several arguments for reconsideration, none of which suffice. The Court expresses its appreciation for Defendant's work in ensuring an accurate record by alerting the Court to certain factual errors in its previous order. However, because those errors do not cut against the Court's underlying logic, they are harmless and do not justify reconsideration.