Opinion
24-6188
10-29-2024
(D.C. No. 5:23-CV-00586-J) (W.D. Okla.)
Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [* ]
Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge
After examining Vincent Hepburn's brief and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Hepburn appeals pro se from an order of the district court denying his Fed R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms the district court's order.
To the extent Hepburn's appellate brief can be read as challenging the merits of the district court's July 17, 2023, order dismissing Hepburn's False Claims Act complaint, this court lacks appellate jurisdiction. At most, assuming NASA Administrator Bill Nelson was sued in his official capacity, Hepburn had sixty days to file a notice of appeal from the underlying dismissal of his complaint. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B); see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) ("[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement."). Hepburn did not file a notice of appeal. Instead, nearly a year after the district court entered its judgment, Hepburn filed the instant Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. A review of the district court's docket reveals Hepburn did not file any motion that could toll Rule 4(a)(1)(B)'s sixty-day requirement between the entry of judgment and the filing of the instant Rule 60(b) motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). Accordingly, this court's appellate jurisdiction is limited to the order of the district court denying Hepburn's Rule 60(b) motion.
This court reviews for abuse of discretion the denial of a Rule 60(b) Motion for relief from judgment. Lebahn v. Owens, 813 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 2016). "Rule 60(b) relief is extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances." Id. "We will not reverse the district court's decision on a Rule 60(b) motion unless that decision is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable." Id. (quotation omitted). This standard is exacting. See Johnson v. Spencer, 950 F.3d 680, 700-01 (10th Cir. 2020) (holding this court will set aside the district court's denial of relief under Rule 60(b)(6) "only if we find a complete absence of a reasonable basis and are certain that the decision is wrong").
The arguments set out in Hepburn's Rule 60(b) motion are "factually frivolous" and "clearly baseless." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992); see also Hepburn v. United States, No. 24-6045, 2024 WL 3287252, at *1-2 (10th Cir. July 3, 2024) (unpublished disposition cited solely for background purposes) (describing the factually and legally frivolous basis for Hepburn's Federal Tort Claims Act complaint, which factual and legal basis is identical to the basis advanced in this case). That being the case, the district court acted well within its discretion in denying Hepburn's Rule 60(b) motion. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (holding that district courts have inherent power to dispose of frivolous or malicious actions).
For those reasons set out above, the order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma dismissing Hepburn's Rule 60(b) motion is hereby AFFIRMED.
[*] This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.