The district court found that, at one point, Snead's cousin told him the problem had been "taken care of." Contrary to Snead's argument, whether Snead directly threatened, intimidated, or influenced a witness is not dispositive. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.9 (stating a defendant is accountable for obstructive conduct that he "aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused"); see also United States v. Maurstad, 35 F.4th 1139, 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 2022) (noting a defendant's attempt to publicize witness names supports an inference that he intended to intimidate or threaten them for purposes of § 3C1.1); United States v. Brisbin, 659 Fed.Appx. 903, 906 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (determining that district court did not err in finding the defendant attempted to obstruct justice when he identified several government witnesses or cooperators during conversation with his mother, expressed his desire to harm them, and told her that he was going to get a copy of his presentence investigation report and send it out and put it on his Facebook page).
However, this case is readily distinguishable from Galaviz, as Real's "obstructive conduct occurred within the PSR-objection period. . . . Within this context, [Real] could have believed, but could not have known, what disputed facts the government would be required to prove at sentencing and whether the witnesses named in the PSR would testify." United States v. Brisbin, 659 F. App'x 903, 906 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Although the PSR did not identify the confidential witness by name, it describes that witness's various interactions with the conspirators and his cooperation with law enforcement.
Redmon's conduct clearly constituted an attempt to obstruct justice. See United States v. Vaca, 289 F.3d 1046, 1049 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that "[a]n attempt to intimidate or threaten a witness, even if unsuccessful, is sufficient to sustain" an adjustment for obstruction of justice (citation omitted)); United States v. Smith, 665 F.3d 951, 955 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that an attempt requires intent to engage in criminal conduct and a substantial step toward commission of the criminal conduct sufficient to "strongly corroborate[]" criminal intent); see also United States v. Brisbin, 659 F. App'x 903, 906-07 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (affirming district court's finding that defendant's recorded telephone conversation with his mother about posting his PSR on a social networking site constituted a substantial step toward intimidating government witnesses and thus attempting to obstruct justice). The district court thus did not clearly err in finding a factual basis for the § 3C1.1 obstruction-of-justice adjustment and in applying that adjustment.