The Court finds that the 1990-1999 CBAs unambiguously provide vested medical benefits for retirees until age 65 at no cost based on clear and express provisions discussed above. See (D's Opposition at 2 (citing UMW v. Brushy Creek Coal Co., 410 F. Supp. 2d 723, 733 (S.D. Ill. 2066) (intent to vest must be clear and express)). The Court finds no other reasonable interpretation of the express and clear language in the CBAs. There being no ambiguity in the CBAs, the Court does not consider any extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' intent to provide or not to provide these vested benefits.

See, e.g., In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit ERISA Litigation, 58 F.3d 896, 903-04 (3rd Cir. 1995) (holding that plan not ambiguous where SPD contained both "lifetime" language and a clear, broad reservation of rights clause); Jensen v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 945, 950 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that ERISA plan ambiguous as to vesting where it contained both lifetime language and an unambiguous reservation of rights clause); Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 836 F.2d at 1518 (construing in larger context a phrase providing continuing health insurance "until death of retiree" to limit the company's obligation to provide benefits until death, but noting that phrase itself was "highly probative of intent to vest benefits");United Mine Workers of Am. v. Brushy Creek Coal Co., 410 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727-28 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (finding contract to be ambiguous where it contained both lifetime language and a reservation of rights clause). For instance, in Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1329-31 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit found that a booklet containing "lifetime" language was not probative evidence that ERISA welfare benefits had vested where the booklets also did not meet the statutory definition of an SPD and the booklets contained a disclaimer stating that a contract would be the controlling document, and that contract in turn contained a clear reservation of rights clause.