Opinion
No. 1:17-cr-00010-NONE
10-09-2020
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. CURTIS ANDREW BALDWIN, et al., Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
(Doc. Nos. 93, 101)
Pending before the court is defendant Curtis Andrew Baldwin's motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) as supplemented. The motion and supplement are largely based on defendant's medical condition and the alleged risks posed to him by the ongoing coronavirus ("COVID-19") outbreak. (Doc. Nos. 93 at 6; 101.) For the reasons explained below, defendant's motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
On October 19, 2018, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) as alleged in Count Three of the indictment in this case. (Doc. No. 74 at 2.) Specifically, as part of the presentence investigation it was determined that defendant Baldwin was responsible for supplying 439 grams of actual methamphetamine to a confidential source and was subsequently arrested by federal authorities. (Doc. No. 80 (Presentence Report) at 5.) It was also determined that under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines defendant Baldwin's adjusted offense level was 29 and his criminal history category was VI, resulting in an advisory sentencing guideline range calling for a sentence of 151 to 188 months imprisonment. (Id. at 19.) The U.S. Probation Office recommended a low-end-guideline sentence of 151 months imprisonment. (Id.) At the sentencing hearing held on January 14, 2019, the sentencing judge departed downward from the guideline range and sentenced the defendant to the custody of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for a term of imprisonment of 128 months, with that term to run consecutively with a state sentence imposed against defendant in a different case, and with a 60 month term of supervised release to follow. (Doc. No. 85 at 2-3.)
In light of the amount of actual methamphetamine involved in defendant's offense of conviction he faced a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence on this charge. (Doc. No. 80 at 1, 15.)
Defendant is currently serving his federal sentence at the U.S. Bureau of Prisons' ("BOP") Lompoc Federal Correctional Institute in Lompoc, California ("FCI Lompoc"). (Doc. No. 93 at 1.) On April 22, 2020, defendant appearing pro se filed the pending motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Id.) Defendant, by and through his appointed counsel (see Doc. Nos. 94, 95), filed a supplemental opening brief in support of that motion on May 24, 2020. (Doc. No. 101.) On June 22, 2020, the government filed its opposition to the motion, and on June 28, 2020, defendant filed his reply thereto. (Doc. Nos. 105, 108.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A court generally "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see also Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010) ("'[A] judgment of conviction that includes [a sentence of imprisonment] constitutes a final judgment' and may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances."). Those limited circumstances include compassionate release in extraordinary cases. See United States v. Holden, 452 F. Supp. 3d 964, 968 (D. Or. 2020). Prior to the enactment of the First Step Act of 2018 ("the FSA"), motions for compassionate release could only be filed by the BOP. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2002). Under the FSA, however, imprisoned defendants may now bring their own motions for compassionate release in the district court. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2018). In this regard, the FSA specifically provides that a court may
upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that -18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or
(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission [.]
If the BOP denies a defendant's request within 30 days of receipt of such a request, the defendant must appeal that denial to the BOP's "Regional Director within 20 calendar days of the date the Warden signed the response." 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). If the Regional Director denies a defendant's administrative appeal, the defendant must appeal again to the BOP's "General Counsel within 30 calendar days of the date the Regional Director signed." Id. "Appeal to the General Counsel is the final administrative appeal." Id. When the final administrative appeal is resolved, a defendant has "fully exhausted all administrative rights." See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2), the BOP may release an incarcerated defendant to home confinement "for the shorter of 10 percent of the term of imprisonment of that prisoner or 6 months." The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act ("the CARES Act"), Pub. L. 116-136, expands the BOP's authority to release incarcerated defendants without judicial intervention. The CARES Act allows the BOP to "lengthen the maximum amount of time" for which a prisoner may be placed in home confinement under § 3624(c)(2) "as the Director determines appropriate," assuming "the Attorney General finds that emergency conditions will materially affect the functioning" of the BOP. CARES Act, Pub. L. 116-136, Div. B, Title II, § 12003(b)(2) (2020). However, the BOP's authority in this regard is limited to "the covered emergency period." Id. The BOP's authority expires "30 days after the date on which the national emergency declaration terminates." Id. § 12003(a)(2). After the CARES Act was enacted, the Attorney General issued a memo instructing the BOP to "immediately review all inmates who have COVID-19 risk factors" beginning with those who are housed at facilities where "COVID-19 is materially affecting operations." Office of Att'y Gen., Increasing Use of Home Confinement at Institutions Most Affected by COVID-19 (Apr. 3, 2020). The BOP has acted on the Attorney General's guidance, including one case in which a sentenced prisoner was released to home confinement after serving less than half his sentence from a facility that reported no positive COVID-19 cases at the time of his release. See Hannah Albarazi, Paul Manafort Seeks Prison Release Over COVID-19 Fears, LAW360 (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1263706/paul-manafort-seeks-prison-release-over-covid-19-fears (noting that the prisoner's counsel had argued that the CARES Act "broadens the authority" of the BOP to release prisoners to home confinement); Khorri Atkinson, Paul Manafort Released From Prison Amid COVID-19 Fears, LAW360 (May 13, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1273090/paul-manafort-released-from-prison-amid-covid-19-fears.
The applicable policy statement with respect to compassionate release in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines sets out criteria and circumstances describing "extraordinary and compelling reasons." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") § 1B1.13; see also United States v. Gonzalez, No. 2:18-cr-00232-TOR, 2020 WL 1536155, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 31, 2020) (noting that courts "universally" rely on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to define "extraordinary and compelling reasons," even though that policy statement was issued before Congress passed the FSA and authorized defendants to file compassionate release motions). However, a large and growing number of district courts across the country have concluded that because the Sentencing Commission has not amended the Guidelines since the enactment of the FSA, courts are not limited by the pre-FSA categories described in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 in assessing whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances are presented justifying a reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). See, e.g., United States v. Parker, ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2020 WL 2572525, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2020) (collecting cases); United States v. Rodriguez, 424 F. Supp. 3d 674, 681 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
The Sentencing Guidelines also require that to be granted a reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the defendant must not pose "a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2).
In the past, when moving for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), it was recognized that the defendant bore the initial burden of demonstrating that a sentence reduction was warranted. See United States v. Sprague, 135 F.3d 1301, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1998). Although the Ninth Circuit has not specifically addressed the question of which party bears the burden in the context of a motion for compassionate brought pursuant to § 3582(c) as amended by the FSA, district courts that have done so have agreed that the burden remains with the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Greenhut, No. 2:18-cr-00048-CAS, 2020 WL 509385, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2020); United States v. Van Sickle, No. 18-cr-0250-JLR, 2020 WL 2219496, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 7, 2020).
ANALYSIS
As district courts have summarized, in analyzing whether a defendant is entitled to compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the court must determine whether a defendant has satisfied three requirements:
First, as a threshold matter, the statute requires defendants to exhaust administrative remedies. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Second, a district court may grant compassionate release only if "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction" and "that such reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id. Third, the district court must also consider "the factors set forth in Section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable." Id.Rodriguez, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 680; see also United States v. Ramirez-Suarez, 16-CR-00124-LHK-4, 2020 WL 3869181, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2020); Parker, 2020 WL 2572525, at *4; United States v. Trent, No. 16-cr-00178-CRB-1, 2020 WL 1812242, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2020) (noting that as to the third factor, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) release must be "consistent with" the sentencing factors set forth in §3553(a)).
A. Administrative Exhaustion
According to the government, defendant submitted an administrative request to the warden at FCI Lompoc around April 1, 2020 and it was denied seven days later on April 8, 2020. (Doc. Nos. 105 at 8; 105-1 at 10; 108 at 2.) Defendant then filed his original motion for compassionate release in this court on April 22, 2020. (Doc. No. 93.) Defendant argues that the exhaustion requirement's 30-day window applies even where a warden responds within 30 days. (Doc. No. 108 at 2.) However, that interpretation is flawed, as noted above. See supra note 2. Nonetheless, the court need not definitively resolve the issue of whether defendant has properly exhausted his administrative remedies. As discussed below, the pending motion for compassionate release fails to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting defendant Baldwin's release.
B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
"Extraordinary and compelling reasons" warranting compassionate release may exist based on a defendant's medical conditions, age and other related factors, family circumstances, or "other reasons." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1 (A)-(D). Even though the catch-all of "other reasons" was included in the policy statement at a time when only BOP could bring a compassionate release motion, courts have agreed that it may be relied upon by defendants bringing their own motions under the FSA. See, e.g., United States v. Kesoyan, No. 2:15-cr-236-JAM, 2020 WL 2039028, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2020) (collecting cases).
Thus, the medical condition of a defendant may warrant compassionate release where he or she "is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced illness with an end of life trajectory)," though "[a] specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not required." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1 (A)(i). Non-exhaustive examples of terminal illnesses that may warrant a compassionate release "include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia." Id. In addition to terminal illnesses, a defendant's debilitating physical or mental condition may warrant compassionate release, including when:
The defendant isId. at cmt. n.1 (A)(ii). Where a defendant has moderate medical issues that otherwise might not be sufficient to warrant compassionate release under ordinary circumstances, some courts have concluded that the risks posed by COVID-19 tips the scale in favor of release in particular situations. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, No. 2:03-cr-00271-AB, 2020 WL 1627331, at *10-11 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2020) ("Without the COVID-19 pandemic—an undeniably extraordinary event—Mr. Rodriguez's health problems, proximity to his release date, and rehabilitation would not present extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence. But taken together, they warrant reducing his sentence.").
(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,
(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or
(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process,
that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.
Compassionate release may also be warranted based on a defendant's age and other related factors. In these situations, "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist where a "defendant (i) is at least 65 years old; (ii) is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process; and (iii) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(B). In determining a defendant's projected release date, courts may take into account any "good time credits" awarded to the defendant by BOP for "exemplary" behavior in prison as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Burrill, No. 17-cr-00491-RS, 2020 WL 1846788, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2020).
However, because defendant Baldwin is only 58 years old (Doc. No. 80 at 3), his age and age-related factors do not play a role in consideration of his pending motion.
Here, defendant Baldwin argues that extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting his compassionate release exist due to his age, health conditions, and the risk posed to him by COVID-19. To establish extraordinary and compelling reasons in support of his compassionate release motion, defendant must show that he is "suffering from a serious physical . . . condition . . . that substantially diminishes [his] ability . . . to provide self-care" in FCI Lompoc and "from which he . . . is not expected to recover." See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1 (A)(ii). Defendant is 58 years old and claims he is obese, has tested positive for tuberculosis, has both high cholesterol and high blood pressure, and is a diabetic. (Doc. No. 101 at 17-18.) The government concedes that defendant may potentially demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons based on his diabetes and, potentially, his prior diagnosis of tuberculosis, which the government has assumed arguendo is a "chronic lung disease." (Doc. No. 105 at 15-16.)
Defendant's BOP medical records corroborate his Type 2 diabetes diagnosis. (Doc. No. 124 at 8 (sealed).) However, the court is unable to identify any evidence before it supporting defendant's tuberculosis diagnosis, although the government does not dispute that defendant did test positive for tuberculosis at some point. (See passim Doc. No. 80 (Presentence Report) at 14 (reflecting defendant's report that he suffers from hypertension, sleep apnea, prediabetes, and used a continuous positive airway pressure machine while sleeping, but noting that defendant did not provide any documentation of these conditions so that the probation officer could not verify them). Aside from his Type 2 diabetes and tuberculosis, defendant suffers from hypertension which was noted at the time of his sentencing and is confirmed by his BOP medical records. (Id.; Doc. No. 124 at 9 (sealed).) Finally, defendant both qualified as medically obese at the time of his sentencing, and is still medically obese as recently as May 22, 2020. (Doc. Nos. 80 (Presentence Report) at 3 (listing defendant at 6'2" and 260 pounds, placing his BMI at approximately 33.4); 124 at 16 (sealed: BMI now higher).)
Therefore, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"), defendant is at higher risk for becoming severely ill were he to contract COVID-19 because of his Type 2 diabetes and his obesity. See Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): People Who Are at Increased Risk for Severe Illness, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-increased-risk.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2020). Defendant "might be at an increased risk for severe illness from COVID-19" because of his hypertension. Id. (stating those who suffer from pulmonary hypertension are in fact at risk, as opposed to hypertension generally which "may" place an individual at risk). Additionally, defendant may be at higher risk of severe illness from the virus due to his age. Id. On the whole, it appears clear that defendant is at higher risk of a severe illness were he to contract COVID-19.
Nonetheless, the court notes that defendant tested positive for COVID-19 on May 6, 2020. (Doc. Nos. 105 at 9; 108 at 3.) And defendant does not contest the government's assertion that he "has since recovered." (See id.) Indeed, defendant's BOP medical records state that he was asymptomatic and denied suffering from any of COVID-19's major symptoms. (Doc. No. 124 at 19 (sealed).) For example, defendant denied having a cough, shortness of breath, muscle pain, fatigue, headaches, chills, sore throat, or a new loss in taste or smell. (Id.) After the passage of time, defendant was deemed to have met the "criteria for the release from isolation" at his place of imprisonment (Id.) Nonetheless, defendant argues that the possibility of reinfection from COVID-19 weighs in favor of his compassionate release. (Doc. No. 108 at 3.) In this regard, many courts have "err[ed] on the side of caution to avoid potentially lethal consequences" because "the science is unclear on whether reinfection is possible." United States v. Yellin, No. 3:15-cr-3181-BTM-1, 2020 WL 3488738, at *13 (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2020) (finding extraordinary and compelling reasons exist where a COVID-positive inmate at FCI Terminal Island, who did not develop severe symptoms, suffered from a combination of medical conditions that placed him at risk of serious complications from COVID); see also United States v. Hanson, No. 6:13-cr-00378-AA-1, 2020 WL 3605845, at *4 (D. Or. July 2, 2020) ("[T]here is no current scientific evidence to indicate that a 'recovered' COVID-19 patient is immune from reinfection, as several courts have recently acknowledged. . . . [T]he Court remains concerned about FCI Terminal Island's ability to provide adequate care in light of defendant's complex medical needs. The Court is not convinced that FCI Terminal Island has been successfully mitigating the risk of reinfection, given the high numbers of infected inmates and Defendant's own contraction of the virus."). Other courts have taken the position that uncertainty surrounding the danger of reinfection "cuts against compassionate release," in part because it is the defendant's burden to establish that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" justifying compassionate release exist. See United States v. Molley, No. CR15-0254-JCC, 2020 WL 3498482, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 29, 2020).
Out of an abundance of caution, the court concludes that because of his Type 2 diabetes, obesity, and hypertension, combined with the potential risk of reinfection from COVID-19, defendant is "suffering from a serious physical . . . condition . . . from which he . . . is not expected to recover." See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1 (A)(ii). Even so, the question then remains whether defendant Baldwin has demonstrated that his medical conditions "substantially diminish[] [his] ability . . . to provide self-care" in FCI Lompoc. See id.
Based on the current record, the answer to that question is no—defendant has not shown he is unable to exercise self-care. In fact, defendant does not argue that he is unable, or is in any way hindered, from taking care of his obesity, diabetes, and hypertension while imprisoned—aside from his conclusory statement that he is "'powerless to escape the infection' if it comes again." (Doc. No. 108 at 3.) It is true that FCI Lompoc suffered from a significant COVID-19 outbreak, with it being reported by the BOP 746 inmates and 16 staff who tested positive but recovered, while two inmates died at the hands of the virus. See COVID-19 , FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2020). At the moment, however, it is currently reported that there are currently zero inmates and three staff who have active cases of COVID-19. Because it appears that current active cases among prisoners at FCI Lompoc have been reduced to zero, adding COVID-19 to the equation in this case does not tip the scales in favor of defendant's compassionate release. (See also Doc. No. 105-1, Ex. 5, at 12-42 (documenting steps FCI Lompoc has taken to reduce the prevalence of the virus).) Even defendant acknowledges that the possibility of contracting the virus again is only a possibility—not a foregone conclusion. (See Doc. No. 108 at 3 (arguing defendant "could become infected again if he remains" in FCI Lompoc).) Moreover, despite already contracting the virus, defendant appears to be enjoying adequate physical health. (See Doc. No. 124 at 15-16 (sealed: BOP medical records dated May 22, 2020, roughly three weeks after defendant contracted COVID-19, stating defendant was not in pain and appeared alert and orientated).) It appears that the BOP is providing defendant with regular and proper care for his Type 2 diabetes, hypertension, and his sleep apnea. (See generally Doc. No. 124 (sealed).) While there is still some unknown risk to defendant due to the possibility that he could be reinfected with COVID-19, that speculative possibility provides no basis upon which the court could conclude that defendant has shown he is "substantially diminishe[d]" in his ability to "provide self-care" at FCI Lompoc. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1 (A)(ii). Thus, defendant Baldwin has failed to carry his burden in this regard. See Greenhut, 2020 WL 509385, at *1 ("The defendant bears the initial burden to put forward evidence that establishes an entitlement to a sentence reduction.").
FCI Lompoc has a population of 971 inmates. FCI Lompoc, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/lof/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2020).
While the undersigned does not necessarily accept these reported numbers at face value in light of current CDC guidelines with respect to both testing and the manner of counting "active cases," there is also no evidence before the court challenging those reported numbers in this case.
Therefore, in this case, the court does not find extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying compassionate release pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A).
C. Consistency With the § 3553(a) Factors
Because the pending motion and supplemental opening brief fail to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying compassionate release in this case, the court need not address whether any reduction in defendant's sentence would be consistent with consideration of the sentencing factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Nonetheless, the court notes that defendant's motion would be denied on this basis as well.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) provides that, in determining the sentence to be imposed, the court shall consider: the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public from further crimes of the defendant and provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; the kinds of sentences available; the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines; any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission; the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
Defendant was involved in selling almost one pound of actual methamphetamine to a confidential source, and the money from that transaction was recovered from defendant Baldwin's person. (Doc. No. 80 (Presentence Report) at 19.) In addition to that conduct, defendant's lengthy criminal history dating back 20 years ago—ranging from possession of controlled substances, forgery, and evading police officers on multiple occasions—resulted in a determination that his criminal history category was VI, the highest level under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. (Id. at 7-12, 19.) The U.S. Probation Office recommended a low-end of the guidelines sentence of 151 months in prison. (Id.) Still, the court departed downward and sentenced defendant to a below-guideline sentence of 128 months. (Doc. No. 85 at 2.) The undersigned will not second guess the judgment of the sentencing judge.
Defendant has served only approximately 17 months of his 128-month sentence. (See Doc. No. 105-1, Ex. 2, at 6.) A 17-month sentence, a nearly 110-month reduction in the sentence imposed, would not adequately reflect the seriousness of defendant's offense of conviction, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, or afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. See § 3553(a); see also United States v. Purry, No. 2:14-cr-00332-JAD-VCF, 2020 WL 2773477, at *2 (D. Nev. May 28, 2020); United States v. Shayota, No. 1:15-cr-00264-LHK-1, 2020 WL 2733993, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2020) ("The length of the sentence remaining is an additional factor to consider in any compassionate release analysis, with a longer remaining sentence weighing against granting any such motion." (citation omitted)).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, defendant's motion for compassionate release (Doc. Nos. 93, 101) is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 9 , 2020
/s/_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE