Opinion
No. CR17-1039-LTS
2021-06-22
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Andre CARROLL, Defendant.
Dan Chatham, US Attorney's Office, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff. Cory Goldensoph, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendant.
Dan Chatham, US Attorney's Office, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff.
Cory Goldensoph, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendant.
ORDER
Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before me on defendant Andre Carroll's pro se motion (Doc. 77) and amended motion (Doc. 79), filed through counsel, for compassionate release. The Government has filed a response (Doc. 81). Oral argument is not necessary. See Local Rule 7(c).
II. BACKGROUND
On September 20, 2018, I sentenced Carroll to 120 months’ imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl near a protected location following a conviction for a prior felony drug offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 841(b)(1)(C), 846, 851 and 860(a). Doc. 74. Carroll is 54 years old. According to the online Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inmate locator, he is incarcerated at Springfield MCFP in Springfield, Missouri, and has a projected release date of March 31, 2026.
III. COMPASSIONATE RELEASE STANDARDS
A court's ability to modify a sentence after it has been imposed is extremely limited. One way a court may modify a sentence is through "compassionate release" as outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which was recently modified by the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA). See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603. In the past, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) permitted a court to reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment only upon the motion of the Director of Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The FSA modified § 3582(c)(1)(A) such that a defendant may now directly petition the court "after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." See Mohrbacher v. Ponce , No. CV18-00513, 2019 WL 161727, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2019) (discussing modifications made to § 3582(c)(1)(A) by the FSA); see also United States v. Perez-Asencio , No. CR18-3611, 2019 WL 626175, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019).
If a defendant fully exhausts administrative remedies, the court may, upon motion of the defendant, reduce the defendant's sentence, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, if the court finds that:
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or
(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);
And that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ...
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Carroll does not meet the requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). He is under 70 years of age and has not served at least 30 years in prison pursuant to a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). Doc. 70 at 2. Thus, Carroll's only possible avenue for relief is § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
The starting point in determining what constitutes "extraordinary and compelling reasons" under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is the Sentencing Guideline discussing compassionate release issued by the United States Sentencing Commission. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2018); see also United States v. Hall , No. CR98-7, 2019 WL 6829951, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 13, 2019) ; United States v. Rivernider , No. CR10-222, 2019 WL 3816671, at *2 (D. Conn. Aug. 14, 2019). The Guideline provides that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist in the following circumstances:
(A) Medical Condition of the Defendant.—
(i) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced illness with an end of life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not required. Examples include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia.
(ii) The defendant is—
(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,
(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or
(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process,
that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.
(B) Age of the Defendant.—The defendant (i) is at least 65 years old; (ii) is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process; and (iii) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less.
(C) Family Circumstances.—
(i) The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or minor children.
(ii) The incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner.
(D) Other Reasons.—As determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1.
This Guideline predates the FSA and has "not been amended to reflect that, under the FSA, a defendant may now move for compassionate release after exhausting administrative remedies." Rivernider , 2019 WL 3816671, at *2. Courts are split on whether the policy statement is binding because it predates the FSA's changes to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A number of district courts have concluded that Guideline § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 does not restrain a court's assessment of whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to release a defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez , 424 F. Supp. 3d 674, 681 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ; United States v. Urkevich , No. CR03-37, 2019 WL 6037391, at *3 (D. Neb. Nov. 14, 2019) ; United States v. Brown , 411 F. Supp. 3d 446, 451 (S.D. Iowa 2019) ; United States v. Fox , No. CR14-03, 2019 WL 3046086, at *3 (D. Me. July 11, 2019) ; United States v. Beck , 425 F. Supp. 3d 573, 579 (M.D.N.C. 2019) ; United States v. Cantu , 423 F. Supp. 3d 345, 352 (S.D. Tex. 2019). Other courts have concluded that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist only if they are included in the Guideline. See, e.g., United States v. Lynn , No. CR89-0072, 2019 WL 3805349, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2019).
As I have previously stated, I agree with those courts that have found that although the Guideline provides helpful guidance on what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons, it is not conclusive given the recent statutory changes. See United States v. Schmitt , No. CR12-4076-LTS, 2020 WL 96904, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 8, 2020) ; see also Rodriguez , 424 F. Supp. 3d at 682 (Congress knew that the BOP rarely granted compassionate release requests prior to the FSA, and the purpose of the FSA is to increase the number of compassionate release requests granted by allowing defendants to file motions in district courts directly even after the BOP denies their request); Brown , 411 F. Supp. 3d at 451 (same).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has declined to expressly overrule the current version of § 1B1.13. But it has indicated that district courts should consider extraordinary and compelling reasons outside the strict confines of § 1B1.13. In a case where the district court denied a defendant's compassionate release motion, the defendant argued the district court erred by relying on the § 1B1.13 policy statements. In declining to consider that issue, the Eighth Circuit noted that the district court was clearly aware of the change of the law:
While some courts adhere to "the pre-First Step Act policy statements," "[o]ther courts [have] ruled that the pre-First Step Act policy statements are inapplicable, and that a judge has discretion to determine, at least until the Sentencing Commission acts, what qualifies as ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons.’ " Id. (citing United States v. Brown , 411 F. Supp. 3d 446, 448–51 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 8, 2019) ) ...
After analyzing whether Rodd satisfied the "extraordinary and compelling reasons" criteria set forth in § 1B1.13, the district court assumed that Rodd satisfied a more expansive definition of the phrase and analyzed the compassionate-release motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Specifically, the court stated, "Even assuming Congress intended to expand the use of compassionate release with the First Step Act, the Section 3553(a) factors present at sentencing have not changed. Rodd does not qualify for compassionate release." Id.
United States v. Rodd , 966 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2020). The Eighth Circuit went on to find that:
We need not determine whether the district court erred in adhering to the policy statements in § 1B1.13. The district court knew its discretion. It expressly stated that "[e]ven assuming Congress intended to expand the use of compassionate release with the First Step Act, the Section 3553(a) factors present at sentencing have not changed" and, as a result, "Rodd does not qualify for compassionate release." [United States v. ] Rodd , 2019 WL 5623973, at *4 [(D. Minn. Oct. 31, 2019)] ; see also id. ("[E]ven assuming a more expansive definition of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ under the First Step Act, Rodd's Motion is denied."). In other words, the district court assumed that Rodd's health and family concerns constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. Therefore, we need only determine "whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that the § 3553(a) factors weigh against granting [Rodd's] immediate release."
Rodd , 966 F.3d at 747. In a footnote, the Eighth Circuit also observed that, " ‘[a]s the Sentencing Commission lacks a quorum to amend the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, it seems unlikely there will be a policy statement applicable to [compassionate-release] motions brought by defendants in the near future.’ United States v. Beck , 425 F. Supp. 3d 573, 579 n.7 (M.D.N.C. 2019)." Id. at 746 n.7 ; see also United States v. Loggins , 966 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 2020) (where the Eighth Circuit observed that § 1B1.13 does not reflect the current version of the compassionate release statute, but found no error because "[w]here the [district] court expressly considered post-sentencing rehabilitation (a circumstance not listed in § 1B1.13 ), the more natural inference is that the court did not feel constrained by the circumstances enumerated in the policy statement, but simply found that a non-retroactive change in [sentencing] law did not support a finding of extraordinary or compelling reasons for release."
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Carroll submitted an administrative request for compassionate release on April 18, 2020, requesting release in light of debilitating medical issues. Doc. 80-1. On April 30, 2020, his warden denied the request. Doc. 80-2. He filed his pro se motion in October 2020 and his amended motion, through counsel, in May 2021. I find that Carroll has exhausted his administrative remedies. B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Carroll alleges, and BOP records indicate, that he suffers from numerous health problems, including: (1) congestive heart failure ; (2) chronic kidney disease ; (3) type 2 diabetes with neuropathy ; (4) morbid obesity ; (5) hypertension ; (6) hyperlipidemia ; (7) hypoxia ; (8) acute respiratory failure; (9) asthma ; (10) osteoarthritis ; (11) osteopenia ; (12) nerve pain; (13) neuralgia neuritis ; (14) metabolic encephalopathy ; and (15) degenerative disc disease. Doc. 80 at 8–14; Doc. 80-3 at 53, 136–37, 368, 514, 572–73, 580, 583. The Government does not dispute that Carroll suffers from these conditions but denies that they constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying early release. The Government argues that his conditions have responded well to treatment and that he is able to maintain independent living. Doc. 81 at 6. The Government also notes that he has not always complied with BOP medical recommendations and has refused or failed to show up for hygiene assistance. Id. at 7.
"Hypoxia is a condition or state in which the supply of oxygen is insufficient for normal life functions ...." Hypoxia and Hypoxemia (Low Blood Oxygen) , MedicineNet, https://www.medicinenet.com/hypoxia_and_hypoxemia/article.htm (last visited June 3, 2021).
Osteopenia occurs when an individual's bones are weaker than normal but not to the point of osteoporosis. What is Osteopenia ? , WebMD, https://www.webmd.com/osteoporosis /guide/osteopenia-early-signs-of-bone-loss (last visited June 3, 2021).
Neuralgia and neuritis are typically described as distinct conditions. Neuralgia refers to nerve pain. Neuritis is nerve inflammation and may trigger neuralgia. Neuralgia , Better Health Channel, https://www.betterhealth.vic.gov.au/health/conditionsandtreatments/neuralgia (last visited June 3, 2021).
Metabolic encephalopathy occurs when "another health condition, such as diabetes, liver disease, kidney failure, or heart failure, makes it hard for the brain to work." What Is Encephalopathy , WebMD, https://www.webmd.com/brain/what-is-encephalopathy (last visited June 3, 2021).
Carroll's overall physical condition appears to be deteriorating. His ailments are numerous and increasingly serious. Prior to sentencing, he was hospitalized several times in 2016 and 2017 due to chronic kidney disease or acute respiratory failure. Doc. 70 at 17–18, ¶¶ 63–65. This trend has continued during Carroll's incarceration. A February 2019 record indicates he had been recently hospitalized, during which he lost 60 pounds of water weight and later lost consciousness due to low blood pressure. Doc. 80-3 at 577. During a November 2019 hospitalization, he was classified as "critically ill" for two days, placed on a ventilator and was hospitalized for eight days in total. Doc. 80-3 at 79, 83, 381, 517. His poor heart function and respiration have started to affect his cognitive functioning. Doc. 80-3 at 514 (noting metabolic encephalopathy ). After reviewing his conditions in April 2020, a BOP physician stated that Carroll "may have steeper than average end-of-life trajectory." Doc. 80-11. In early October 2020, he was hospitalized after suffering shortness of breath, vision problems and twitching. Doc. 80-6 at 87, 91. He spent time in the ICU and was described as "acutely ill" and suffering from chronic respiratory failure and congestive heart failure. Doc. 80-8 at 56, 61.
There is tension in the record regarding his mobility. While distributing heroin, Carroll traveled to sites around Dubuque, Iowa. Doc. 70 at 5–6, ¶¶ 6–9. But by the time of sentencing, Carroll was described as "frequently bedridden and requir[ing] a wheel chair [sic] in order to be mobile." Id. at 18, ¶ 76. The BOP has limited him to sedentary work only and has issued him a wheelchair, walker, hospital bed and a "reacher" to help pick up items. Doc. 80-7 at 143; Doc. 80-3 at 365. His stamina appears limited: he needs a wheelchair for long distances and one record indicates he needed an inhaler after standing up from his bed. Doc. 80-6 at 118; Doc. 80-3 at 106.
The records indicate the BOP has issued Carroll a number of other medical devices including a glucose meter, Bi-PAP machine and an Oxygen Concentrator. Doc. 80-7 at 145. The BOP issued Carroll an elevator pass for moving around his facility. Doc. 80-4 at 104. Records from 2019 and 2021 indicate he regularly receives assistance from BOP staff for, inter alia , activities of daily living, having dressings changed, receiving oxygen and receiving physical therapy, even if he did not always rely on them. Doc. 80-3 at 395–423; Doc. 80-5 at 31–32. The BOP has directed that Carroll will continue to need assistance applying ointment to his body through at least October 2021. Doc. 80-5 at 8.
Paradoxically, the BOP classifies him as having a high level of physical self-maintenance and ability to engage in activities of daily living. Doc. 80-10.
While I recognize that some of Carroll's choices may be aggravating the severity of his conditions, such as his failure to comply with some medical recommendations, I find Carroll's numerous serious medical conditions, the increasing severity of those conditions and Carroll's limited mobility constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying early release. Therefore, I will consider whether the remaining factors support granting his motion.
See, e.g. , Doc. 80-3 at 262 (Carroll refusing low cholesterol/low sodium diet, acknowledging unhealthy dietary choices, denying his diabetes diagnosis and refusing related medication); Doc. 80-6 at 121 (Carroll reporting he does not take some of his prescribed medications).
C. Section 3553(a) Factors and Danger to Community
Guideline § 1B1.13(2) provides that compassionate release is appropriate only where "the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) [.]" Additionally, § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a court consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) before granting a motion for compassionate release. Section 3553(a) requires that I consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines [issued by the Sentencing Commission ...;]
(5) any pertinent policy statement [issued by the Sentencing Commission ...’]
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
The Government argues the sentencing factors weigh against early release, citing Carroll's offense conduct, criminal history and the portion of his sentence he has yet to serve. Doc. 81 at 9–10. Carroll's offense conduct is indeed aggravating. He was held accountable for trafficking 355 grams of heroin and 0.69 grams of fentanyl. Doc. 70 at 7, ¶ 14. He distributed these substances within 1,000 feet of public playgrounds. Id. at 5–6, ¶¶ 6–8. His pretrial release was revoked after he resided at a home where marijuana and drug paraphernalia were found and he tested positive for cocaine, codeine, morphine and 6-acetylmorphine. Id. at 3, ¶ 2. He admitted to abusing his sister's prescription medication. Id. However, no violence was associated with his offense conduct.
6-acetylmorphine is a metabolite indicating heroin use or exposure. What is 6-acetylmorphine? , Labcorp , https://www.labcorp.com/content/q-what-6-acetylmorphine (last visited June 2, 2021).
Carroll's criminal history is also aggravating. It largely consists of possessing or distributing controlled substances. Doc. 70 at 9–13, ¶¶ 27–35. His only violent offense, unlawful restraint, occurred when he was 15 years old in 1982. Id. at 9, ¶ 27. His most recent prior conviction occurred in 1997, after which he was sentenced in this court to 140 months’ imprisonment for distributing approximately 7.46 grams of crack cocaine. Id. at 12–13, ¶ 35. After starting supervised release in 2007, Carroll's release was revoked in 2008 and 2012 for leaving the district without permission, failing to comply with required drug testing, frequenting bars, using illegal drugs, failing to comply with electronic monitoring and incurring new law violations. Id. These past failures on release are cause for concern. However, his criminal history is largely non-violent and his past offenses, including his violations of supervised release, are often intertwined with his substance abuse. See United States v. Smith , 464 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1024 (N.D. Iowa 2020) (granting compassionate release to inmate with lengthy, sometimes violent criminal history); cf. United States v. Campbell , No. CR03-4020-LTS, 2020 WL 3491569, at *9 (N.D. Iowa June 26, 2020) (recommending home confinement for defendant whose criminal history was driven by addiction and was non-violent aside from two domestic abuse assaults).
Carroll has served slightly less than 50% of his sentence. Congress exercised its Constitutional authority in determining that a sentence of 120 months is the minimum that a court may impose for his offense. While this does not preclude granting compassionate release before a defendant has served at least the statutory minimum sentence, it is a factor that weighs against release—especially if a defendant has served only a small fraction of that time. United States v. Willison , No. CR15-4034-LTS, 2020 WL 6121159, at *8 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 16, 2020). Having been incarcerated since September 2017 (Doc. 70 at 3, ¶ 2), Carroll has served approximately 44 months’ imprisonment. However, I note that Carroll's guideline range would have been 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment but for the mandatory minimum. Id. at 23, ¶ 90.
The Government also argues that Carroll suffered from many of the problems he does now at the time of the offense's commission. Doc. 81 at 7–8. This is true, to an extent. As discussed, he was hospitalized in 2016 and 2017 for severe illnesses. One of his heroin sources continued to deliver him heroin to distribute even while Carroll was "confined due to his medical problems." Id. at 9, ¶ 24. But his physical condition and mobility have declined since the commission of his offense. Again, by the time of sentencing, he was already "frequently bedridden and require[d] a wheel chair [sic] in order to be mobile." Id. at 18, ¶ 66. He regularly relies on BOP staff members for assistance with care. These worsening conditions suggest that Carroll's ability to be a threat is significantly diminished. See United States v. Conner , 465 F. Supp. 3d 881, 893 (N.D. Iowa 2020) (granting release to defendant who similarly had limited mobility and depended on a wheelchair and supplemental oxygen).
Other § 3553(a) factors are mitigating. Carroll became involved in a street gang at the age of 12 and characterizes himself as "a product of his environment." Doc. 70 at 17, ¶ 62. He has abused substances, most recently heroin, valium and Xanax, and stated that he self-medicated with heroin to deal with his physical ailments. Id. at 9, ¶ 24, and at 19, ¶¶ 75–76. He has stated that his drug addiction has contributed to his criminal history because he "couldn't leave the drugs and lifestyle alone." Id. at 20, ¶ 79. At his sentencing, he had been sober for almost a year due to his incarceration and wanted to continue on that path. Sentencing Tr. at 10. In addition to his physical ailments, he suffers from anxiety and depression. Doc. 70 at 19, ¶ 70.
Because no official sentencing transcript was prepared, all citations to the sentencing are from the court reporter's rough, unedited transcript.
Carroll's BOP disciplinary record indicates he has received only one infraction – being insolent to a staff member in February 2019. Doc. 80-15. Further, he has served his sentence while suffering from severe medical issues and pain he has variously characterized as "aching," "deep," "unremitting," "sharp" and "burning." Doc. 80-3 at 368–69. He takes morphine nightly for this pain. See, e.g., id. at 11, 13. His health conditions and his chronic pain mean that his sentence has been significantly more laborious than sentences served by other inmates. See Schmitt , 2020 WL 96904, at *6 (holding similarly); United States v. McGraw , No. 2:02-cr-00018-LJM-CMM, 2019 WL 2059488, at *5 (S.D. Ind. May 9, 2019) ("Mr. McGraw has served much of his sentence while seriously ill and in physical discomfort ... [F]urther incarceration in his condition would be greater than necessary to serve the purposes of punishment ...."); United States v. Ebbers , 432 F. Supp. 3d 421, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) ("[H]aving reached a point where [the inmate's] quality of life is quite low, releasing [him] will not prevent him from being adequately punished nor will it discount the seriousness of his offense or diminish the message that his crimes were unacceptable").
Because of that history and those health issues, along with his "steeper than average end-of-life trajectory" I find it to be unlikely that he will be a danger to any person or the community if released. See United States v. Tidwell , 476 F. Supp. 3d 66, 80 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (noting that an inmate whose "health is deteriorating rapidly" would not pose a risk to others). Moreover, when released, Carroll will be subject to supervised release for eight years. Doc. 74 at 3. As discussed above, his criminal history has been driven, in large part, by his addiction. He had achieved sobriety by the time of sentencing and United States Probation will be able to help coordinate services so that he can maintain his sobriety.
Further, conditions of supervision, such as mandatory drug testing, will ensure that the court catches any relapse and has the opportunity to impose appropriate consequences. Supervised release thereby reduces whatever risk he may pose to the public. United States v. Lopez , 487 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1162 (D.N.M. 2020) ("[The defendant] will also be under the supervision of United States Probation Office and this Court will retain the ability to place him back into custody in the event that he violates any of the conditions of his supervised release."); Beck , 425 F. Supp. 3d at 585 (conditions of supervised release "result in substantial oversight"). Further, the continued restrictions on his freedom through supervision contribute to the goal of imposing sufficient punishment. Lopez , 487 F. Supp. 3d at 1162 ; Conner , 465 F. Supp. 3d at 894. Finally, Carroll has submitted a document indicating that his release plan is to live with his brother in Chicago, Illinois. Doc. 80-16. His brother has stable employment and the housing would be close to public transportation for Carroll's benefit. Id. If that type of release plan is followed, Carroll would avoid returning to the environment where he committed this offense. Conner , 465 F. Supp. 3d at 894.
For the reasons discussed above, I find that releasing Carroll under these unusual circumstances would not undermine the goal of deterrence. Nor would his release produce an unwarranted sentencing disparity, as the reduced sentence is based on his unique medical circumstances. After considering all of the applicable factors, I find that Carroll is eligible for compassionate release and will therefore grant his motion.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1. Defendant Andre Carroll's motion (Doc. 77) and amended motion (Doc. 79) for compassionate release are granted . However, execution of this order is stayed for twenty-eight (28) days to allow the Bureau of Prisons and United States Probation an opportunity to make the necessary arrangements for Carroll's release.
2. Based on the stay of execution described in the preceding paragraph, Carroll's term of imprisonment is hereby reduced to time served as of July 20, 2021 .
3. All other aspects of the judgment (Doc. 74) remain in effect, including those related to Carroll's term of supervised release.
4. The Clerk of Court shall provide a copy of this order to the Probation Office and the institution where Carroll is incarcerated.