Opinion
23-cr-643 (AS)
02-27-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. FIDEL ARAMBOLES, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
ARUN SUBRAMANIAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The government alleges that during a car stop on May 27, 2023, officers found a Bersa Thunder 380 pistol in Fidel Aramboles's possession. Dkt. 1 ¶ 3. The government also says that Aramboles has four prior felony convictions related to weapons and narcotics. ¶ 4. Aramboles was indicted on one count of possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Dkt. 9. Aramboles moves to dismiss the indictment. He argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, invoking the Second Amendment. For the following reasons, Aramboles's motion is DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” The Supreme Court has interpreted the Second Amendment to “protect[] the right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008).
More recently, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Second Amendment protects “an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.” Id. at 17. But the Court clarified the test for evaluating the constitutionality of a regulation: “[W]hen the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct,” a regulation of that conduct may be upheld only if the government demonstrates that the “regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 18.
Section 922(g)(1) criminalizes the possession of a firearm by individuals who have been convicted of a felony. In 2013, the Second Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013). The Second Circuit noted that neither Heller nor McDonald “cast[s] doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” Id. at 281 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626). The Second Circuit has not issued any decisions regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) since Bruen.
DISCUSSION
Aramboles argues that the Second Amendment applies to him and, under Bruen, § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional.
However, the Court remains bound by Bogle, in which the Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). The Court must follow Bogle “unless it would be impossible to comply with both its commands and those of the Supreme Court” in Bruen. Augenbaum v. Anson Invs. Master Fund LP, 2024 WL 263208, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2024). Here, the Court holds that Bogle and Bruen can be reconciled.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed felon disarmament laws as consistent with the Second Amendment. First, in Heller, the Court stated that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” 554 U.S. at 626. And two years later in McDonald, a plurality of the Court “repeat[ed Heller's] assurances.” 561 U.S. at 786. It was this precedent that Bogle applied when it upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). See 717 F.3d at 281.
Bruen is also consistent with Bogle. Bruen disavowed “means-end scrutiny in the Second Amendment context,” in favor of an analysis focused on “historical tradition.” 597 U.S. at 18. But Bogle did not apply a means-end analysis. It emphasized (just as Heller did) that felon disarmament was a “longstanding prohibition[].” 717 F.3d at 281. Moreover, Bruen did not cast doubt on the constitutionality of these laws. The majority stated that “nothing in [its] analysis should be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of . . . shall-issue regimes, which often require applicants to undergo a background check . . . [and] are designed to ensure only that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, law-abiding, responsible citizens.” 597 U.S. at 38 n.9 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Three members of the Bruen majority also wrote or joined separate opinions emphasizing the constitutionality of felon disarmament laws. See id. at 72 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Our holding decides nothing about who may lawfully possess a firearm ....Nor have we disturbed anything that we said in Heller or McDonald . . . about restrictions that may be imposed on the possession or carrying of guns.”); id. at 80-81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.) (“Properly interpreted, the Second Amendment allows a variety of gun regulations,” including the “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” described in McDonald (citations omitted)).
Aramboles suggests that the Court is not required to follow Bogle because it “was a one-paragraph decision that cited no historical research and relied entirely on dicta from Heller and McDonald.” Dkt. 12 at 6. But as already explained, Bogle properly relied on the “longstanding prohibitions” of felon disarmament, rather than the means-end analysis that Bruen foreclosed. 717 F.3d at 281. And the Court is not otherwise free to ignore Bogle because of its length. Instead, the question is whether Bruen and Bogle are irreconcilable, and the Court holds that they are not.
In short, the Second Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions in Heller and McDonald. And Bruen did not disrupt things in a way that would permit this Court to ignore Bogle's clear dictate. So the Court agrees with the many other courts in this District that have held that Bogle remains binding. See, e.g., United States v. Golston, 2024 WL 149603, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2024); United States v. D'Angelo, 2023 WL 9056404, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2023); United States v. Williams, 2023 WL 8355891, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2023); United States v. Fayton, 2023 WL 8275924, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2023); United States v. Nelson, 2023 WL 6520378, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2023); United States v. Craft, 2023 WL 6215326, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2023); United States v. Davila, 2023 WL 5361799, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2023); United States v. Hampton, 2023 WL 3934546, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2023); United States v. Barnes, 2023 WL 2268129, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2023); United States v. King, 634 F.Supp.3d 76, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).
CONCLUSION
Aramboles's motion to dismiss the indictment is therefore denied. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Dkt. 12.
SO ORDERED.