To answer appellants' argument that no purpose is served by denying their motion since the information sought by appellees will still be unavailable at trial due to Lively's death, we reiterate the holding in Division 1 of this opinion, i.e., in order to be entitled to a grant of summary judgment appellants as movants are required to meet their burden of proof, whether appellees respond or not. Appellants did not carry sufficiently their burden, and so summary judgment was properly denied. Compare United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Cowley Assoc., 183 Ga. App. 478 ( 359 S.E.2d 160) (1987), in which summary judgment was granted to the movant in spite of the fact that the opposing party's best witnesses were deceased and therefore unavailable for testimony, because the movant had affirmatively negated the elements necessary to the respondent's recovery. Judgment affirmed. Banke, P. J., concurs specially.

Finally, if ambiguity still remains, the court must submit the issue to the jury. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Cowley Associates, 183 Ga. App. 478, 359 S.E.2d 160, 162 (Ga.App. 1987); Travelers, 349 S.E.2d at 476. On close examination, we find that the provisions of the contract that United relies on to deny coverage to Del Guidice are ambiguous. Our construction of the contract resolves the ambiguity, however, and leaves no question requiring submission to a jury.

The Court finds "charge is made" to "mean the person offering a service puts the recipient on notice that there will be some amount assessed against him for providing that service; in other words, the service would not be provided for free." U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cowley & Assocs., 183 Ga.App. 478, 359 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1987). Here, Defendant Collins testified that the financial arrangement between Chute for the Skye and Gulf Coast was that Gulf Coast was "to tow their banner and they were to pay us for our services."

First, a court must "decide whether the contract language is ambiguous; if it is, then [the court must] apply the applicable rules of construction; and if an ambiguity still remains, the jury may resolve it." United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Cowley Assoc., 183 Ga. App. 478, 479, 359 S.E.2d 160 (1987); see Copy Sys. of Savannah, Inc. v. Page, 197 Ga. App. 435, 436, 398 S.E.2d 784 (1990); United of Omaha, 894 F.2d at 1564; Dickens, slip op. at 4. Thus, before submitting an insurance contract to the jury for construction, a court first should attempt to construe it as a matter of law. E.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blakey, 255 Ga. 699, 700, 342 S.E.2d 308 (1986).