Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER TO CONTINUE CASE TO 1/28/16 AT 9:00 A.M.
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, Jason Hitt, and Defendant Tiffany Brown, represented by Attorney Dina Santos; Defendant Nicholas Ramirez, represented by Attorney Michael Bigelow, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 19, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until January 28, 2016, and to exclude time between November 19, 2015, and January 28, 2016, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
Dina L. Santos, A Professional Law Corporation, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for: TIFFANY BROWN.
MICHAEL BIGELOW, ESQ., Attorney for NICHOLAS RAMIREZ.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review discovery, conduct investigation, and to otherwise prepare for trial. This case involves a significant amount of discovery, including a related case in another district. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
b) The government does not object to the continuance.
c) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
d) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 19, 2015, to January 28, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.