United States v. Ariza-Ibarra

32 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Ariza-Ibarra

    651 F.2d 2 (1st Cir. 1981)   Cited 46 times
    Permitting an adverse inference from a witness's failure to testify if "the evidence shows that the witness is available to testify on behalf of the party, that the testimony of the witness would be relevant and noncumulative, and that the witness is not prejudiced against the nonproducing party"

    KEETON, District Judge. Following a new trial ordered by this court in United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216 (1st Cir. 1979) ( "Ariza I"), defendants Teodoro Ariza-Ibarra ("Ariza") and Alvaro Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") were again convicted by a jury of conspiracy to import 50,000 pounds of marijuana and 25 kilos of cocaine from Colombia into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 963. On this appeal, we are required to address an issue left open in Ariza I, 605 F.2d at 1219-20 n. 3, concerning the scope of the government's duty under Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), and United States v. Davila Williams, 496 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1974), to provide a defendant with accurate information concerning the whereabouts of a confidential informant.

  2. U.S. v. Martinez

    938 F.2d 1078 (10th Cir. 1991)   Cited 165 times
    Holding "firearms, large sums of cash, . . . and uncharged quantities of illegal drugs" are admissible to show a defendant is involved in the distribution of illegal drugs

    It is basically immaterial to the admissibility inquiry in cases like these whether the accused has been charged with an offense directly related to his or her possession of a "tool of the trade." See United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1224-25 (1st Cir. 1979). In particular, in admitting firearms and large amounts of cash, courts have recognized the high level of violence that is not uncommonly associated with the drug distribution business and the prevalence in this business of large-scale cash transactions.

  3. U.S. v. Newton

    891 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1989)   Cited 60 times
    Holding that "the possession of large amounts of unexplained cash in connection with evidence of narcotics trafficking is generally relevant and admissible"

    It is common ground that the possession of large amounts of unexplained cash in connection with evidence of narcotics trafficking is generally relevant and admissable. United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1225 (1st Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Wood, 834 F.2d 1382, 1386 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Collins, 764 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 255-57 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 846, 103 S.Ct. 102, 74 L.Ed.2d 92 (1982); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1105 (2d Cir. 1975).

  4. United States v. Chagra

    669 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1982)   Cited 114 times
    Affirming admissibility of evidence of appellant's purchase of expensive private real estate in prosecution under continuing criminal enterprise statute

    Evidence of this type is admissible even though the government does not specifically trace the source of those funds to the illegal acts charged against the defendant because "a dishonest acquisition . . . [is] a natural and prominent hypothesis," 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 154, at 601 (1940 Supp. 1981), explaining the defendant's affluence. United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1225, 1225 n. 11 (1st Cir. 1979), appeal after remand, 651 F.2d 2 (1981); United States v. Barnes, supra, 604 F.2d at 147; id. (cases cited); United States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 54, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975); United States v. Rouse, 494 F.2d 45, 46 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); United States v. Manning, 440 F.2d 1105, 1110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 837, 92 S.Ct. 125, 30 L.Ed.2d 69 (1971); Hagan v. United States, 245 F.2d 556, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1957) (per curiam); United States v. Jackskion, 102 F.2d 683, 684 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 635, 59 S.Ct. 1032, 83 L.Ed. 1517 (1939); Commonwealth v. Mulrey, 170 Mass. 103, 49 N.E. 91, 94 (1898) (Holmes, J.) In the present case there was sufficient evidence that appellant was engaged in a large-scale continuing narcotics enterprise so as to justify, under this principle, the admission as relevant and probative evidence of his receipt of large sums of

  5. U.S. v. Cardales

    168 F.3d 548 (1st Cir. 1999)   Cited 93 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "due process is satisfied when the foreign nation in which the vessel is registered authorizes the application of United States law to the persons on board the vessel"

    The district court did not err by permitting Officer Taravela to testify about the corroborating evidence because Cardales' counsel asked Taravela about the cause for the defendants' arrests, thereby opening the door for the government to explore on redirect the grounds for the arrests. Cf. United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1226 (1st Cir. 1979). Because we find that the district court did not err in any of the evidentiary rulings challenged on appeal, Peterson's cumulative error argument necessarily fails.

  6. U.S. v. Ford

    22 F.3d 374 (1st Cir. 1994)   Cited 66 times
    Concluding that, where the officers had independent probable cause to search the defendant's home, "[it was] inevitable that the existence of probable cause would find fruition in the issuance of a search warrant," and noting that this conclusion was bolstered by evidence that the decision to seek a warrant already had been made

    United States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446, 1454 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1346, 122 L.Ed.2d 728 (1993). See also United States v. Newton, 891 F.2d 944, 948 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1224-25 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895, 102 S.Ct. 392, 70 L.Ed.2d 209 (1981). Dr. Ford contends that he sufficiently explained the source of a substantial portion of the cash.

  7. U.S. v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia

    996 F.2d 436 (1st Cir. 1993)   Cited 48 times
    Noting that a trial judge is "not . . . shackled to a rigid and unyielding set [of] rules and procedures" but rather is "vested with the discretion to fashion an appropriate and responsible procedure to determine whether misconduct actually occurred and whether it was prejudicial"

    Similarly, evidence of the acquisition of otherwise unexplained wealth may corroborate other evidence of participation in lucrative crimes. United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1224-25 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895, 102 S.Ct. 392, 70 L.Ed.2d 209 (1981). 3.

  8. U.S. v. Figueroa

    976 F.2d 1446 (1st Cir. 1992)   Cited 44 times
    Holding that "district court minimized any danger from prejudicial spillover through its repeated instructions that the jury was to give separate consideration to each charge against each defendant"

    Evidence that the defendant possessed or controlled substantial sums of money from unexplained sources is relevant in a prosecution for drug trafficking. See United States v. Newton, 891 F.2d 944, 948 (1st Cir. 1989) (possession of large amounts of unexplained cash relevant in connection with drug trafficking); United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1224-25 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895, 102 S.Ct. 392, 70 L.Ed.2d 209 (1981) (evidence of large amounts of cash from undisclosed source relevant to charge of drug trafficking). The evidence revealed that Angel Figueroa's wealth included over $117,000 in bank accounts and withdrawal rights to an additional $30,000.

  9. Perez v. Irwin

    963 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1992)   Cited 9 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that defining reasonable doubt as "doubt to a moral certainty" diluted the government's burden of proof by suggesting to the jury that to acquit, their doubt must rise to the level of moral certainty

    See, e.g., United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 436 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091, 97 S.Ct. 1100. 1101, 51 L.Ed.2d 536 (1977); United States v. Acarino, 408 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961, 89 S.Ct. 2101, 23 L.Ed.2d 746 (1969); United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711, 720-21 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 578, 66 L.Ed.2d 476 (1980); United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1228 (1st Cir. 1979), appeal after remand, 651 F.2d 2 and cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895, 102 S.Ct. 392, 70 L.Ed.2d 209 (1981). In the instant case the phrase "moral certainty" was used not to emphasize the prosecution's burden of proof, but rather incorrectly to define the degree of doubt necessary to entitle petitioner to an acquittal.

  10. U.S. v. Geer

    923 F.2d 892 (1st Cir. 1991)   Cited 30 times

    United States v. Newton, 891 F.2d 944, 948 (1st Cir. 1989). See also United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1224-25 (1st Cir. 1979). Trial counsel did, however, object to the following exchange between Brunelle and the prosecutor: