The above-quoted statement of the trial judge is the only evidence in the record as to the reasons why he dismissed this case on speedy trial grounds ("I think all of this has gone far enough"). A somewhat similar fact situation was addressed by the Tenth United States Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Barney, 550 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1977). In that case, "the trial judge, upon learning that [the defendant] had been unable to make bond and had been in custody for five months, apparently concluded that this one fact in itself constituted sufficient ground for finding a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial."

It is also consistent with the standard of review we have applied to rulings on other motions seeking dismissal based on delays in a criminal proceeding. See United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir. 2010) ("We review the denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial Act for an abuse of discretion . . . . and its underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error."); United States v. Barney, 550 F.2d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 1977) (applying abuse of discretion standard to district court's dismissal of criminal proceeding under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) for "unnecessary delay").

It is also consistent with the standard of review we have applied to rulings on other motions seeking dismissal based on delays in a criminal proceeding. See United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir. 2010) ("We review the denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial Act for an abuse of discretion . . . . and its underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error."); United States v. Barney, 550 F.2d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 1977) (applying abuse of discretion standard to district court's dismissal of criminal proceeding under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) for "unnecessary delay").

. . ." United States v. Barney, 550 F.2d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 1977). Consequently, we review the district court's decision in this case for an abuse of discretion.

A dismissal under Rule 48(b), whether it be on motion or sua sponte, is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. Barney, 550 F.2d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 1977). Appellant's complaint focuses on the period between November 1989, and May 1990.

Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion by the District Court in denying his Rule 48(b) motion. United States v. Barney, 550 F.2d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Aberson, 419 F.2d 820 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1066, 90 S.Ct. 1497, 25 L.Ed.2d 687 (1970); Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1969). Conclusion

“A dismissal under Rule 48(b), whether it be on motion or sua sponte, is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Kalady, 941 F.2d 1090, 1094 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Barney, 550 F.2d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 1977)).

Other courts have recognized that a "presumptively prejudicial" delay in a given case requires the examination of the remaining factors. See, e.g., Isaac v. Perrin, 659 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1981) (10-month delay in sexual assault case held sufficient to trigger further analysis of Barker factors); Morrison v. Jones, 565 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1977) (delay of three years sufficient to trigger further analysis of Barker factors; however, right to speedy trial held not violated because defendant failed to prove prejudice and did not request speedy trial); Smith v. Mabry, 564 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1977) (10-month delay following defendant's assertion of speedy trial right held sufficient to trigger inquiry); United States v. Barney, 550 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1977) (a delay of only five months while defendant was incarcerated and awaiting trial held sufficient to require further inquiry); Paine v. McCarthy, 527 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1975) (10-month delay before trial sufficient to trigger further examination despite fact that defendant did not make speedy trial demand for several months and the demand, when made, came within 90 days of statutory trial date); United States ex rel. Spina v. McQuillan, 525 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1975) (26-month delay sufficient to trigger further analysis but insufficient alone to require finding of prejudice). As I noted earlier, the defendant in this case was confined in a county jail and in other secure institutions for the entire 28 months of pretrial delay.