As will be discussed subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that, because average unit values ("AUVs") may be influenced by changes in the mix of product sales, AUVs will not always provide a reasonable means for the ITC to estimate price changes in conducting its injury determination. See U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 96 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the ITC's ability to rely on AUVs as an indication of falling prices is subject to a rebuttable presumption that the distribution of product sales remains constant). Whether such concerns undermine the reasonableness of the ITC's use of AUVs in its like product determination, however, does not affect the substantiality of the record evidence supporting the Commission's finding.

"It is within the Commission's discretion to make reasonable interpretations of the evidence and to determine the overall significance of any particular factor or piece of evidence." Maine Potato Council v. United States, 9 CIT 293, 300, 613 F. Supp. 1237, 1244 (1985) (citation omitted); United States Steel Group v. United States, 96 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (decision about what weight to give a particular piece of evidence is "at the core of [the] evaluative process"). The volume data on the record, based on value, indicate that while apparent domestic consumption decreased, and the share of consumption held by the subject imports increased over the period of investigation, the share of consumption held by the domestic like product increased as well.

Angus argues that Chairman Newquist and Commissioner Rohr erred in using the so-called "two-step" analysis for material injury. Under this method, a commissioner first assesses the state of the relevant domestic industry. If the assessment produces a conclusion that the industry is materially injured, then the analysis proceeds to its second step, which is the separate inquiry asking whether the pertinent imports contribute in a non-de minimis way to such material injury. United States Steel Group v. United States, 96 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus, under the two-step approach, one first assesses whether there is a material injury, and if so, then determines whether there is causation.

Given these limitations, the Commission's decision to disregard the Foreign Producers' model in the Commission's threat of material injury analysis was not unreasonable. See U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 18 CIT 1190, 1224, 873 F.Supp. 673, 703 (1994), aff'd,96 F.3d 1352 (Fed.Cir.1996) (noting Commission's discretion in interpreting data).

Based on the totality of the record before it, the Court may find that the ITC's ultimate conclusion is supported by substantial evidence, even where it determines that a subsidiary finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. See United States Steel Group v. United States, 96 F.3d 1352, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Moreover, that a challenging party seeking review

The Commission evaluates the causal effects of' the three factors on the harm to the domestic industry by applying the standards set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (7)(C). See U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 96 F.3d 1352, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Trent Tube Dir. v. Avesta Sandvik Tube, 975 F.2d 807, 814 (1992). The relevant portions state:

We review the Commission's conclusions of law de novo. United States Steel Group v. United States, 96 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1996). We review the Court's evaluation of Commission factual determinations by stepping into the shoes of the Court and duplicating its review, Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Ass'n v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 266 F.3d 1339, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2001), evaluating whether Commission determinations are unsupported by substantial evidence or otherwise not in accordance with law. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i); Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716, 719 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Again, although the specific facts differ herein,Corus Group cannot be discounted. In U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 96 F.3d 1352, 1359-62 (Fed. Cir. 1996), domestic steel producers challenged the ITC's negative injury determinations. In that case, two commissioners engaged in one-step analysis, others took a two-step approach, and one commissioner did not specify his type of analysis.

In light of the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches, the Commission properly exercised its discretion by choosing among acceptable methodologies, and its choice is supported by substantial evidence. See United States Steel Group v. United States, 18 CIT 1190, 1218, 873 F. Supp. 673, 699 (1994) (providing "[i]t is within the agency's discretion to select a particular methodology, as long as the choice is supported by substantial evidence"), aff'd, 96 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Angus's suggested contribution analysis method is therefore unpersuasive.

Furthermore, Appellants point to no support for their proposition that the Commission can only satisfy the “by reason of” language in the statute by conducting a counterfactual analysis. Appellants' Br. 34–35. Indeed, in Bratsk, this court noted “the Commission uses different methodologies in determining whether the domestic injury was ‘by reason of’ the [less-than-fair-value] imports,” and “the antidumping statute ‘on its face compels no [ ] uniform methodology, and we are not persuaded that we should create one, even were we so empowered.’ ” Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1373 n. 3 (quoting U.S. Steel Grp. v. United States, 96 F.3d 1352, 1362 (Fed.Cir.1996) ).As to Appellants' citations to various tort and criminal law statutes containing the terms “because of” or “by reason of,” which the Supreme Court has stated require but-for causation, Appellants are correct the Commission is required to demonstrate causation under the trade statutes.