Opinion
NUMBER 2012 CA 1578
06-03-2013
UNISYS CORPORATION v. THE LOUISIANA OFFICE OF MOTOR VEHICLES, THROUGH KAY HODGES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE LOUISIANA OFFICE OF MOTOR VEHICLES, THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, THROUGH MICHAEL D. EDMONSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, AND THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH PAUL RAINWATER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF ADMINISTRATION
Robert L. Rieger, Jr. V. Thomas Clark Kellen J. Mathews Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee, Unisys Corporation Lesia Hulbert-Batiste Warren Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant, Division of Administration for the State of Louisiana J. Wendell Clark Jamie Hurst Watts Sharon S. Whitlow Mark L. Barbre Counsel for Defendants/Appellants, Louisiana Office of Motor Vehicles, through Nick Gautreaux, in his capacity as Commissioner, and the Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, through Michael D. Edmonson, in his capacity as Deputy Secretary
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Docket Number 593,558
Honorable Todd W. Hernandez, Judge Presiding
Robert L. Rieger, Jr.
V. Thomas Clark
Kellen J. Mathews
Baton Rouge, LA
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee,
Unisys Corporation
Lesia Hulbert-Batiste Warren
Baton Rouge, LA
Counsel for Defendant,
Division of Administration for
the State of Louisiana
J. Wendell Clark
Jamie Hurst Watts
Sharon S. Whitlow
Mark L. Barbre
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants,
Louisiana Office of Motor Vehicles,
through Nick Gautreaux, in his
capacity as Commissioner, and the
Louisiana Department of Public
Safety & Corrections, through
Michael D. Edmonson, in his
capacity as Deputy Secretary
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., McCLENDON AND HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.
WHIPPLE , C.J.
This matter involves a claim for payment under a consulting services contract entered into by the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections (the Department), and Unisys Corporation, pursuant to the provisions of the Professional, Personal, Consulting, and Social Services Procurement Code (hereinafter referred to as the Professional Services Procurement Code), LSA-R.S. 39:1481, et seq. The Department appeals the district court's judgment, which maintained Unisys's exception of no cause of action and dismissed the Department's reconventional demand on the basis that the Department had no right of review under the Professional Services Procurement Code. Also before this court is a motion to dismiss the Department's appeal, filed by Unisys. For the following reasons, we deny Unisys's motion to dismiss the Department's appeal, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand for further proceedings.
In its petition for judicial review filed in the district court below, Unisys named as defendants the Louisiana Office of Motor Vehicles (OMV), the Department, and the Division of Administration. OMV and the Department filed the reconventional demand at issue herein. For ease of discussion, these two defendants are referred to jointly herein as "the Department."
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December 2002, the Department contracted with Unisys for Phase II of the Next Generation Motor Vehicles project, a project to re-engineer the computer systems of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles (OMV) for management of drivers' licenses, suspensions, vehicle registration, and other related functions. Subsequently, in August 2004, Unisys was awarded the Phase III contract for the project, and ultimately, in April 2008, the parties entered into a new contract, incorporating Phase II and Phase III with combined project deliverables and a consolidated schedule.
Thereafter, at a December 2008 meeting between representatives of Unisys and the Department, a decision was made to terminate the 2008 contract for convenience. Accordingly, by letter dated January 14, 2009, the Department gave Unisys written notice of termination of the contract, effective thirty days from the date of the letter.
Section 4.2 of the consulting services contract, regarding termination for convenience, provides that the "Agency may terminate the Contract at any time without penalty by giving thirty (30) days written notice to the Contractor of such termination or negotiating with the Contractor an effective date."
Following termination of the contract, Unisys prepared an inventory of deliverables and their completion status and requested additional payment in excess of $8 million for work allegedly "in progress" at the time of the termination. After attempted negotiations between the parties were unsuccessful, the Deputy Secretary of the Department reviewed Unisys's claim for further payment and concluded that no further payments were due under the contract with regard to Unisys's request for payment for retainage, deliverables in progress, or purported unpaid completed deliverables. Specifically, the Deputy Secretary determined that: (1) the contract did not authorize payment of the retainage upon early termination of the contract; (2) the deliverables in progress were not satisfactorily completed; (3) the work performed by Unisys had not yielded a usable product for the Department; and (4) the documentation regarding the four purportedly completed deliverables revealed that all contractual requirements for payment had not occurred.
Section 4.2 of the consulting services contract further provides that the "[c]ontractor shall be entitled to payment for deliverables in progress[,] to the extent work has been performed satisfactorily."
In accordance with LSA-R.S. 39:1524 and 39:1525 of the Professional Services Procurement Code, Unisys then sought a written decision resolving the controversy from the Commissioner of Administration. Unisys asked the Commissioner to confirm that the contract was terminated for convenience by the Department and to resolve the amount of additional compensation due to Unisys for work performed up to the date of termination. The matter was submitted to the Commissioner on the administrative record, the contracts between Unisys and the Department, and the briefs of the parties.
Pursuant to section 6.0 of the contract, the parties agreed that "[a]ny claim or controversy arising out of the contract shall be resolved by the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statute[s] 39:1524-26."
On July 9, 2010, the Commissioner issued a decision. The Commissioner noted that Unisys was contending that it was entitled to additional payment under the contract for three items: $1,514,905.00 for deliverables approved; $2,716,240.00 for recovery of retainage; and $4,470,673.00 for work that it contended was substantially complete or in progress at the time of termination of the contract. Recognizing that upon termination of the contract, Unisys was entitled to payment for deliverables in progress "to the extent the work has been performed satisfactorily and approved by the Agency," the Commissioner concluded that Unisys was entitled to payment for approved deliverables in the amount of $1,320,084.00, but that Unisys was not entitled to payment for the other items claimed. The Commissioner's decision advised Unisys that it was entitled to appeal the decision in accordance with LSA-R.S. 39:1526 and "49:464(B) "
This reference appears to be a typographical error. From the record, it appears that the Commissioner intended to refer to LSA-R.S. 49:964B, regarding judicial review of final agency decisions in adjudication proceedings.
Unisys then filed in the district court below a "Petition for Limited Judicial Review of Administrative Decision," challenging the Commissioner's denial of its claims for retainage and for deliverables in progress. In its petition, Unisys specifically stated that it was not seeking review of the portion of the Commissioner's decision finding that Unisys was entitled to $1,320,084.00 for the deliverables approved. Instead, Unisys further asserted that the Department had no right to appeal the Commissioner's decision and, thus, that "this part of the Decision is final and conclusive." Nonetheless, the Department then filed an answer to the petition for judicial review together with a "reconventional demand," seeking "to traverse the adverse finding of the Commissioner" that Unisys was entitled to payment of $1,320,084.00 under the contract for deliverables approved.
In response to the Department's reconventional demand, Unisys filed a declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action. In support of its exceptions, Unisys contended that the Department had no right of action or cause of action for judicial review of the Commissioner's decision pursuant to LSA-R.S. 39:1524, et seq. and, thus, that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Department's request for judicial review, which had been mischaracterized as a "reconventional demand." After a hearing on the matter, the district court, in reasons for judgment, found as follows:
The court agrees that the State may argue and present evidence on matters when it finds the Commissioner's ruling to be erroneous, but the court does not believe the law allows the State to file its own judicial review. The reconventional demand filed by the State is in effect its own petition for judicial review.
Thus, the court rendered judgment, maintaining the exception of no cause of action and dismissing the Department's reconventional demand with prejudice. The judgment further provided that the court's "judicial review is hereby limited to the matters raised in the Petition filed by [Unisys]."
From this judgment, the Department appeals, contending that the district court erred in dismissing its reconventional demand for review of the Commissioner's entire decision, including the additional payment awarded to Unisys. Unisys also filed with this court a motion to dismiss the Department's appeal, which was referred to the panel hearing the merits of the appeal. Thus, we first address the motion to dismiss the appeal.
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
In its motion to dismiss the Department's appeal, Unisys, in essence, contends that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide the appeal. Unisys urges that the appeal should be dismissed under LSA-C.C.P. art. 2162, which provides that an appeal may be dismissed at any time for lack of jurisdiction of the appellate court. Specifically, Unisys urges that because the Department has no cause of action to bring a reconventional demand, "the District Court necessarily lacked subject matter jurisdiction; therefore, this Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction." We disagree.
At the outset, we note that in its petition for judicial review, Unisys specifically stated that it was seeking judicial review pursuant to LSA-R.S. 39:1526 and LSA-R.S. 49:964. At the time the April 2008 contract was entered into, LSA-R.S. 39:1526(A) provided that "[t]he Nineteenth Judicial District Court, subject to appeal as provided by law, shall have jurisdiction over controversies involving the state in connection with a petition for review of a decision made pursuant to R.S. 39:1525." Accordingly, both the district court and this court have subject matter jurisdiction to review the administrative action involving settlement of controversies arising out of professional consulting services contracts, such as the contract at issue herein. Thus, even if this court were to accept the argument that the Department lacked a cause of action as asserted in its reconventional demand, neither the district court nor this court would be divested of jurisdiction over the controversy herein.
As stated in footnote 5, supra, LSA-R.S. 49:964 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs judicial review of a final agency decision or order in an "adjudication proceeding," which has been defined as "an agency proceeding that results in a disposition that is required to be made (by constitution or statute) after notice is given and a hearing is held." Thus, unless some statute requires notice and a hearing, an agency action is not an "adjudication" for purposes of the APA. Metro Riverboat Associates. Inc. v. Louisiana Gaming Control Board, 2001-0185 (La. 10/16/01), 797 So. 2d 656, 662 n.7; see also LSA-R.S. 49:951(1) & (3). Notably, the relevant provisions of the Professional Services Procurement Code, LSA-R.S. 39:1524-1526, governing the settlement of controversies arising under professional service contracts, do not set forth any procedure for notice and a hearing. Indeed, in the instant matter, the Commissioner rendered her decision based upon the administrative record consisting solely of documents such as contract proposals, weekly and monthly status reports, and change orders, and no evidentiary hearing was conducted. (R. 170, 168-3978). Thus, there was no "adjudication" in this case, and the provisions of LSA-R.S. 49:964 do not, per se, apply. See United Healthcare Insurance Company v. State. Division of Administration, 2011-1398 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/28/12), 103 So. 3d 1095, 1099.
Subsection (A) of LSA-R.S. 39:1526 was amended by Act No. 878 of the 2008 Legislative Session. The Act provided that the amendments contained therein shall not apply to any claim or controversy arising out of any contract or agreement executed prior to August 1, 2008. Thus, the amendment does not apply herein.
Moreover, we note that the argument raised by Unisys in its motion to dismiss the Department's appeal was the foundation of its argument in support of its exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action argued in the district court below and also forms the basis of the issues presented in this appeal. When a motion to dismiss an appeal is based on issues which go to the merits of the case, those issues should not be determined on such a motion, but instead they should be resolved on appeal. Gulf States Utilities Company v. Dixie Electric Membership Corporation, 248 La. 458, 179 So. 2d 637, 639 (1965); Asian International, Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 435 So. 2d 1064, 1065-66 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Stirling Properties, Inc. v. FBF #1, LLC, 2010-1575, p. 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/25/11), 2011 WL 1103241 (unpublished).
Accordingly, Unisys's motion to dismiss the Department's appeal is denied.
MERITS OF THE DEPARTMENT'S APPEAL
On appeal, the Department contends that the district court erred in maintaining Unisys's exception of no cause of action and dismissing, with prejudice, its reconventional demand. The Department contends that pursuant to article V, section 16(A) of the Louisiana Constitution, the district court has original jurisdiction, not appellate jurisdiction, over this contract dispute. Thus, the Department argues, in the absence of constitutional authority, the Professional Services Procurement Code cannot place original jurisdiction over breach-of-contract claims with the Commissioner of Administration and if the provisions of the Code were interpreted to limit the district court's jurisdiction over this contract dispute to appellate, rather than original, jurisdiction, those provisions would be unconstitutional.
Section 16(A)(1) of Article V of the Louisiana Constitution provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by this constitution or except as heretofore or hereafter provided by law for administrative agency determinations in worker's compensation matters, a district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters." Generally, a contract dispute would constitute a civil matter over which jurisdiction is vested in the district courts. Central Louisiana Electric Company v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 601 So. 2d 1383, 1385 (La. 1992).
While asserting that the Commissioner cannot legislatively be granted authority to "adjudicate" breach-of-contract claims, the Department nonetheless contends that the provisions of the Professional Services Procurement Code may be read so as to give them constitutional effect. Specifically, the Department asserts that "[c]areful review" of the relevant provisions demonstrates that the Commissioner has been granted the authority to "compromise" Unisys's claim, a compromise which Unisys has now rejected by filing suit. Thus, the Department contends, while the provisions of the Professional Services Procurement Code allow the Commissioner to bind the state agency if a settlement can be reached prior to suit, "there is no limitation on either the state or a contractor instituting an action in district court on the contract dispute."
Alternatively, the Department argues that it is permitted to traverse all claims asserted by Unisys, regardless of whether the district court is exercising original or appellate jurisdiction. Noting that LSA-R.S. 39:1525 provides that the decision of the Commissioner "shall be final and conclusive unless fraudulent, or unless the contractor institutes suit pursuant to R.S. 39:1526 ," the Department asserts that by the "very terms" of this statute, the Commissioner's decision did not become "final," as Unisys, the contractor, chose to institute suit. Moreover, the Department argues, nothing in the Professional Services Procurement Code permits "only partial judicial review" of the Commissioner's decision (or limits the district court's consideration to only a portion of the Commissioner's decision) such that Unisys would be allowed to limit the district court's review to only a portion of that decision. Thus, the Department contends, if this court concludes that the district court is exercising appellate jurisdiction, rather than original jurisdiction, its pleading styled "reconventional demand" should be treated as a properly filed answer to Unisys's appeal.
Subpart B of Part V of Chapter 16 (the Professional Services Procurement Code), entitled "Settlement of Controversies," is comprised of LSA-R.S. 39:1524 and 1525, which provide as follows:
§ 1524. Authority of the commissioner of administration(Emphasis added). Moreover, Subpart C of Part V of Chapter 16, entitled "Actions," is comprised solely of LSA-R.S. 39:1526, which at the time the April 2008 contract at issue was confected, provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
Prior to the institution of any action in a court concerning any contract, claim or controversy, the commissioner of administration with the concurrence of the attorney general is authorized to compromise, pay, or otherwise adjust the claim by or against or a controversy with a contractor relating to a professional, personal, consulting, or social service contract entered into with the state under their respective authority, including a claim or controversy based on breach of contract, mistake, misrepresentation, or other cause for contract modification or rescission. Nothing herein shall limit the authority of the commissioner of administration, pursuant to rules and regulations to issue, negotiate, or accept changes in the terms and conditions of a contract. When authorized, such compromise, payments, or adjustments shall be promptly paid; however, subject to any limitations or conditions imposed by rule or regulation, the commissioner of administration shall charge back all or any portion of such payments to the department or departments for whose benefit the contract was let.
§ 1525. Action on contract claims
This Section applies to a claim by or controversy between the state and a contractor arising out of a contract for professional, personal, consulting, or social services. If such a claim or controversy is not resolved by mutual agreement, the commissioner of administration, or his designee, shall promptly issue a decision in writing. A copy of that decision shall be mailed or otherwise furnished to the contractor, shall state the reasons for the action taken, and shall inform the contractor of his right to judicial relief as provided in this Part. The decision shall be final and conclusive unless fraudulent, or unless the contractor institutes suit pursuant to R.S. 39:1526. If the commissioner of administration, or his designee, does not issue a written decision within one hundred twenty days after written request for a final decision, or within such longer period as may be established in writing by the parties to the contract, then the contractor may proceed as if an adverse decision had been received.
§ 1526 Jurisdiction; actions in certain cases(Emphasis added).
A. The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, subject to appeal as provided by law, shall have jurisdiction over controversies involving the state in connection with a petition for review of a decision made pursuant to R.S. 39:1525.
As amended by Acts 2008, No. 878, Section (A) of LSA-R.S. 39:1526 now provides:
The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, subject to appeal or review by the First Circuit Court of Appeal or by the supreme court, as otherwise permitted by law and the state constitution, shall have jurisdiction over any claims arising out of a request for proposal or award of a contract, any controversies involving the state, or any other matters in connection with a petition for review of a decision made pursuant to this Chapter, following the exhaustion of administrative remedies as provided by law or regulation.
These statutes contemplate an administrative procedure by which claims by or against a contractor pursuant to a professional services contract may be "compromise[d], pa[id], or otherwise adjust[ed]" by the Commissioner of Administration. Moreover, where a contractor is dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner, the contractor may institute suit by filing a "petition for review" of the decision pursuant to LSA-R.S. 39:1526(A). See United Healthcare Insurance Company v. State, Division of Administration, 2011-1398 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/28/12), 103 So. 3d 1095, 1099.
Judicial review of the decision of an administrative agency is an exercise of a court's appellate jurisdiction pursuant to LSA-Const. art. V, § 16(B), which provides that "[a] district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by law." For the purpose of judicial review of an administrative action, district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and only have appellate jurisdiction to review administrative decisions as provided by the legislature or constitution. Willows v. State, Department of Health & Hospitals, 2008-2357 (La. 5/5/09), 15 So. 3d 56, 60; Metro Riverboat Associates, Inc. v. Louisiana Gaming Control Board, 2001-0185 (La. 10/16/01), 797 So. 2d 656, 660. Additionally, the existence of a specific statutory procedure generally implies a legislative intent that the special statutory procedure be the exclusive means of obtaining judicial review in the situations to which it applies. Willows, 15 So. 3d at 60; Metro Riverboat Associates, Inc., 797 So. 2d at 660.
While the Department contends that the district court has original jurisdiction over this matter (such that its reconventional demand is proper), we are guided by the Supreme Court's analysis in Metro Riverboat Associates, wherein the Court instructed that "[t]o determine whether [the party instituting suit] invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the court, or whether it, in fact, filed suit under the court's original jurisdiction, we must examine the petition itself." Metro Riverboat Associates, Inc., 797 So. 2d at 660. In examining Unisys's petition, we note first that the petition asserts that the district court has jurisdiction pursuant to LSA-R.S. 39:1526, the statute governing judicial review of the Commissioner's decision, and LSA-R.S. 49:964, the statute governing judicial review of agency adjudications. Additionally, in the petition, Unisys specifically states that it is seeking "limited judicial review" and further asserts that the portions of the Commissioner's decision over which it does not seek judicial review are "final and conclusive." Thus, we conclude that Unisys did not invoke the district court's original jurisdiction, but instead sought to file an appeal, seeking judicial review of the Department's administrative action in "compromis[ing], pay[ing], or otherwise adjust[ing]" the claim by Unisys. See Metro Riverboat Associates. Inc., 797 So. 2d at 660-661.
The Department states in brief that it has not yet "directly" presented to the district court the issue of whether the district court is exercising appellate versus original jurisdiction under LSA-R.S. 39:1524-1526. However, it clearly presented this argument to the district court in its opposition to Unisys's exceptions, wherein it asserted that the district court had original jurisdiction over this contract dispute, that LSA-R.S. 39:1526 did not authorize the district court to exercise appellate jurisdiction, and that Unisys had "mischaracterized its petition as one for judicial review."
Moreover, regarding any argument by the Department that to the extent that LSA-R.S. 39:1525 and 39:1526 limit the district court's jurisdiction to appellate jurisdiction over breach-of-contract claims in contracts governed by the Professional Services Procurement Code such that these statutes unconstitutionally infringe upon the district court's original jurisdiction, we note that the Department has not properly asserted a constitutional challenge to these statutes in the district court. A constitutional challenge may not be considered by an appellate court unless it was properly pleaded and raised in the district court below. Willows, 15 So. 3d at 63; see also Brown v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 2000-0539 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/22/01), 804 So. 2d 41,47, writ denied, 2001-2504 (La. 12/7/01), 803 So. 2d37.
In Brown, the Commissioner of Insurance filed a petition for judicial review under the APA, such that the matter was before the district court under its appellate jurisdiction (despite the fact that the Commissioner had no right of action to seek judicial review). In affirming the district court's dismissal of the suit on exception of no right of action, and the denial of the opportunity to amend the petition, this court questioned the Commissioner's ability to cumulate an ordinary proceeding challenging the constitutionality of the judicial review provisions of the APA with his petition for judicial review, noting that the Commissioner appeared to have an adequate remedy at law in that regard by filing a declaratory judgment action or other type of proceeding. Brown, 804 So.2d at 47. Indeed, the Commissioner of Insurance did precisely that, filing a petition for preliminary and permanent injunctions and a petition for declaratory judgment, challenging the constitutionality of the Acts creating the Division of Administrative Law. See Woolev v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, 2004-0882 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So 2d 746 753-754.
Nonetheless, based on the plain reading of LSA-R.S. 39:1525 and 39:1526 alone, we agree with the Department that the district court erred in dismissing the Department's claim, regardless of whether it would be more properly styled as a reconventional demand or as an answer to the Department's appeal (petition for judicial review). Revised Statute 39:1525 specifically provides that the Commissioner's "decision shall be final and conclusive unless fraudulent, or unless the contractor institutes suit pursuant to R.S. 39:1526." (Emphasis added). Thus, where the contractor has sought review of the Commissioner's decision pursuant to LSA-R.S. 39:1525 and 39:1526, the Commissioner's decision does not become "final," thereby allowing for review of the entire decision by the district court. While LSA-R.S. 39:1525 does not grant the Department the specific independent right to institute a suit for judicial review to challenge the Commissioner's decision if the contractor chooses not to do so, the statute likewise does not give the contractor the right to limit the district court's review to only portions of the decision unfavorable to the contractor and to claim that the remaining portions of the decision have become final.
With regard to judicial review of agency adjudications, the APA specifically provides that "[n]o agency or official thereof, or other person acting on behalf of an agency or official thereof shall be entitled to judicial review under this Chapter." LSA-R.S. 49:964(A)(2); see also Woolev v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, 2004-882 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So. 2d 746, 769. By contrast, where the contractor has instituted an action for judicial review under the Professional Services Procurement Code, neither LSA-R.S. 39:1525 nor any other provision of the Code specifically prohibits the agency from asking the district court to review aspects of the Commissioner's decision other than those challenged by the contractor or to review all aspects of the decision.
Thus, we conclude that if the contractor does seek review of the Commissioner's decision, by the clear wording of LSA-R.S. 39:1525, the decision does not become final and conclusive (not merely those portions of the decision unfavorable to the contractor that the contractor seeks to have modified or reversed). The district court then has the right to review all portions of the decision. For these reasons, we must conclude that the district court erred in maintaining Unisys's exception of no cause of action and dismissing the Department's claim, whether properly styled as a "reconventional demand" or as an answer to Unisys's appeal/petition for review, through which it sought to have the district court also consider the portion of the Commissioner's decision that granted partial relief to Unisys.
See generally EOP New Orleans, L.L.C. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 2001-2968 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/27/02), 831 So. 2d 1033, 1035 n.4 ("Since the district court was reviewing the [decision of the Louisiana Tax Commission] under its appellate jurisdiction, the Assessor's pleadings were essentially an answer to the appeal of [the taxpayer] and not a reconventional demand.").
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, Unisys's motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The April 27, 2012 judgment of the district court, maintaining the exception of no cause of action filed by Unisys and dismissing the Department's reconventional demand, is hereby reversed. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. Costs of this appeal are assessed against Unisys Corporation.
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL DENIED; JUDGMENT REVERSED AND MATTER REMANDED.