Opinion
A101867.
10-24-2003
UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARLENE M. CAMPBELL, Defendant and Appellant.
Arlene M. Campbell purports to appeal from the orders filed in the trial court in connection with United Commercial Banks (Bank) successful application for appointment of a receiver under Code of Civil Procedure section 564, subdivision (b)(10). The court initially appointed Robert Warren as interim receiver of certain real properties owned by Samuel and Alice Fong in San Francisco, and issued a temporary restraining order and order to show cause on February 4, 2003. The gravamen of the action commenced by the Bank was to obtain specific performance of the provisions of two deeds of trust recorded against two properties owned by the Fongs.
On February 27, 2003, the trial court filed its order appointing Mr. Warren as the permanent receiver with reference to the properties and required him to post a $50,000 bond. The courts order appointing the permanent receiver contained further provisions providing that he would manage the properties, collect rents, and otherwise marshal the assets of the receivership estate for distribution by the court. We have taken judicial notice of the fact that since the filing of this appeal, the trial court has entered its concluding order approving the final report and account of the receiver; discharging the receiver; and authorizing the disbursement of all funds held by the receiver. The receivers bond has been exonerated.
In pertinent part, Arlene M. Campbells notice of appeal states: "I am appealing against the order of Judgment Feb. 27, 2003, and order, Feb. 04, 2003." As described above, the original order appointing the receiver was filed February 4, 2003 and the courts order appointing the permanent receiver was filed February 27, 2003.
Ms. Campbell appears in this court in propria persona, and filed her "appellants opening brief" on July 23, 2003. Ms. Campbells opening brief fails to conform to any of the minimum requirements of California Rules of Court, rules 13 and 15, regarding the format and contents of briefs filed in this court. Ordinarily, we are flexible within the parameters of the Rules of Court in order to provide litigants, especially those representing themselves, to obtain a hearing on the merits. Indeed, we granted Ms. Campbell several extensions of time in order to attempt to perfect her appeal. However, it is apparent from our review of the limited record, provided by the respondent, that appellants opening brief not only fails to articulate any pertinent or intelligible legal argument, but also that it will be impossible for her do so, even if we were to permit her to file a new opening brief. (See Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119.)
As best as we can determine from the documents filed by Ms. Campbell, she seems to have parked her three vehicles at one of two real properties which were subject to the receivership and may or may not have had some sort of tenancy arrangement with the Fongs. It does not appear that she resided at either of the properties. She makes no claim that she was a creditor of the receivership estate, which was dispersed prior to the discharge of the receiver, and prior to her appeal. It is evident from the register of actions, which is part of the clerks transcript, that Ms. Campbell never appeared in the action and was never a party. Nothing in the record suggests that Ms. Campbell was an agent of any party involved in the action or that she had any other interest in the receivership proceedings. Even if we were to presume her status as a tenant, at one or the other of the properties subject to the receivership, she would have no standing to appeal from the trial courts orders appointing the receiver. (See People v. Arthur Murray, Inc. (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 333, 338.)
Our review of the record does not disclose any basis for Ms. Campbells legal challenge to the appointment of the receiver in these proceedings. The gist of Ms. Campbells opening brief appears to be that she believes the Fongs were treated unfairly and deserved an opportunity to pay their debts without the imposition of a receivership. These are not matters from which Ms. Campbell can appeal.
Accordingly, we conclude that it is best to treat the appeal as abandoned for failure to state any intelligible legal argument. The appeal is dismissed. (Berger v. Godden, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 1119.)
We concur: Kline, P. J., and Ruvolo, J.