The findings of the commission in this regard will not be disturbed by this court when supported by competent evidence. The cases of Beck v. Davis, 175 Okla. 623, 54 P.2d 371, and United States Casualty Co. v. Ledford, 180 Okla. 416, 70 P.2d 817, are hereby overruled insofar as they are in conflict herewith. 2. SAME — Workmen's compensation policy issued to copartnership which later became corporation — Finding that insurer was insurance carrier of corporation at date of employee's injury sustained by evidence that insurer had notice of transition to corporation and failed to give statutory notice of cancellation of policy and by its action recognized policy as in full force.
"Under the provisions of section 2, Chapter 29, Sessions Laws 1933, 85 Okla.St.Ann. § 41, the State Industrial Commission is vested with jurisdiction and authority to determine the liability of an insurance carrier to an injured employee of the insured, and as an incident to the authority expressly granted, may determine from the evidence presented, whether there was a relationship of employer and insurance carrier in effect upon the date of the injury. The findings of the Commission in this regard will not be disturbed by this court when supported by competent evidence. The cases of Beck v. Davis, 175 Okla. 623, 54 P.2d 371, and United States Casualty Co. v. Ledford, 180 Okla. 416, 70 P.2d 817, are hereby overruled in so far as they are in conflict herewith."
It is first argued by petitioner, Traders and General Insurance Company, that the State Industrial Commission is without authority to determine this question. Tri-State Casualty Insurance Co. v. Bowen, 189 Okla. 97, 113 P.2d 981, specifically overruled Beck v. Davis, 175 Okla. 623, 54 P.2d 371, and United States Casualty Company v. Ledford, 180 Okla. 416, 70 P.2d 817, insofar as they held to the contrary, and held the State Industrial Commission has the right to determine the insurer of the party liable in a Workmen's Compensation case. See, also, Young v. Postal Mutual Indemnity Co., 189 Okla. 187, 115 P.2d 139.
As pointed out above, in order to do this it became necessary for the State Industrial Commission to conduct a collateral hearing and to try an issue foreign to the matter which it had under consideration. That the State Industrial Commission was not authorized to determine this issue is too well settled to require any extensive discussion. R. S. Smith Construction Co. v. Newcomb, 181 Okla. 5, 71 P.2d 1091; United States Casualty Co. v. Ledford, 180 Okla. 416, 70 P.2d 817. The order insofar as it attempts to hold the petitioner liable is erroneous as a matter of law and is vacated in this respect; in all other respects the order is sustained.
In Farmers Gin Co. v. Jones, 146 Okla. 79, 293 P. 527, it is held that the State Industrial Commission has no jurisdiction to determine whether a policy had been canceled under certain provisions of the policy itself, and wholly apart from the provisions of the statute providing a method for cancellation by giving notice as therein provided. In United States Casualty Co. v. Ledford, 180 Okla. 416, 70 P.2d 817, decided July 6, 1937, it is held: "The State Industrial Commission has no jurisdiction to construe contract rights between the parties to an insurance policy." See, also, Beck v. Davis, 175 Okla. 623, 54 P.2d 371.
In Farmers Gin Co. v. Jones, 146 Okla. 79, it was held that the State Industrial Commission had no jurisdiction to determine whether a policy had been cancelled under certain provisions of the policy, itself, wholly apart from the provisions of the statute and by giving notice as therein provided. [See, also, Beck v. Davis (Okla.), 54 P.2d 371; R.S. Smith Construc. Co. v. Newcomb (Okla.), 71 P.2d 1091; United States Casualty Co. v. Ledford (Okla.), 70 P. 817.] In Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Henderson (Tex.), 15 S.W.2d 565, the court held that the commission had no jurisdiction to set aside a compromise and settlement agreement of a compensation claim alleged to have been fraudulently procured, the court saying, l.c. 566; "Averements of fraud in procurement are essentially of judicial cognizance."