In a number of decisions, courts have upheld the infringement of a civilian's constitutional rights when exigent circumstances warranted such infringement. See, e. g., Grewe v. France, 75 F. Supp. 433 (E.D.Wis. 1948); Hines v. Mikell, 259 P. 28 (4th Cir. 1919); Ex parte Falls, 251 F. 415 (D.N.J. 1918); McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D.Va. 1943); Perlstein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1945); In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.Ohio 1944); Ex parte Jochen, 257 F. 200 (S.D.Tex. 1919). Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 33 n. 59, 77 S.Ct. at 1239 n. 59.
Bowman v. Harrison, 59 Wn. 56, 109 P. 192; Yarbrough v. Pugh, 63 Wn. 140, 114 P. 918. Its purpose is to advise anyone extending credit to a business operating under an assumed name, as to who are the real persons conducting the business. Union Trust Co. v. Quigley, 145 Wn. 176, 259 P. 28. In view of these statutory objectives, the term "business," as used in the statute, refers to an occupation or employment engaged in for the purpose of a livelihood or profit.
Such violation of the law was held to be mere matter of abatement, going only to the legal capacity of the plaintiff to sue. Bryant v. Wellbanks, 88 Cal. A. 144, 263 P. 332; UnionTrust Co. v. Quigley, 145 Wn. 176, 259 P. 28. Notwithstanding such interpretation of their assumed business name acts, however, Washington has construed its real estate brokers act as rendering unenforceable agreements entered into by unlicensed brokers ( Irons Inv. Co. v. Richardson, supra [ 184 Wn. 118, 50 P.2d 42]), and California has indicated that its legislature never intended that its real estate brokers act should receive any such construction as would permit an action to be maintained by a broker to recover a commission, when he had no license at the time the sale was effected, or during the time in which he rendered the services for which he seeks to recover. Davis v. Chipman, supra ( 210 Cal. 609, 293 P. 40).
The filing of assumed names only affects the right of the party doing business under such names to sue in the courts of this state. Union Trust Co. v. Quigley, 145 Wn. 176, 259 P. 28. [13, 14] It may be conceded, as contended by plaintiff, that a trade name is not necessarily abandoned by disuse. We have so held in Olympia Brewing Co. v. Northwest Brewing Co., supra, where the disuse of a trade name for several years was occasioned by a statutory restriction on the sale of liquor, and in Washington Barber etc. Co. v. Spokane etc. Co., 171 Wn. 428, 18 P.2d 499, where we held the Spokane Barber Supply Company had a superior right to the use of that name until the corporation became bankrupt in 1928, and that the trade name was not abandoned, but was passed to the trustee in bankruptcy, as an asset of the bankrupt estate.
Failure to comply with the statute goes to the capacity to sue. Union Trust Co. v. Quigley, 145 Wn. 176, 259 P. 28 (1927). But cases have held that where the interested person's name is disclosed, the statute is not applicable.