"We do not believe the trial court erred in its ruling. The situation here is identical with that addressed in United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 990, 100 S.Ct. 521, 62 L.Ed.2d 419 (1979).
The record shows clearly that although the veniremen, Smith and Slaughter, had read accounts or listened to broadcasts concerning defendant's criminal activities neither had formed an opinion concerning defendant's guilt and both stated unequivocally they would determine the case solely upon the evidence presented in Court. 4. Cross-examination on a part of a transaction enables the opposing party to elicit evidence on redirect examination of the whole transaction at least to the extent that it relates to the same subject. The Trial Court correctly ruled that if defense counsel examined the Commonwealth's witness Meekins concerning his plea agreement and other crimes with which Meekins was charged the Commonwealth would be permitted to question Meekins with respect to Defendant's participation in the same offenses. United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 990 (1979) followed. Woody v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 296, 199 S.E.2d 529 (1973); Deavers v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 14, 225 S.E.2d 458 (1979) distinguished.
Since then, however, that doctrine has developed into a distinct due process analysis for claims involving federal convictions. E.g., Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 256-58; United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1979). Hughey contends that the district court's February 15 order left Botsford with no other choice but to withdraw because, due to circumstances beyond his control, Botsford was unable to commit to an April trial date.
Each case must be reviewed in light of its particular setting. Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589, 84 S.Ct. at 849; United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 990, 100 S.Ct. 521, 62 L.Ed.2d 419 (1979). And, "[u]nless we conclude that the ruling of the [trial] court was an unreasonable resolution of the various factors confronting it, we must uphold the lower court's ruling, even though it may be considered a harsh one."
The district court denied the motions. We have previously held that while a bill of particulars is a proper procedure for discovering names of coconspirators the Government plans to call as witnesses at trial, United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069, 1077 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 990, 100 S.Ct. 521, 62 L.Ed.2d 419 (1979), reversal is mandated only in those cases where it is shown that the "defendant was actually surprised at trial and prejudiced in his substantial rights." United States v. Vesich, 726 F.2d 168, 169 (5th Cir. 1984).
We consider these arguments in the light of the well settled rule that the disposition of motions for continuance is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, which will not be disturbed on appeal except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Whether an abuse of discretion has occurred is to be decided on a case-by-case basis in the light of all the circumstances. United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069, 1074 (5th Cir. 1979). In addition, a defendant can obtain reversal only by demonstrating serious prejudice.
United States v. Fredericks, 586 F.2d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted). See also, e. g, United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Tate v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 99 S.Ct. 200, 58 L.Ed.2d 182 (1978); United States v. Prout, 526 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976). A third formulation is similar: the District Court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant.
" Addison correctly notes that "a bill of particulars is a proper procedure for discovering names of coconspirators the Government plans to call at witnesses at trial." United States v. Hughes, 817 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069, 1077 (5th Cir. 1979)). However, neither Hughes nor Barrentine held that a defendant is always entitled to such disclosure, or that such disclosure is never appropriately delayed until closer to trial on the basis of safety concerns.
See United States v. Little, 11-189-01, 2012 WL 566805, at *1 (W.D. La. Feb. 19, 2012) ("[T]he trial court should only grant a bill of particulars when the information is necessary for the defendant to prepare for trial. The Defendant is obligated to demonstrate that he will be prejudiced if he does not receive the information sought.") (internal citation omitted) (citing United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069, 1077 (5th Cir. 1979)); Davis, 582 F.2d at 951 ("[I]t is well established that generalized discovery is not a permissible goal of a bill of particulars."). The government cites to United States v. Cochran for the proposition that it need not disclose when the agreement to enter the conspiracy occurred.
However, a bill of particulars is the proper procedure for the defendant to discover the name of an unindicted alleged co-conspirator, if the government intends to call such a person as a witness at trial. See United States v. Hughes, 817 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069, 1077 (5th Cir. 1979). With respect to overt acts, unlike under the general conspiracy statute (Title 18, United States Code, Section 371), the government need not prove an overt act by the defendant in furtherance of a drug conspiracy.