Summary
denying motion without prejudice to its renewal upon proper exhaustion of defendant's administrative remedies
Summary of this case from United States v. SanchezOpinion
No. 1:15-cr-00329-DAD-BAM
04-23-2020
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. CECILIO ALANIZ, JR. Defendant.
ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE DEFENDANT CECILIO ALANIZ, JR.'S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF SENTENCE UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
(Doc. No. 165)
Defendant Cecilio Alaniz, Jr. moves the court to modify his sentence of 78 months in the custody of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") imposed upon him by this court on September 12, 2018. (Doc. Nos. 94, 95.) Defendant seeks relief due to the risk posed by the COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak and requests that the court modify his sentence to a term of time served and immediately order his release on supervised release with a period of home confinement. (Doc. No. 165.) For the reasons set forth below, defendant's request will be denied without prejudice.
Federal courts may modify an imposed term of imprisonment based on a compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Defendants may bring their own motions for compassionate release pursuant to that statute only after fully exhausting their administrative remedies with the BOP "or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A defendant may be eligible for compassionate release if the court finds that "extraordinary or compelling reasons" warrant a sentence reduction. Id. The court must ensure, however, that a sentence reduction is "consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Id. The court must also consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when deciding a motion for compassionate release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
Defendant asks that the court deem § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement to be here. (Doc. No. 165 at 9.) Defendant's counsel asserts that she has sent letters requesting that defendant be released to strict home detention to the warden of the Federal Correctional Institution, Lompoc ("FCI Lompoc"), the prison where defendant is currently incarcerated, but has not received a response from the BOP. (Doc. No. 165 at 9.) However, in the pending motion defendant does not provide the court with the date(s) on which these letters were allegedly sent or when they were received by the warden of FCI Lompoc. Thus, it is not apparent to the court that defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies.
Defendant does urge the court to waive § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the various medical conditions from which defendant allegedly suffers and that make him particularly vulnerable to becoming severely ill if he contracts the virus. (Doc. No. 165 at 13-15.) However, § 3582(c)(1)(A) imposes a mandatory exhaustion regime, foreclosing the exercise of judicial discretion, even under such circumstances. See U.S.A. v. Gillis, No. 14-cr-00712 SJO (1), 2020 WL 1846792, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2020) (listing cases).
The advancing of this argument may be fairly characterized as a concession that 30 days has not yet passed from the receipt of defendant's request for compassionate release by the warden at Lompoc. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). --------
The court notes that some district courts have held that the administrative exhaustion requirement may be waived because of the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., United States v. Colvin, No. 3:19-cv-179 (JBA), 2020 WL 1613943, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 2, 2020). However, this court is bound "by the Ninth Circuit's holding that 'while judicially-created exhaustion requirements may be waived by the courts for discretionary reasons, statutorily-provided exhaustion requirements deprive the court of jurisdiction and, thus, preclude any exercise of discretion by the court.'" United States v. Meron, No. 2:18-cv-0209-KJM, 2020 WL 1873900, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2020) (citing Gallo Cattle Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 159 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1998)).
Although the court recognizes the extraordinary nature of the national public health emergency posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, it simply does not have the power to waive the statutory requirement imposed by Congress that defendant first exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking relief from the court.
Accordingly, defendant's emergency motion for modification of the previously imposed term of imprisonment (Doc. No. 165) is denied without prejudice to its renewal upon proper exhaustion of defendant's administrative remedies. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 23 , 2020
/s/_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE