Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 28, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until June 4, 2015, and to exclude time between May 28, 2015, and June 4, 2015, under Local Code T4.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, JUSTIN L. LEE, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
MICHAEL LONG, Counsel for Defendant, PATRICIA ALBRIGHT.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find:
a) Counsel for the defendant is currently engaged in a state murder trial in front of the Honorable Robert Twiss in Sacramento County Superior Court (People v. Rodgers). Counsel for the defendant estimates that he will still be in trial on May 28.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time consult with his client and prepare for trial.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 28, 2015 to June 4, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.