Opinion
2:19-CR-0168-MCE
06-14-2021
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ANGEL JOVANI BARRAZA-GARCIA, SAUL ADRIAN HEREDIA-BOJORQUEZ, AND DOROTEO ASUERES-GARCIA, Defendants.
PHILLIP A. TALBERT Acting United States Attorney JAMES R. CONOLLY Assistant United States Attorney Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America CLEMENTE M. JIMENEZ Counsel for Defendant ANGEL JOVANI BARRAZA-GARCIA TODD D. LERAS Counsel for Defendant SAUL ADRIAN HEREDIA-BOJORQUEZ MIA CRAGER Assistant Federal Defender Counsel for Defendant DOROTEO ASUERES-GARCIA
PHILLIP A. TALBERT
Acting United States Attorney
JAMES R. CONOLLY
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America
CLEMENTE M. JIMENEZ
Counsel for Defendant
ANGEL JOVANI BARRAZA-GARCIA
TODD D. LERAS
Counsel for Defendant
SAUL ADRIAN HEREDIA-BOJORQUEZ
MIA CRAGER Assistant Federal Defender
Counsel for Defendant DOROTEO ASUERES-GARCIA
[AMENDED] STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND JR. SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 10, 2021. By this stipulation, the parties now request that the Court continue the status conference to July 22, 2021, and to exclude time under the Court's General Orders, as well as under Local Code T4, for the reasons set forth below.
On June 7, 2021, on behalf of all parties, the government filed a stipulation and proposed order requesting to move this status conference to July 24, 2021. That date was included in error. The government now files this amended stipulation and proposed order, requesting to move the status conference instead to July 22.
On April 17, 2020, this Court issued General Order 617, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California scheduled to commence before June 15, 2020, and allows district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after June 1. This and previous General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.
Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness, ” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally or in writing”).
Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act-which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory and inexcusable-General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.
The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens' eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F.Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules.
In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).
The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make “additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge's discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D.
STIPULATION
1. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference in this matter to July 22, 2021, at 10:00 a.m., and to exclude time between the date of the Court's order, below, and July 22, 2021, under Local Code T4 and this Court's General Orders.
2. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, photographs, physical narcotics evidence, and video surveillance. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review the charges and discovery, conduct investigation, and consult with their respective clients regarding potential defenses in this matter.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period between the date of this Court's order, below, and July 22, 2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to the Court's General Orders, in the interest of public health and safety, and pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action Cal. March 18, 2020). outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
3. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.