That language, Grant argues, is perfectly plain, directing that "for the purpose" of § 3583 (supervised release) and § 3013 (special assessments) - undoubtedly laws "other" than § 924(a)(4) - his § 922(q) convictions are to be treated as misdemeanors, subject to no more than a one-year term of supervised release and to no special assessments at all. The First Circuit recently rejected precisely this argument, on plain error review, in United States v. Alvira-Sanchez, 804 F.3d 488, 494-95 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2030 (2016). As in this case, the district court in Alvira-Sanchez treated a § 922(q) offense as a felony for purposes of imposing a three-year term of supervised release under § 3583 and a $100 assessment under § 3013.
A "district court's power under § 3582(c)(2) to reduce the prison term of a defendant who was sentenced based on a guideline range that has subsequently been lowered by the United States Sentencing Commission constitutes one such ‘exception to the general rule of finality’ governing such sentences." United States v. Zayas–Ortiz , 808 F.3d 520, 523 (1st Cir.2015) (quoting Dillon , 560 U.S. at 824, 130 S.Ct. 2683 ); see alsoUnited States v. Alvira–Sanchez , 804 F.3d 488, 495 (1st Cir.2015) ("If a defendant is sentenced to a prison term based on a sentencing range that the Sentencing Commission later lowers, a district court may reduce the defendant's sentence if such a reduction is consistent with the Commission's policy statements.") (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) )."District courts proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) follow a two-step approach."
Two circuits have concluded that the government's interpretation is not plainly erroneous. United States v. Grant , 665 F. App'x 304, 308 (4th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. Alvira-Sanchez , 804 F.3d 488, 495 (1st Cir. 2015).
All that remains is Castillo's request to be resentenced by a different judge. Requests for a new judge on remand are granted "only in very unusual cases," United States v. Vázquez-Méndez, 915 F.3d 85, 88 (1st Cir. 2019), such as where "there is reason to think that a judge will base sentencing determinations on unreliable or inaccurate information" or where "the original judge displayed a ‘deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible,’ " United States v. Alvira-Sanchez, 804 F.3d 488, 496 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Yosd v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 2008) ); see also United States v. Zavala-Martí, 715 F.3d 44, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2013) (remanding for resentencing by a different judge because the defendant's original life sentence exceeded the statutory maximum and was based in part on ex parte information). This is not such an unusual case.
Therefore, Amendment 782 applied to all grouped counts, whether—viewed independently and in isolation from the other counts—they were drug offenses or firearm offenses. See United States v. Collazo-Santiago , 637 F. App'x 951, 952 (7th Cir. 2016) (firearm sentence eligible for reduction because firearm conviction under Section 922(g)(1) grouped with drug conviction under § 3D1.4 and therefore was "based on" guideline range that was subsequently lowered); United States v. Alvira-Sanchez , 804 F.3d 488, 491 n.1, 495–96 (1st Cir. 2015) (Amendment 782 reduced sentencing range on drug counts and grouped firearm count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(4) which required consecutive sentence but did not require term of imprisonment); see also United States v. Torres , 856 F.3d 1095, 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 2017) (after grouping under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c), "the money-laundering offense level was entirely dependent on the drug-trafficking" offense level; because " Section 3582(c)(2) refers specifically to sentencing range, not any given offense," "[i]f a reduction was appropriate for the drug-trafficking offense levels [under Amendment 782], then it was appropriate for [the] money-laundering [offense] as well"). In its brief, even the government concedes that after grouping, the calculated base offense level for Counts 1 through 11 and 13 was "based on the Drug Quantity Table found at USSG § 2D1.1."