Other insurance as per other insurance provisions in a policy of insurance exists only where two or more insurance policies covering the same intestate, the same subject matter and providing protection against the same risks are taken out by the insured named in that policy. Southern Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Jones, 279 Ala. 577, 188 So.2d 537; United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 275 Ala. 243, 154 So.2d 3; American Ins. Co. v. Newberry, 215 Ala. 587, 112 So. 195. The insured making claim under the Uninsured Motorist Coverage of his policy for injury by an uninsured motorist is entitled to recover the amount of his bodily injury or loss within the limits of that particular policy. Sellers v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., (Fla.), 185 So.2d 689; Bryant v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817; Pulley v. Allstate Ins. Co., D.C., 242 F. Supp. 330; White v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Cir., 361 F.2d 785. An insured protected by multiple policies containing Uninsured Motorist Coverage can proceed against any one or more of the insurers, and shall be entitled to recover from any one or all of them, and he may recover the amount of his bodily injury or loss as long as the same shall be within the policy limits.

Where automobile owner's liability policy provides coverage for permissive user of automobile described therein, and a policy issued to the user extends coverage for non-owned automobiles, the owner's policy describing the particular vehicle in use is the primary insurer and the user's policy provides secondary or excess coverage, particularly where latter provides that such coverage shall be excess over other collectible insurance. American Auto. Ins. Co. v. English, 266 Ala. 80, 94 So.2d 397; United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Hodges, 275 Ala. 243, 154 So.2d 3; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. De La Cruz, 283 Ala. 167, 214 So.2d 909; Couch 2d, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, §§ 62:71, 62:72; 8 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4914. Where two insurance policies apply to the same loss, and coverage under only one is specific, the specific policy is primary, and coverage under the general policy is excess or secondary. Trinity Universal Fire Ins. Co. v. General Accident, Fire Life Assurance Corp., Ltd., 35 N.E.2d 835 (Ohio 1941); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co. v. Cochran Oil Mill and Ginnery Co., 105 S.E. 856 (Ga.App. 1921); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 152 N.W. 434 (Minn.

Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 231 Ala. 640, 166 So. 24; Commercial Fire Ins. Co. v. Morris, 105 Ala. 498, 18 So. 34; Aetna Cas. and Surety Co. v. Mitchell, 281 Ala. 412, 203 So.2d 268. Where the terms of a policy of insurance are not expressly agreed upon, it will be presumed that the parties contemplated such terms, conditions and limitations as are usual in policies issued to cover like risks, or in policies previously used by the parties. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 275 Ala. 243, 154 So.2d 3; Liverpool and London and Globe Ins. v. McCree, 210 Ala. 559, 98 So. 880; Couch on Insurance 2d § 14:16. Doctrines of waiver and estoppel are not available to bring within the coverage of an insurance policy risks not covered by its terms, or expressly excluded therefrom.

Nationwide contends that it is liable only for any liability in excess of the $300,000 limit of coverage under Hall's Alfa policy. Citing United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 275 Ala. 243, 154 So.2d 3 (1963), Alfa argues that because under its policy Friedlander is an "additional insured," and not a "named insured," the insurance coverage applicable to Friedlander is excess, and not primary. Alfa insists that its coverage is primary only as to Hall, the "named insured" under its policy. Therefore, Alfa contends that because the amount of the settlement with Packer did not exceed the $1,000,000 limit of coverage under the Nationwide policy, Alfa has no obligation, as an excess insurer, to contribute.

Where two separate companies have insured the same loss, the policy of one company containing an "excess insurance" clause, the liability must be shared between the respective insurers. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 275 Ala. 243, 154 So.2d 3; Southern Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Jones, 279 Ala. 577, 188 So.2d 537; Lamb Weston v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Or. 110, 341 P.2d 110, 76 A.L.R.2d 485; Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 197; Oregon Auto Ins. Co. v. U.S. F. G., 9 Cir., 195 F.2d 958; Peerless Cas. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Cal.App.2d 617, 301 P.2d 602; Arditi v. Mass. Bonding Insurance Co., Mo., 315 S.W.2d 736. Baker, McDaniel Hall, Birmingham, for Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.

In order for other insurance to exist the two policies must cover the same interest, the same subject matter, and be insurance taken out by the named insured in that policy. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 275 Ala. 243, 154 So.2d 3; Southern Guarantee Ins. Co. v. Jones, 279 Ala. 577, 188 So.2d 537. Huie, Fernambucq Stewart, Birmingham, for appellee.

Lewis v. Bradley, 7 Wis.2d 586, 97 N.W.2d 408; 34 A.L.R.2d 936; 4 A.L.R.2d 208; Kietlinski v. Interstate Trans. Lines, 3 Wis.2d 451, 88 N.W.2d 739; Schevling v. Johnson, D.C., 122 F. Supp. 87, Schevling v. Toohey 2 Cir., 213 F.2d 959. Other or double insurance exists only where there are two or more insurance policies covering the same interests, the same subject matter, the same risks, and having the same named insured. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 275 Ala. 243, 154 So.2d 3. MERRILL, Justice.

Security Nat. Bank v. Fidelity Cas. Co., supra. Where ambiguity exists, policy is to be construed in favor of coverage. Mobile Marine Dock Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMillan Son, 27 Ala. 77; U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 275 Ala. 243, 154 So.2d 3; Globe Life Ins. Co. v. Howard, 41 Ala. App. 621, 147 So.2d 853. Documents delivered to a bank enabling one to withdraw or remove money therefrom constitute withdrawal orders or receipts for the withdrawal of funds within insuring clause 4(a) of the policy. Black's Law Dict.; Hensch v. Metropolitan Saving Loan Co., 50 Ohio App. 25, 197 N.E. 416. Attaching one's real signature to a false writing may constitute a forged signature on or in written instructions or advices within insuring clause 4(b) of the policy.

The only issue is whether the automobile the plaintiff was driving when the collision occurred, which had been purchased in a trade name in which her husband individually owned and operated a business and in which the State had issued automobile dealer master tags to him, was "not owned by the named insured or [her] spouse." We have not found a decision of any court on substantially the same facts. Cf. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Heflin, 137 F. Supp. 520, 523 (under a policy issued to an individual, a substitute vehicle owned by a partnership of which the named insured was a member was held "not owned by" the named insured); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 275 Ala. 243 ( 154 So.2d 3) (when title to insured property was in a corporation, property was not owned by individual who owned 77% of stock of corporation). A trade name is merely a name assumed or used by a person recognized as a legal entity.

Universal also insists that it had no liability as to the Dixon Pulpwood Company because, allegedly, its liability thereunto pertaining was limited by provisions of an endorsement to the policy containing "Comprehensive General Liability Insurance" on form L6180 and a "Description of Hazards." Defendant insists that (57) the "Description of Hazards" shows that Dixon Pulpwood was covered only as to liability arising from "Surveyors — land not engaged in actual construction — N.P.D.," which, by stipulation, it was not engaged in at the time of the accident and that, pursuant to the rule set out in United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 275 Ala. 243, 154 So.2d 3 (1963), there could be no "pro rata" application because the two policies did not cover the same interest, the same subject matter, the same risk, and the same insured. However, that rule was set aside by the Supreme Court of Alabama in State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 287 Ala. 477, 252 So.2d 631, 637 (1971), as follows: "[W]e are now convinced that the Hodges holding * * * is too narrow * * *.