Opinion
James D. Crombie, Pro Se Debtor.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF JAMES D CROMBIE'S NOTICES AND MEMORANDUM TO THE COURT, ENTRY OF UNDISPUTABLE EVIDENCE OF FALSE CLAIMS AND REQUEST TO DISMISS CASE WITH PREJUDICE
Comes now Defendant James D. Crombie, and files request for judicial notice. I am not an attorney and cannot afford one in this case, or in litigation related to this case brought by co-Defendant Paron Capital Management, LLC. I request that this Court hear every argument and see every item of evidence I have to bring forward in a defense in this proceeding, and preserve my rights to continue to appeal and to continue to defend my positions in related litigation. I realize that some of my filings and arguments will be procedurally challenged or imperfect to the trained eye of attorneys skilled and adverse to me, but ask and move this Court to hear my arguments without prejudice.
My filings lodged in this court on July 13, 2012 (Docket #163) and in the Memorandum lodged in this court today contain exhibits that are responsive filings in my U.S. Bankruptcy Case contra to Paron's (Memorandum Exhibit A) and the CFTC's side-by-side accusations against me and evidence false claims and false statements by the parties adverse to me in this case and in other related legal proceedings. The filings in Docket #163, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court from earlier this week included as Exhibit A to the Memorandum, and the Exhibits B through H of the Memorandum also evidence malicious, abusive, evasive and vexatious discovery practices by the parties adverse to me in this case and in other related legal proceedings. These three filings together form a composite of evidence and arguments that are beyond disputes or controversy and represent litigation practices by both Paron Capital Management, LLC and the CFTC so malicious straight to the ground it beggars description.
The facts and evidence I have provided in Docket #163 and in the Memorandum filed in this Court today are not in dispute or disputable. Per emphasis, the body of the evidence I have used to argue in both filings were path dependent on documents provided to me by the parties in discovery through this litigation. Several of said documents were concealed by the parties for protracted periods of time in discovery, fabricated or misrepresented, were the centerpieces of false claims against me. A great number of them were also used as falsified evidence by counsels to Paron in a Delaware trial to make false claims and to engage in gharishly vexatious and malicious prosecution in Paron et al. v. Crombie 6380-VCP (Del. Ch. 2011) default trial I was unable to afford legal representation for or to attend. The body of Docket #163 and today's Memorandum will be lodged with the Delaware Supreme Court on appeal when it is procedurally timely (at current there is no final recorded judgment), and the body of today's Memorandum exhibits had already been lodged in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court where Paron has further ligitation filed adverse to me.
I note that I have in Docket #163 filings and in the Memorandum filings today included several references to deposition testimony in the CFTC v. Paron et al. case which are not further supported by copies of the deposition transcripts as exhibits. I will attest that I attended these depositions, took notes and stand by the accuracy of what I have purported in these filings as accurate and not as misstatements to the testimony under oath of McConnon, Lyons or third party witnesses. I do not have copies of the deposition transcripts and further rely entirely on my notes, and note to this court under oath that the reason why I do not have copies of these transcripts is I cannot afford to purchase them, and copies of them were not provided to me by the parties who are not required to do so, but also intend to use such documents as evidence at trial in this case. In lieu of permitting the parties adverse to me to merely state I have not authenticated or provided the deposition transcript evidence, I ask that this court challenge litigants adverse to me to impeach my statements whilst also lodging a full and complete record of deposition transcripts in their counter-arguments as exhibits to avoid any possibility or inference that they have misstated or misrepresented the full, complete and accurate record of the testimony evidence itself. Given the pattern of obstructive behavior and misrepresentations of evidence by parties averse to me in this case, I respectfully request that this court acknowledge that these same parties adverse to me are not honest arbiters of discovery or of representations made to evidence in this case.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2), I respectfully request that the Court take judicial notice of the July 13, 2012 Notice and the Memorandum filed today and all of their evidence contents. Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) provides that a court may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably be disputed. The fact evidence provided in my filings on July 13, 2012 and today are not disputable: it is path reliable on documents provided by the parties in this case to me, public records documents and litigation filings under oath by the same parties adverse to me in related litigation as to this case. Fed R. Evid. 201(b): Records related to a judicial action are a source of reasonably indisputable accuracy and an appropriate subject for judicial notice. Ezike v. Mittal, No. C 08-1867 SBA, 2009 WL 506867, Feb. 2009. The July 13, 2012 and July 23, 2012 filings I have lodged in this Court are not subject to reasonable dispute and are capable of accurate and ready determination with no possible controversy or opposition.
The Courts have long held that Pro Se pleadings are to be read liberally and if there is relief available that they have failed to request, the Courts should be lenient and the Pro Se litigant should be afforded that available relief. Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1983) Reversed and Remanded which held: "[26] a court should be particularly careful to ensure proper notice to a pro se litigant.' Herron v. Beck, 693 F.2d at 127. See also Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1129 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding district court abused its discretion... failing to afford to a pro se civil rights litigant..." "[37] The pleadings of pro se litigants... subject to less stringent rules...., however inartfully drafted, must be held to less rigorous standards than... by lawyers.'
Woodall v. Foti, 651 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1981); see Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1981)." F.D.I.C. v. Hillcrest Assoc., 66 F.3d 566 (2d Cir. 1995) "reiterating general rule and outlining exception for pro se litigants."
"We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and const rue them liberally." Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) We give a "liberal" reading to pro se filings because those litigants lack formal legal training. See GJR Invs., 132 F.3d at 1369 ("Courts do and should show a leniency to pro se litigants not enjoyed by those with the benefit of a legal education."). In Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 09/17/2003) the Court held: "The law does not entertain the legal fiction that every individual has achieved a state of legal omniscience;... there is no presumption that all of the citizens actually know all of the law all of the time. Practically speaking, citizens must educate themselves about the law" See West Covina, 525 U.S. at 241, 119 S.Ct. at 682 (noting that an individual "can turn to these public sources to learn about the remedial procedures available to him"); id. at 242, 119 S.Ct. at 682 (noting that a citizen "could not reasonably be expected to educate himself about the procedures available to protect this interests"); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1799-1800(1985)"
I, representing myself, invokes the doctrine of staire decisions and the United States Supreme Court's Rulings and Rulings of other Appellate and Civil Courts concerning Pro Se pleadings requests this Honorable Court take Judicial Notice:"Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants' pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers." Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959 ); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233 "Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end. Proper pleading is important, but its importance consists in its effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of a just judgment." Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938) "Where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for protection of civil rights, the Court should endeavor to construe Plaintiff's Pleadings without regard to technicalities." Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway, 151 F.2d. 240, Third Circuit Court of Appeals "Pro Se parties have the right to Appeal, and submit their briefs on appeal even though they may be in artfully drawn", see Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998). "Courts will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants consequences of technical errors if injustice would otherwise result." U.S. v. Sanchez, 88F.3d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Moreover, "the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory." Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis , 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1971). The history of bias and prejudice against pro se litigants within the Courts is long. Stephen Elias who had been with Nolo Press, the nation's leading publisher of self-help law books, back in 1997, in an article Bias Against Pro Per Litigants... stated: "From the moment they first contact the court system, most people who want to represent themselves, without a lawyer, encounter tremendous resistance. Within the closed universe of the courts, this bias is as pernicious as that based on race, ethnic origins or sex." "People who cannot afford a lawyer are a rebuke to the organized bar's monopoly..., because that monopoly is morally-if not legally-justified... the ABA has admitted that 100 million Americans can't afford lawyers." "... the right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most important rights under the constitution and laws." Elmore v. McCammon (1986) 640 F.Supp. 905.
CONCLUSION
I am invoking rights guaranteed to me by both the State of California Constitution and The Constitution of The United States of America, and Moves the Court to take Judicial Notice of staire decisions when ruling on Plaintiffs pro se pleadings. Respectfully submitted, today July 23, 2012. I ask that this Court, in consideration of the undisputable evidence which has been entered to prove false claims, false statements, malicious prosecution and frauds upon the court by the parties adverse to me in this case to also immediately dismiss this case with prejudice.