Summary
affirming the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss because his double jeopardy argument was foreclosed by Sanchez Valle
Summary of this case from Hinton v. United StatesOpinion
No. 16-30276
08-17-2017
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TAWNYA BEARCOMESOUT, Defendant-Appellant.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 1:16-cr-00013-SPW MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana
Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Tawnya Bearcomesout appeals from the district court's denial of her motion to dismiss the indictment and challenges her guilty-plea conviction for involuntary manslaughter, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a) and 1112(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Bearcomesout argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred her successive homicide prosecutions by the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and the United States government because the two entities are not separate sovereigns. This argument is foreclosed. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1870-72 (2016) (successive prosecutions for the same offense are not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause if brought by separate sovereigns, and Indian Tribes "count as separate sovereigns under the Double Jeopardy Clause"). Furthermore, Bearcomesout has not shown impermissible collusion between the United States government and the Northern Cheyenne Tribe such that an exception applies under Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). See United States v. Lucas, 841 F.3d 796, 803 (9th Cir. 2016) (impermissible collusion occurs where "the prosecutors of one sovereign so thoroughly dominate or manipulate the prosecutorial machinery of the other sovereign that the latter retains little or no volition in its own proceedings" (internal quotations omitted)).
AFFIRMED.