Opinion
CASE NO. 2:11-CR-00175-GEB
10-06-2011
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ALICIA CALHOUN, Defendant.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney CAMIL A. SKIPPER Assistant U.S. Attorney Attorneys for Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER
United States Attorney
CAMIL A. SKIPPER
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
[proposed] ORDER CONTINUING
STATUS CONFERENCE AND FINDINGS
REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME
PURSUANT TO SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
[proposed] STATUS CONFERENCE:
10-28-11]
The Court has read and considered the Stipulation for Continuance of Status Conference Date and to Exclude Time Pursuant to Speedy Trial Act, filed by the parties in this matter on October 5, 2011. The Court hereby finds that the Stipulation, which this Court incorporates by reference into this Order, demonstrates facts that support a continuance of the status conference date, and provides good cause for a finding of excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161.
The Court further finds that: (i) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a speedy trial; and (ii) failure to grant the continuance would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; and (iii) failure to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny counsel for the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation. THEREFORE, FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN:
1. The status conference hearing is continued to October 28, 2011.
2. The time period of October 7, 2011, to October 28, 2011,
inclusive, is excluded in computing the time within which the trial must commence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (h)(7)(B)(iv) [Local Code T4].
3. Defendant shall appear in this Court on October 28, 2011, at 9:00 A.M.
4. Nothing in this Order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excluded from the period within which trial must commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize the exclusion of additional time periods from the period within which trial must commence.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.
United States District Judge