This was not a situation in which a "post-sentence application informs the trial court, for the first time, of a plea agreement term that the prosecutor allegedly failed to honor." See United States v. Bullock, 725 F.2d 118, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Further, the court stated at the sentencing hearing that it had been aware of the Illinois decision before the prosecutor's allocution and that it "did not affect the court's decision one whit."
Although plea agreements are to be construed strictly, we conclude that the agreement was not breached in this case. The word "lengthy" clouds "an otherwise clear picture," United States v. Bullock, 725 F.2d 118, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1984), but no breach has occurred; Brummett clearly received "the benefit of his bargain." Bercheny, 633 F.2d at 476.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that, although "[t]he word `lengthy' clouds `an otherwise clear picture,'" the defendant received the benefit of his bargain, but admonished "`the government to avoid occasions for questioning of its meticulous adherence to the terms of a plea bargain.'" Id. at 723 (quoting United States v. Bullock, 725 F.2d 118, 119 (D.C.Cir. 1984)). We find this case to be clearly distinguishable.
[¶ 36] We conclude that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(ii) is not unconstitutionally vague on its face, or as applied to appellant, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to withdraw his pleas; therefore, appellant's convictions are affirmed in all respects. Our decision by no means condones any party breaching the terms of a plea agreement, and we "`admonish the government to avoid occasions for questioning its meticulous adherence to the terms of a plea bargain.' . . . ." United States v. Griffin, 816 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ( quoting United States v. Bullock, 725 F.2d 118, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).