Courtland turned largely on the "unusual circumstances" of the district court's "order," see id., which is not a factor present in Griffin's case. Instead, this case is more like United States v. Oliver, 873 F.3d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Bostock, 910 F.3d 348 (7th Cir. 2018). In Oliver, after both parties had the opportunity to speak, the district court made speculative, off-the-cuff remarks.
The Guidelines treat quantities of "actual" and "ice" methamphetamine—i.e., any methamphetamine above 80% purity—as ten times the weight of the generic variant. See United States v. Bostock, 910 F.3d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 2018). So, a defendant responsible for 45 kilograms of generic methamphetamine receives the same base offense level as a defendant responsible for only 4.5 kilograms of "ice" or "actual" methamphetamine.
But we never require a court to deviate from the Guidelines for policy reasons, though it may do so in its discretion. See United States v. Bostock, 910 F.3d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 2018). The court otherwise appropriately considered the mitigating factors of Briscoe's unstable childhood, mental health and substance abuse struggles, his educational efforts, and his family support in fashioning its ultimate sentence of 276 months' imprisonment.
But even if it had agreed with his arguments, it would not have been required to vary from the Guidelines range on that ground alone. See United States v. Heim, 941 F.3d 338, 340 (8th Cir. 2019); United States v. Bostock, 910 F.3d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 2018). Still, Mr. Smith contends that the problems he sees with the Guidelines undermine the district court's balancing of the § 3553(a) factors.
The Seventh Circuit has held that the 10:1 ratio is sustainable even if there is no correlation between purity and organizational level. United States v. Bostock, 910 F.3d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 2018).
The Seventh Circuit has held that the 10:1 ratio is sustainable even if there is no correlation between purity and organizational level. United States v. Bostock, 910 F.3d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 2018).
This argument has been made and rejected in this Circuit and many others. See United States v.Bostick, 910 F.3d 348, 350-51 (7th Cir. 2018) (upholding refusal of district judge to vary sentence based on the 10:1 ratio of actual methamphetamine to methamphetamine mixture); see also, United States v. Elkins, 1:18-CR-79 DRL-SLC, ECF No. 132 (N.D. Ind. February 4, 2020) (“[T]he court is not of the view that drug weight and drug purity have nothing to do with culpability, the severity of a drug offense, or its harmful impact on the public.
However, the Court likewise recognizes that it may exercise its discretion to follow the Guidelines. See United States v. Bostock, 910 F.3d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 2018) ("A court may deviate from a Guideline if persuaded that the Commission is mistaken, . . . but is never required to do so.") As to the lack of empirical data, as the Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he Commission did not use th[e] empirical approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for drug-trafficking offenses."