Opinion
1:19-CV-00823 EAW, 1:19-cv-01016 EAW
04-21-2020
UNITED STATES of America Relator Nyanchiew Sabat Gachgatwech, Plaintiff, v. Loran M. BOMMER, et al., Defendants. United States of America Relator Nyanchiew Sabat Gachgatwech, Plaintiff, v. Family Court Division of Erie County, et al., Defendants.
United States of America Relator Nyanchiew Sabat Gachgatwech, Buffalo, NY, pro se.
United States of America Relator Nyanchiew Sabat Gachgatwech, Buffalo, NY, pro se.
INTRODUCTION
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge
Pro se plaintiff Nyanchiew Sabat Gachgatwech ("Plaintiff") filed two actions, purportedly alleging civil rights violations—United States of America Relator Nyanchiew Sabat Gachgatwech v. Bommer, et al. , No. 1:19-cv-00823-EAW (the "Bommer Action") and United States of America Relator Nyanchiew Sabat Gachgatwech v. Family Court Division of Erie County, et al. , No. 1:19-cv-01016 EAW (the "Family Court Action"). (Dkt. B-1; Dkt. F-1). Plaintiff has also filed motions to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and affirmations of poverty in support thereof. (Dkt. B-2; Dkt. F-2). Because the Complaints in each of these actions suffer from similar defects, the Court has considered them together. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's motions for in forma pauperis status and they are granted. The Court has also reviewed Plaintiff's Complaints (Dkt. B-1; Dkt. F-1) as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and finds that Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed. However, Plaintiff will be granted an opportunity to remedy certain of the defects as discussed below.
References to numbered docket entries prefaced with "B" refer to documents filed in the Bommer Action, and references to numbered docket entries prefaced with an "F" refer to documents filed in the Family Court Action.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Complaints. (Dkt. B-1; Dkt. F-1). Although Plaintiff's allegations are disjointed and difficult to discern, as is required at this stage of the proceedings, the Court treats Plaintiff's factual claims as true.
I. Bommer Action
In the Bommer Action, Plaintiff asserts claims against defendants Loran M. Bommer ("Bommer"), Sabrie Mouss ("Mouss"), and the Buffalo City Court (collectively, the "Bommer Defendants"). (Dkt. B-1). Plaintiff rented a property for two and a half years from Mouss. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff requested Mouss make repairs to damaged items in the property. (Id. ). However, Mouss never made the repairs. (Id. ). Plaintiff alleges that Bommer and Mouss "conspire[d] against [Plaintiff's] business name[, and] refused to provide [her with a] landlord statement." (Id. ). Sometime thereafter, Mouss, through his or her counsel Bommer, instituted eviction proceedings against Plaintiff. (See id. ). On June 19, 2019, a warrant was issued to evict Plaintiff from the property. (Id. at 7).
Plaintiff alleges that she was not properly served as her office was closed when Bommer "served the unsigned [petition] by [the] [j]udge." (Id. ). Plaintiff alleges that the Buffalo City Court "document" ordering her eviction was an illegal order because it did not list the name or signature of the issuing judge. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff further alleges that "[her] office did not get a chance to be present in a court of law." (Id. ). The gravamen of Plaintiff's Complaint appears to be that she was wrongfully evicted from the property without appropriate process of law. (Id. at 5 ("All I need is for the court to see the facts. The service was illegal. No proper [service]. These parties [were] agents of United States. All thing is legal, if not legal is illegal. We must not be lawless people.")).
II. Family Court Action
In the Family Court Action, Plaintiff asserts claims against defendants Family Court Division of Erie County ("Erie County Family Court"), Erie County, Buffalo City Court, New York State Department of State, Erie County Family Court Judge Mary G. Carney, Erie County Family Court Support Magistrate John J. Aman, Erie County Clerk Michael P. Kearns, Erie County District Attorney John J. Flynn, and Buffalo City Court Judges Betty Calvo-Torres and Debra Givens (collectively, the "Family Court Defendants"). (Dkt. B-1 at 2-3).
Plaintiff alleges that Judge Carney removed Plaintiff's son from her custody "without [a] lawful claim." (Id. at 5). Plaintiff also alleges that the Erie County Clerk's Office and the Erie County District Attorney's Office "ignored the case." (Id. ). Plaintiff further alleges that her two vehicles were towed by "the Buffalo City Police, under Buffalo City Court," and that the Buffalo City Police and the New York State Police issued false arrest warrants. (Id. ). Plaintiff further alleges that despite no "ev[i]dence of measurable disease," Judge Givens ordered Plaintiff undergo a mental health evaluation by an unlicensed doctor at the Erie County Mental Health Clinic. (Id. ). Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asks the Court to return her son and vehicles. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff also requests that the Court order the removal of the restriction on Plaintiff's "social security number account credits to discharges public and private debt," and that the Court stop "public servants conducting commercial transactions on [Plaintiff's] social security number." (Id. ).
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff's Motions for In Forma Pauperis Status are Granted
Plaintiff's motions for in forma pauperis status and affirmations of poverty in support thereof have been reviewed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Plaintiff has met the statutory requirements for in forma pauperis status and permission to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The Court now turns to its obligation to screen Plaintiff's Complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
II. Legal Standard
" Section 1915 requires the Court to conduct an initial screening of complaints filed by civil litigants proceeding in forma pauperis , to ensure that the case goes forward only if it meets certain requirements." Guess v. Jahromi , No. 6:17-CV-06121(MAT), 2017 WL 1063474, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2017), reconsideration denied , No. 6:17-CV-06121(MAT), 2017 WL 1489142 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2017). In evaluating the complaint, a court must accept as true all of the plaintiff's factual allegations and must draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g. , Larkin v. Savage , 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003). Upon conducting this initial screening, a court must dismiss the case pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) "if the [c]ourt determines that the action (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." Eckert v. Schroeder, Joseph & Assocs. , 364 F. Supp. 2d 326, 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
III. Plaintiff's Claims Based upon "Sovereign Citizenship"
Plaintiff's submissions and the allegations contained therein are characteristic of claims by "sovereign citizens." For example, Plaintiff refers to her name as a "trademark name," repeatedly refers to other individuals as "corporations," and claims to be "the sovereign power and tribunal of record" for her own "sovereign nation state." (See, e.g. , Dkt. F-1 at 7-9, 18).
The Second Circuit has described "sovereign citizens" as "a loosely affiliated group who believe that the state and federal governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore have no authority to regulate their behavior." United States v. Ulloa , 511 F. App'x 105, 107 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013). "The ‘sovereign citizen’ belief system has been described by other courts as ‘completely without merit,’ ‘patently frivolous,’ United States v. Jagim , 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992), and having ‘no conceivable validity in American law,’ United States v. Schneider , 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990)." Wellington v. Foland , No. 3:19-CV-0615 (GTS/ML), 2019 WL 3315181, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2019). Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff's claims are premised on her rights as a "sovereign citizen," those claims are dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IV. Plaintiff's Claims Based on Her Eviction and Child Custody Proceedings
Liberally construing Plaintiff's Complaints, it appears that Plaintiff requests the Court to review the validity of her eviction and child custody proceedings. However, the Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over landlord-tenant and child custody disputes. See Rosquist v. St Marks Realty Assoc., LLC , No. 08-CV-2764 (NGG), 2008 WL 2965435, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008) (citing cases holding federal courts do not have jurisdiction over residential landlord-tenant matters); Torres v. Family Court/Administration for Children's Servs. , No. 01 CIV. 4351(RWS), 2001 WL 1111510, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001) ("Torres' claims against [the Administration for Children's Services] and the Family Court fall within the ambit of cases excluded by Ankenbradt v. Richards , 504 U.S. 689, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992), because the gravamen of her claim involves child custody—an area at the core of the domestic relations exception.").
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks review of previous state judicial proceedings, such review is barred by the Rooker - Feldman doctrine. The long-standing Rooker - Feldman doctrine "provides that, in most circumstances, the lower federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to review final judgments of state courts." Morrison v. City of N.Y. , 591 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 482-83, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413, 414-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) ).
"[C]ourts consistently apply the Rooker - Feldman doctrine when dismissing matters arising from summary process or eviction proceedings in a state court." Ratcliffe v. Liberty Home Equity , No. 3:19-CV-01842 (KAD), 2019 WL 6135446, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 19, 2019) (collecting cases). Courts also routinely dismiss cases involving child custody orders on the basis that such actions are barred by the Rooker - Feldman doctrine. See Hagy v. New York State Supreme Court Justice Joan B. Lobis , No. 09 Civ. 0879(SCR)(PED), 2010 WL 1789920, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2010) (collecting cases). The Court sees no reason to depart from this precedent here.
Accordingly, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims arising out of her eviction and child custody proceedings and, thus, dismisses such claims without prejudice. See Charles v. Levitt , 716 F. App'x 18, 22 (2d Cir. 2017) ("[T]he Rooker - Feldman doctrine implicates federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction, rather than the substantive merits of a case. And where a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it also lacks the power to dismiss with prejudice." (citation and quotation omitted)). Moreover, because a more fulsome pleading could not cure this defect, the Court does not grant leave to amend these claims.
V. Plaintiff's Remaining Claims
Plaintiff also complains that her two vehicles were towed by "Buffalo City Police, under Buffalo City Court." (Dkt. F-1 at 5). However, Plaintiff does not provide further details as to the circumstances in which her vehicles were towed, and so no fact-finder could conclude that the towing was a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights. Plaintiff also alleges that she is owed a "refund" on her "social security account transaction – counterfeit security" (id. at 4), and requests the Court to stop "all public servants conducting commercial transaction on [Plaintiff's] social security number" (id. at 5). Based on these sparse and disjointed allegations, the Court is unable to discern the factual basis of Plaintiff's remaining claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff's claims are further subject to dismissal as she either does not allege the personal involvement of individual Defendants or seeks to assert claims against Defendants that either cannot be sued or are immune from suit. However, as outlined below, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend claims against certain Defendants.
A. Buffalo City Police
Plaintiff lists the Buffalo City Police as a defendant. However, "[a] police department is an administrative arm of the municipal corporation" and "cannot sue or be sued because it does not exist separate and apart from the municipality and does not have its own legal identity." Baker v. Willett , 42 F. Supp. 2d 192, 198 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) ; see also Boans v. Town of Cheektowaga , 5 F. Supp. 3d 364, 373 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) ("Because a police department is an administrative arm of the municipal corporation, a police department does not exist separate and apart from the municipality and does not have its own legal identity and, thus, cannot sue or be sued." (quotation omitted)); Rose v. Cty. of Nassau , 904 F. Supp. 2d 244, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ("Under New York law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued."). Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim against the Buffalo City Police, such claim is dismissed with prejudice.
B. Buffalo City Court and Erie County Family Court
Plaintiff also lists the Buffalo City Court as a defendant. However, "[t]he Buffalo City Court is ... a part of the New York State Unified Court System." Lockridge v. Buffalo City Court , No. 18-CV-834, 2019 WL 1557828, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2019) (citing Brown v. Paterson , No. 10 Civ. 5833(PAC)(HBP), 2011 WL 7429454, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2011) ). The New York State Unified Court System "is protected by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity" and, thus, is "immune from suit." Gollomp v. Spitzer , 568 F.3d 355, 367 (2d Cir. 2009). Consequently, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim against the Buffalo City Court, a part of the New York State Unified Court System, such claim is dismissed with prejudice.
For the same reason, Plaintiff's claim against the Erie County Family Court must also be dismissed. See Dyer v. Family Court , No. 16-cv-6876 (BMC)(RLM), 2016 WL 7494864, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2016) ("[A]ny claims against the Family Court, a court that is part of the New York State Unified Court System, must be dismissed because it is entitled to sovereign immunity as guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment."); Amaker v. State of N.Y. Cty. of New York Family Court , No. 11-cv-4815 (KAM), 2011 WL 4916702, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2011) ("The New York State Unified Court System, of which the family court is a part, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.").
C. Judges Mary G. Carney, Betty Calvo-Torres, and Debra Givens, and Support Magistrate John J. Aman
Plaintiff also lists Support Magistrate John J. Aman, Erie County Family Court Judge Mary G. Carney, and Buffalo City Court Judges Betty Calvo-Torres and Debra Givens as defendants. However, judges and support magistrates are absolutely immune from suit for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. See, e.g. , Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) ; see also Parent v. New York , 786 F. Supp. 2d 516, 533-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing claims against both a judge and support magistrate on the basis of judicial immunity). Allegations that the judge acted in bad faith or with malice (which are not present here) do not pierce the protection of immunity. Pierson v. Ray , 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). The Supreme Court has expressly applied the doctrine of judicial immunity to actions brought pursuant to § 1983. See Pierson , 386 U.S. at 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213.
The Supreme Court has developed a two-part test for determining whether a judge is entitled to absolute immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman , 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). First, "[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’ " Id. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher , 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) ); see also Maestri v. Jutkofsky , 860 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding no immunity where town justice issued arrest warrant for conduct which took place within neither his town nor an adjacent town, thereby acting in the absence of all jurisdiction). The Complaint alleges that Judge Carney wrongfully removed Plaintiff's son from her custody, and that Judge Givens ordered Plaintiff undergo a mental health evaluation. (Dkt. F-1 at 5). The Complaint contains no allegations concerning Judges Calvo-Torres and Support Magistrate Aman. Plaintiff makes no allegations that any of these Defendants acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction, and so her claims against them are subject to dismissal. However, to the extent that Plaintiff can plausibly allege, if true, that these Defendants acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction, Plaintiff will be permitted to replead her claims against these Defendants.
D. Erie County Clerk Michael P. Kearns
Plaintiff lists Erie County Clerk Michael P. Kearns as a defendant. "[Judicial immunity] also applies to government officials for their acts that assist a judge in the performance of his or her judicial duties." Hudson v. Forman , No. 19-CV-1830 (CS), 2019 WL 1517581, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2019) (citing Cleavinger v. Saxner , 474 U.S. 193, 200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) ). "In the State of New York, a County Clerk's duties include those of a state-court clerk." Id. (citing N.Y. Cons. Art. VI, § 6 (e), N.Y. County Law § 525(1) ); see also Diaz v. Pataki , 368 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that pursuant to state law, the Bronx County Clerk's "primary function is to serve as a clerk of the Supreme Court of Bronx County, a state court" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Here, the Complaint only alleges the following regarding the Erie County Clerk's office: "Erie County Clerk office and Erie County District Attorney Office. These two offices ignored the case which was brought to their offices regarding violation done by one of the agency under their supervisor administration on or about 2011 until current time." (Dkt. F-1 at 5). If the complained of action was a result of the County Clerk's performance of a function closely associated with the judicial process, the County Clerk would be entitled to judicial immunity. See Hudson v. Forman , No. 19-CV-9637 (CM), 2019 WL 6312004, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2019) (finding the county clerk defendant entitled to absolute judicial immunity "for following court procedure regarding certification of the record for appeal"); Hudson , 2019 WL 1517581, at *3 (finding the county clerk defendant entitled to judicial immunity for refusing to issue the plaintiff a summons and to certify the plaintiff's record on appeal).
However, to the extent that Plaintiff can plausibly allege, if true, a cognizable claim against the County Clerk—not arising out of his performance of a function closely associated with the judicial process—Plaintiff will be permitted to replead her claim against this Defendant.
E. New York State Department of State
Plaintiff lists the New York State Department of State as a defendant. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over claims against states absent their consent to such suit or an express statutory waiver of immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 100-01, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) ; see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 65-66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Here, Plaintiff's Complaint contains no allegations concerning the New York State Department of State. As such, the Court cannot discern whether Plaintiff alleges claims that are not subject to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim against the New York State Department of State is dismissed without prejudice. However, Plaintiff will be permitted to amend her complaint to set forth the necessary allegations therein.
F. District Attorney John J. Flynn
Plaintiff also lists District Attorney Flynn as a Defendant. However, a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for performing prosecutorial activities that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Hill v. City of N.Y. , 45 F.3d 653, 660-61 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) ). "[G]enerally only (a) the prosecutor's decisions with regard to whether or not to institute a prosecution and (b) his performance of his litigation-related duties are given the shield of absolute immunity. Most other activities are characterized as administrative or investigative and, thus, merit less protection." Ying Jing Gan v. City of N.Y. , 996 F.2d 522, 530 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons , 509 U.S. 259, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the following:
acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity. Those acts must include the professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial or before a grand jury after a decision to seek an indictment has been made.
Id. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606. The Buckley Court distinguished between "the advocate's role in evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, on the one hand, and the detective's role in searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested, on the other hand" and explained that a prosecutor is absolutely immune while performing the former function but not if performing the latter function. Id.
Here, the Complaint only alleges the following regarding the District Attorney's office: "Erie County Clerk office and Erie County District Attorney Office. These two offices ignored the case which was brought to their offices regarding violation done by one of the agency under their supervisor administration on or about 2011 until current time." (Dkt. F-1 at 5). The Court is unable to discern the substance of Plaintiff's allegations and, thus, cannot determine whether Plaintiff's claim relates to the District Attorney's office's prosecutorial tasks as opposed to investigative tasks. However, Plaintiff will be permitted to amend her complaint to set forth the necessary allegations therein.
G. Erie County
Plaintiff lists Erie County as a defendant. To hold a municipality liable in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official custom or policy that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right. Zahra v. Town of Southold , 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Gottlieb v. Cty. of Orange , 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1996) ("In order to establish the liability of a municipality in an action under § 1983 for unconstitutional acts by a municipal employee below the policymaking level, a plaintiff must show that the violation of his constitutional rights resulted from a municipal custom or policy.").
Here, Plaintiff sets forth no allegations against Erie County, appearing to rely solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior . However, municipalities are not subject to § 1983 liability solely on the basis of respondeat superior . Collins v. City of Harker Heights , 503 U.S. 115, 121, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) ; Monell v. N.Y. City Dept. of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a constitutional deprivation was caused by or occurred pursuant to an official custom or policy of Erie County, but will be permitted to amend her complaint to set forth the necessary allegations therein.
VI. Leave to Amend
To the extent Plaintiff may have plausible claims in connection with the towing of her vehicle or "social security account transaction – counterfeit security," Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint in the Family Court Action (No. 1:19-cv-01016 EAW) by May 22, 2020 . Plaintiff is not required to file an amended complaint—but if she fails to do so, her remaining claims will be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is further advised that should she file an amended complaint, she must include specific allegations as to each Defendant's personal involvement in connection with her claims. The Court will enclose with this Order instructions for filing an amended complaint, and the civil complaint form to be used in a non-prisoner context.
Plaintiff is also advised that an amended complaint is intended to completely replace the prior complaint in the action, and thus it "renders [the original complaint] of no legal effect." Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco , 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977). Therefore, Plaintiff's amended complaint must include all of the allegations against Defendants, such that the amended complaint may stand alone as the sole complaint in the action.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motions to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims in connection to her eviction and child custody proceedings without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, the Bommer Action (No. 1:19-CV-00823 EAW) is dismissed in its entirety and the Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.
In addition, with respect to the remaining claims in the Family Court Action (No. 1:19-CV-01016 EAW), Plaintiff's claims based upon "sovereign citizenship," and her claims against the Buffalo City Police, Buffalo City Court, and Erie County Family Court are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint, as directed above, by May 22, 2020 , in which she must include the necessary allegations regarding her claims. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint by this date, her remaining claims will be dismissed with prejudice and the Clerk of Court is directed to close the case without further order of the Court.
SO ORDERED.