Opinion
18-35715
03-22-2022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANA CANFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Nos. 1:16-cv-00088-SPW, 1:03-cr-00074-SPW-1 Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding
Before: SILVERMAN, MILLER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Dana Canfield appeals from the district court's judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Reviewing de novo, see United States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 2003), we affirm.
Canfield contends that the district court erred in concluding that his challenge to his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions was procedurally defaulted. He maintains that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2, is not a crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c), and therefore his actual innocence of the § 924(c) counts excuses the default. As Canfield acknowledges, in United States v. Dominguez we reaffirmed that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c)(3)(A). 954 F.3d 1251, 1261 (9th Cir. 2020). We have also determined that "there is no distinction between aiding-and-abetting liability and liability as a principal under federal law," and therefore a defendant who aids and abets a Hobbs Act robbery offense "is deemed to have committed a crime of violence under § 924(c)'s elements clause." Young v. United States, 22 F.4th 1115, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2022). Canfield, therefore, cannot establish actual innocence to excuse his procedural default.
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.