Unless there be some express provision of law, which would be read into the bond as a part thereof, authorizing suit upon such official bond by an individual for a wrong done him by an officer, then the well settled principle of law that the obligation of a surety can not be extended beyond the terms of his bond nor to one not a party thereto would seem to be applicable, as the bond only created relations between the city as an entity, which the official represented, and such official. Clough v. Worsham, 32 Texas Civ. App. 187[ 32 Tex. Civ. App. 187] ( 74 S.W. 350); Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Jasper, 56 Texas Civ. App. 236[ 56 Tex. Civ. App. 236] ( 120 S.W. 1145). Looking to the charter of the city of Fort Worth, which we are required by section 130, Special Laws of 1907, p. 81, to take judicial cognizance of, there is no provision found in the charter authorizing suits upon official bonds of policemen by persons injured by the unlawful acts of policemen, nor any provision that the bond so required of them when executed shall be for the benefit of the individual who considers himself aggrieved by misperformanee of duties on the part of policemen.

— Recovery can not be had against sureties on tax collector's bond, for defalcation of sheriff, even though the same party should hold both offices. Rev. Stats., arts. 5156-5157, 4892; United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Jasper. 56 Texas Civ. App. 236[ 56 Tex. Civ. App. 236]; Johnson v. Eaton Milling E. Co., 32 P. 825; State v. Thomas, 12 S.W. 1034; Redwood v. Tower, 8 N.W. 907. REESE, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE. —

It is elementary that bonds required by statute are to be strictly construed and are not to be extended by implication beyond the clearly expressed intent of the statute. The District Court, relying upon the following Texas cases, to-wit: McRea v. McWilliams, 58 Tex. 328; Clough v. Worsham, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 187, 74 S.W. 350; U.S.F. G. Co. v. Jasper, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 236, 120 S.W. 1145; U.S.F. G. Co. v. Crittenden, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 283, 131 S.W. 232, and other cases declaratory of the general law, which it is unnecessary to cite, held that the bond did not run in favor of third persons. Undoubtedly the cases cited support this conclusion.

These decisions are uniform against the recovery. McRea v. McWilliams, 58 Tex. 328; Clough v. Worsham, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 187, 74 S.W. 350; U.S.F. G. Co. v. Jasper, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 236, 120 S.W. 1145; U.S.F. G. Co. v. Crittenden, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 283, 131 S.W. 232. This disposition makes it unnecessary to pass upon the contention of the defendant that it has the right to retry the issues of Capt. Megee's tort liability, except to say that I believe the true principle governing such matters is stated in Strathleven v. Baulch (C.C.A.) 244 F. 412.

The obligation of a surety upon the official bond of a constable cannot be extended beyond the terms of such bond, and does not inure to the benefit of one not a party thereto, in the absence of express provisions of law providing therefor. Clough v. Worsham, 74 S.W. 350; McRea v. McWilliams, 58 Tex. 328; United States Fidelity Guar. Co. v. Jasper, 120 S.W. 1145. A writ of sequestration, fair and legal on its face in every way, and apparently signed by the Justice of the Peace as required by law, protects the officer executing such writ, even though the same be faulty and void or voidable by reason of not having been signed correctly by the Justice of the Peace as required by law.

This view finds support in the following adjudications: Scott v. Feilschmidt, 191 Iowa 347, 182 N.W. 382; City of Cairo v. Sheehan, 173 Ill. App. 464; People v. Morgan, 188 Ill. App. 250; Town of Lester v. Trail, 85 W. Va. 386, 101 S.E. 732; State v. U.S. Fidelity Guaranty Co., 85 W. Va. 720, 102 S.E. 683. There is, however, a conflict in the decisions, and the following cases support a contrary rule: Carr v. City of Knoxville, 144 Tenn. 483, 234 S.W. 328, 19 A.L.R. 69; Eaton Rapids v. Stump, 127 Mich. 1, 86 N.W. 438, 89 Am. St. Rep. 451; United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Jasper, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 236, 120 S.W. 1145; United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Crittenden, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 283, 131 S.W. 232; Alexander v. Ison, 107 Ga. 745, 33 S.E. 657. The right of an individual to maintain an action on the bond of a peace officer given to a city is not distinguishable in principle from an action upon a bond of a sheriff wherein the county is named as obligee.

One unlawfully shot by a policeman acting under color of office has no right of action on bond given by policeman to the city, conditioned that he will well and truly perform all duties required of him as such policeman. Carr v. Knoxville, 144 Tenn. 483, 234 S.W. 328, 19 A.L.R. 69; Alexander v. Ison, 107 Ga. 745, 33 S.E. 657; Cushing v. Lickert, 79 Neb. 384, 112 N.W. 616; U.S. F. G. Co. v. Jasper, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 236, 120 S.W. 1145, U.S. F. G. Co. v. Crittenden, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 283, 131 S.W. 232; Eaton Rapids v. Stump, 127 Mich. 1, 86 N.W. 438, 89 Am. St. Rep. 451. The bond sued on not being one required by law or valid ordinance was at most a voluntary or common-law bond, binding the parties thereto, and a member of the public has no right to sue for a breach of such bond.

" ' (Italics ours.) To the same effect are Carr v. Knoxville, 144 Tenn. 483 (19 A. L. R. 69, 234 S.W. 328], Alexander v. Ison, 107 Ga. 745 [33 S.E. 657, State v. Stout, 26 Ind. App. 446 [59 N.E. 1091], United States Fidelity GuarantyCo. v. Jasper, 56 Tex. Civ. 236 [ 120 S.W. 1145], Cushing v. Lickert, 79 Neb. 384 [112 N.W. 616], and United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Crittenden, 62 Tex. Civ. 283 [ 131 S.W. 232]. "In Alexander v. Ison, supra, the action was one to recover damages for false arrest and imprisonment.