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United Food Commercial Workers v. Rite Aid Corp.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division
Aug 12, 2002
Case No. 3:02CV7075 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2002)

Opinion

Case No. 3:02CV7075

August 12, 2002


ORDER


This is a suit to vacate an arbitrator's award. Pending are a motion by the defendant, Rite Aid Corporation, for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 10) and a cross-motion by the plaintiff Local 911 of the United Food and Commercial Workers, for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the defendant's motion shall be granted, and the plaintiff's motion shall be denied.

The parties are signatories to a collective bargaining agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, Rite Aid is obligated to acknowledge Local 911 as the representative of its employees in any "replacement stores."

For several years Rite Aid operated a drugstore in Tiffin, Ohio, referred to as Store 2334, whose employees were represented by Local 911. In early 1999, Rite Aid purchased another store in Tiffin, SanMar Pharmacy, placed the Rite Aid name on the store, and designated the SanMar store as Store 3191.

Local 911 took the position that the Store 3191 was a replacement store for Store 2334. Rite Aid rejected that assertion, and refused to recognize Local 911 as the representative of the SanMar employees.

For more than three months, Rite Aid operated both Store 2334 and the Store 3191. It closed store 2334 in August, 1999. The following Summer, in June, 2000, Rite Aid opened a newly constructed "big box" store in Tiffin, closed Store 3191, and designated its newly constructed big box store as a replacement for Store 3191.

As a result of this sequence of events, Local 911 no longer represented Rite Aid's employees in Tiffin. Local 911 filed a grievance, and the dispute — which involved the sole question of whether the new facility is a "replacement store," as that term is used in the collective bargaining agreement — proceeded to arbitration.

The arbitrator ruled that the new store was not a replacement store, and concluded that Rite Aid had not violated the collective bargaining agreement. In reaching this conclusion, the arbitrator found: 1) Rite Aid had not purchased Store 3191 as a replacement for Store 2334; 2) closing of Store 2334 (the union store) in August, 1999, was unrelated to Rite Aid's acquisition of Store 3191; 3) there was no evidence that the new facility was a replacement store for Store 2334; and 4) the past practice between the parties indicated that not every newly acquired or constructed store is automatically a replacement store.

The union claims that the arbitrator's decision: 1) exceeded the arbitrator's powers; 2) instituted his own brand of industrial justice; 3) did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement; and 4) is contrary to public policy.

Review of an arbitrator's decision is narrow and deferential. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 36-37 (1987). While a court can reverse an award that does not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement or manifests the arbitrator's own version of industrial justice, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960), mere error on the arbitrator's part, or disagreement on the part of the reviewing court with the analysis and outcome, is not a sufficient basis for vacating the award. E.g., Misco, 484 U.S. at 36-37. But this does not mean that a reviewing court can simply rubber stamp the arbitrator's decision. Int'l Union of Electronic Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 791 v. Hurd Corp., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3062 (6th Cir.) (Unpublished Decision).

The Union's principal contention, on which its arguments primarily rest, is that the arbitrator exceeded his powers, instituted his own brand of industrial justice, and did not draw the essence of his decision from the collective bargaining agreement when he referred, as he did in a number of places in his opinion, to Rite-Aid's lack of intent to replace Store 2334 with Store 3191 at either its original SanMar location or at its ultimate location in the new big box. Such reference, Local 911 argues, added a condition to the collective bargaining agreement's replacement store provision, and thus requires vacation of his decision.

I disagree. The term, "replacement store," is not defined in the agreement. It is appropriate for the arbitrator to consider the employer's intent, among other circumstances, when the employer engages in a series of actions that ultimately affect its relationship with its employees' collective bargaining representative. Had the union discovered evidence showing an intent to circumvent the collective bargaining agreement by playing corporate hop-scotch, the arbitrator properly could have considered such evidence.

Here the arbitrator considered several factors in reaching his determination that Store 3191 was not a replacement store for Store 2334. Among these were: financial performance, concurrent operation of both stores for three and a half months, and the gap of about ten months between the closing of Store 2334 and the opening of the big box Store 3191. While the arbitrator also considered Rite Aid's intent, that was not, contrary to the union's argument, the sole or determinative factor. It was but one among several factors leading to his conclusion, which is supported by the evidence considered by the arbitrator.

I conclude, accordingly, on consideration of the parties' arguments, that the arbitrator's decision did not exceed his powers, institute his own brand of industrial justice, or fail to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.

Local 911's final argument is that the arbitrator's decision was contrary to public policy. Here, again, I disagree with the union's contention. It does not specify a particular public policy allegedly breached by the arbitrator, aside from the general policy favoring collective bargaining and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. The arbitrator's decision, and the way in which he reached it does not contravene that policy.

In light of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED THAT the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings be, and the same hereby is granted, and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is denied.

So ordered.


Summaries of

United Food Commercial Workers v. Rite Aid Corp.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division
Aug 12, 2002
Case No. 3:02CV7075 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2002)
Case details for

United Food Commercial Workers v. Rite Aid Corp.

Case Details

Full title:United Food and Commercial Workers Local 911, AFL-CIO Plaintiff v. Rite…

Court:United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division

Date published: Aug 12, 2002

Citations

Case No. 3:02CV7075 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2002)