A principal purpose of the filing provisions of the FPA is "to give advance notice of proposed rate changes" to the customer. Union Texas Prods. Corp. v. FERC, 899 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1990) (reversing the denial of a waiver where, inter alia, the needed information appeared elsewhere in the general transmission rate filings). It does not appear that FERC gave consideration to whether that purpose was satisfied here. Not only did Cajun have actual notice of increases in Factor APM, but there appears to be no dispute that the proposed changes are provided for by the CTOC agreement. Therefore, the emphasis by FERC on GSU's delay of several years in filing for a different factor is greatly ameliorated.
Id. Moreover, a principal purpose of the filing provisions of NGA is to give advance notice of proposed rate changes to the customer. Cf. Union Tex. Prods. Corp. v. FERC, 899 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1990) (same with regard to Federal Power Act); see also ConEd, 958 F.2d at 434 n. 7 ("Noting the identical language and purposes of the Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act notice provisions, the Supreme Court has cited them interchangeably.") (citing Arkla, 433 U.S. at 577 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. at 2930 n. 7). In a typical Section(s) 7 situation, parties agree on a particular service and on proposed rates, the service begins, and the Commission decides whether to allow the service and what the rates will be. The "norm" in such a situation is that the Commission's "finally determined rate" will be applied starting from the date of initial service.
Id. at 1104. See, Union Texas Products Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 899 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1990) (overruling commission's $1.8 million penalty on seller for its failure to file required one-page form giving advance notice of proposed rate increase); Neighborhood TV Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., 742 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (where rule governs the information agency requires before it will consider a filing by one it regulates, courts have been especially apt to allow agencies much leeway in granting waivers to own rules); Superior Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Reg. Com'n, 667 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1982) (commission's punctilious insistence that failure to follow its directions in minor respect should result in such disproportionately heavy penalty works manifest injustice and constitutes abuse of discretion); Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., supra (agency's determination as to what data it requires in making discretionary decision cannot provide basis for that court to mandate rejection of tariff filing made without supporting economic data); Municipal Elec. Util. Ass'n of Ala. v. Federal