The mere fact, therefore, that respondent's mortgage was not verified or recorded will not render it invalid as to appellant unless he purchased the property for value, and in good faith; and no one can become a purchaser or an incumbrancer of property in good faith if he have notice of a pre-existing mortgage, although such mortgage may not be recorded or verified in accordance with the statute." ( Roy Co. v. Scott, Hartley Co., 11 Wn. 399, 39 P. 679; Trust Co. v. Hendrickson, 25 Barb. 484; Chase v. Box Co., 11 Wn. 377, 39 P. 639; Darland v. Levins, 1 Wn. 582, 20 P. 309; Hinchman v. Railway Co. [Wash.] 44 P. 867; Jones, Chat. Mortg. 4th Ed. sec. 318.) In New York the statute declares that a mortgage is "void as against the creditors of a mortgagor, and as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith."

In cases decided before that Act became effective, it was held in general that the unlawful acquisition of land in contravention of the constitutional provision and of statutes enacted to carry such provision into effect is voidable only and therefore can be questioned only in a direct proceeding by the state. Union Trust Co. v. Hendrickson, 69 Okla. 277, 172 P. 440; Brown v. Capps, 164 Okla. 91, 22 P.2d 1008; Texas Co. v. State ex rel. Coryell, 198 Okla. 565, 180 P.2d 631. But none of those cases involved directly or remotely the right of a sole heir to challenge a devise to a corporation of real estate which the constitutional and statutory provisions forbid it to take, acquire, hold, and own. And those cases do not stand alone. In Local Investment Co. v. Humes, 51 Okla. 251, 151 P. 878, after saying that a conveyance to a corporation in violation of the constitutional provision was not absolutely void but merely voidable, it was said that the state alone can question the corporation's right to hold under such conveyance, except perhaps where individual wrong or injustice would result from denying the right to do so to such individual.

Here, as we have seen, we have admittedly no actual notice and — since there is no statutory provision on the subject — no constructive notice. What is actual notice and what constructive notice has been so often defined by the courts that it would be a useless task to discuss it here. Cases directly in line with what we have said on the subject are: Burck v. Taylor, 152 U.S. 634, 654, 14 S.Ct. 696, 703, 38 L.Ed. 578; Mayor, etc., of City of Baltimore v. Whittington, 78 Md. 231, 27 A. 984; Charles v. Roxana Petroleum Corporation, 8 Cir., 282 F. 983; Ex parte Caplis, D.C., 275 F. 980; Dunn v. City of New York, 205 N.Y. 342, 98 N.E. 495; Union Trust Co. v. Hendrickson, 69 Okla. 277, 172 P. 440, 442. In the first above cited case the Supreme Court said: "If notice was essential to charge them [the defendants], actual notice should have been given, at least in the absence of a statute providing some means for constructive notice."

Insolvency alone does not place the directors of a corporation in the position of trustees of its property for the benefit of all of its creditors. American Exchange Nat. Bank v. Ward, 111 F. 782, 49 C.C.A. 611, 55 L.R.A. 356; Brittain v. Burnham, 9 Okla. 522, 60 P. 241; Union Trust Co. v. Hendrickson, 69 Okla. 277, 172 P. 440. There may be reasonable hope that it can be made solvent, and to that end it may enter into all appropriate contracts, including contracts of preference, while a going concern with fair prospects of rehabilitation.

Also, in Union Trust Co. v. Hendrickson the court said: 1918, 69 Okla. 277, 172 P. 440, 441. "The law seems to be well established by the great weight of authority that, if a corporation is not authorized to acquire real estate except in a limited amount for prescribed purposes, the acquisition of additional property cannot be questioned by a private individual, but can only be questioned by the state.

It is firmly established that "constructive notice" is a creation of statute, and that no record will operate to give constructive notice unless such effect has been given it by some statutory provision. 46 C.J., par. 46, p. 550; Union Trust Co. v. Hendrickson, 69 Okla. 277, 172 P. 440; Lyon v. Davis, 95 F.2d 103. Sec. 16 [ 16-16], Title 16, O.S. 1941, is as follows:

"The legal existence of a corporate entity may not be inquired into by those with whom it has, in the name and capacity of such entity, contracted." In Union Trust Co. v. Hendrickson, 69 Okla. 277, 172 P. 440, in the syllabus, we said: "The state alone can question as ultra vires the acquiring title to and holding real property by a corporation."

This question is also well settled in this jurisdiction, contrary to the contention of plaintiff. In the case of Union Trust Co. v. Hendrickson, 69 Okla. 277, 172 P. 440, it is said: "The state alone can question as ultra vires the acquiring title to and holding real property by a corporation."

It is the general rule that public records such as the one involved herein are not constructive notice unless expressly made so by statute. Union Trust Co. v. Hendrickson, 69 Okla. 277, 172 P. 440. The statute in this case does not, as does the statute applying to records in the office of the county recorder, expressly make the register of contractors constructive notice to anyone, and, in view of the great responsibility imposed on parties by this doctrine, we think that unless the statute expressly and explicitly does make a public record constructive notice it does not become such.

Its interest in the car should not be condemned, and upon the sole evidence that an officer took one smell and thought the contents of a can was corn liquor. In re One Chevrolet Auto., 205 Ala. 337, 87 So. 592; Eckl v. State, 205 Ala. 466 88 So. 567; Fearn v. State, 205 Ala. 478, 88 So. 591; State ex rel. Seibels v. Farley, 206 Ala. 172, 89 So. 510; Snyder v. State, 207 Ala. 147, 92 So. 170; State ex rel. Almon v. One Black Horse Mule, 207 Ala. 277, 92 So. 548; Standard Oil Co. v. State, 207 Ala. 303, 92 So. 894; State ex rel. Elmore v. Leveson, 207 Ala. 638, 93 So. 608; Armstrong v. Jefferson Co., 208 Ala. 645, 95 So. 39; Shelliday v. U.S., 25 F.(2d) 372; 20 R. C. L. 342; Re Atlantic Beach Corp., 244 F. 829; Union Trust Co. v. Hendrickson, 69 Okl. 277, 172 P. 440; 46 C. J. 540; Re Locust Bldg. Co., 299 F. 756. Thos. E. Knight, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Jas. L. Screws, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.