Opinion
No. 58654-8-I.
May 7, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 06-1-07010-1, Laura C. Inveen, J., entered July 14, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Becker, J., concurred in by Appelwick, C.J., and Coleman, J.
Under the collective bargaining agreement between Teamsters Local Union No. 117 and King County, a grievance is subject to binding arbitration if it requires interpretation and application of the agreement. The Teamsters sued the County on the ground that the County should have paid certain employees at a higher rate. Because the resolution of this dispute requires interpretation and application of the agreement, the trial court properly dismissed the suit.
According to the undisputed facts, the Teamsters represent security officers and security sergeants employed by King County. The Teamsters are one of several unions that make up the Joint Crafts Council. The Joint Crafts Council negotiated a collective bargaining agreement covering the security officers and several other bargaining units with King County. The agreement, which covers January 2003 through December 2005, requires certain grievances to be resolved by binding arbitration.
The agreement is broken up into 19 articles, and each article is broken into sections. Each of these articles applies to all of the bargaining units.
Article 6 is entitled "Hours of Work". Section 6.2, at issue in this appeal, provides for premium pay for certain shifts:
6.2 First Shift — An employee assigned to work on a shift beginning between the hours of 5:00 A.M. and 11:59 A.M. will be considered to be on first shift.
6.2.1 Second Shift — An employee assigned to work on a shift beginning between the hours of 12:00 P.M. and 8:59 P.M. will be considered to be on second shift. The pay rate for an employee assigned to second shift will be his/her base hourly rate of pay plus ten (10) percent. An employee who is regularly assigned to the second shift will have all compensable time paid at the higher rate of pay.
6.2.2 Third Shift — An employee assigned to work on a shift beginning between the hours of 9:00 P.M. and 4:59 A.M. will be considered to be on third shift. The pay rate for an employee assigned third shift will be his/her base hourly rate of pay plus fifteen (15) percent. An employee who is regularly assigned to the third shift will have all compensable time paid at the higher rate of pay.
Clerk's Papers at 29 (Collective Bargaining Agreement)
The other sections of Article 6 cover different topics: the standard work schedule, an employee bidding process for open shifts, temporary shift changes, notice of shift changes, and "Alert Status".
After the 19 articles, the agreement contains several appendices. Appendix L is entitled "International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 117". It addresses specifically the job classifications of Security Officer and Security Sergeant. The appendix warns: "This APPENDIX modifies the Agreement by adding to, modifying or supplanting specific provision(s) therein." Section L.2.2 and Section L.3 each end with a parenthetical, "Supplants Article 6":
Clerk's Papers at 81.
L.2 Filling of Vacant Shifts by Regular Employees — Full time regular employees may bid for available vacant regular established schedules by seniority with the most senior full-time employee having first choice for the schedule available for regular full-time employees.
L.2.1 Part-time regular employees may bid for available regular established schedules by seniority with the most senior part-time employee having first choice for schedules available for regular part-time employees. In addition, part-time regular employees may submit requests for open shifts each month in writing to the Security Chief/designee. The request must be submitted by the tenth (10th) day of each month for the next month's open work.
L.2.2 Employees bidding for a new established schedule must be qualified, as determined by the County, or his/her bid will be denied. The County has the right to remove an employee from the schedule if it determines the employee has a performance problem. Notices of available regular established schedules will be posted for ten (10) consecutive days. Copies of the work schedule will be available for employees and they are responsible for knowing their assignments. (Supplants Article 6)
. . .
L.3 Temporary Schedule Requests — Temporary employees will submit their requests for shifts in writing to the Security Chief/designee. The request must be submitted by the tenth (10th) day of each month for the next month's available open work. Regardless of the requests submitted by temporary employees, the County reserves the right to assign temporary employees to meet its staffing needs at anytime of its choosing. Copies of the work schedule will be available for employees and they are responsible for knowing their assignments. (Supplants Article 6 and Sections 7.6 and 7.6.1 do not apply to temporary employees)
Clerk's Papers at 81-82.
On February 1, 2006, the Teamsters wrote a letter to a County labor negotiator. The letter asserted that the County had failed to pay the security officers the shift differential as provided for in Article 6 and threatened a lawsuit unless the County promptly made back payments. The County's negotiator responded on February 17 with a letter denying that the officers were entitled to shift differential. The letter also pointed out that, during the contract negotiations, the County had specifically rejected the Teamsters' proposal to include shift differential for security officers.
The Teamsters sued the County on February 24, 2006. They alleged that the County had breached the collective bargaining agreement by failing to pay shift differential. The Teamsters also alleged that the County's failure to pay was willful and therefore violated the Wage Rebate Act. See RCW 49.52.050(2); .070.
The County moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Teamsters' claims were required to be resolved by binding arbitration. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The Teamsters appeal.
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment this court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). Review is de novo. Mount Adams Sch. Dist. v. Cook, 150 Wn.2d 716, 722, 81 P.3d 111 (2003).
The arbitrability of public sector labor-management disputes is governed by the rules set forth in the "Steelworkers' Trilogy". Peninsula School v. Employees, 130 Wn.2d 401, 413-414, 924 P.2d 13 (1996). The Trilogy consists of United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S. Ct. 1343, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S. Ct. 1347, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409 (1960); and United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S. Ct. 1358; 4 L. Ed. 2d 1424 (1960). These rules state a strong presumption of arbitrability:
(1) Although it is the court's duty to determine whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute, the court cannot decide the merits of the controversy, but may determine only whether the grievant has made a claim which on its face is governed by the contract. (2) An order to arbitrate should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. (3) There is a strong presumption in favor of arbitrability; all questions upon which the parties disagree are presumed to be within the arbitration provisions unless negated expressly or by clear implication.
Council of County City Employees v. Spokane County, 32 Wn. App. 422, 424-25, 647 P.2d 1058 (1982). Even "frivolous" grievances must be arbitrated. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568 ("The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the court will deem meritorious.").
The collective bargaining agreement in this case allows either party to require binding arbitration of any grievance. The agreement defines a "grievance" as "an issue relating to the interpretation and application of rights, benefits, or conditions of employment as contained in this Agreement." We must decide if the Teamsters have raised any claim that can be resolved without "interpretation and application" of the collective bargaining agreement.
Clerk's Papers at 54 (Article 15.3).
The Teamsters contend no interpretation is necessary because the contract requires shift differential pay by its clear terms. The Teamsters recognize that shift differential pay for the security officers can come only from Article 6. They also acknowledge the two parenthetical provisions in Appendix L that state: "Supplants Article 6." According to the Teamsters, that phrase cannot mean that all of Article 6 is supplanted because Appendix L says only that it "modifies the Agreement by adding to, modifying or supplanting specific provision(s) therein." The Teamsters contend the reference to "Article 6" is not a reference to a specific provision and therefore the two shift differential provisions in Article 6 have not been supplanted.
Clerk's Papers at 81 (emphasis added).
The County asserts that the words "specific provision(s)" and "Supplants Article 6" have a different meaning. According to the County, a reference to "Article 6" is a reference to a "specific provision" of the agreement. According to the County, "Supplants Article 6" means "Supplants all of Article 6."
The Teamsters offer several reasons why they believe the County's interpretation to be incorrect. They argue that if all of Article 6 was supplanted, as the County argues, then none of the provisions of Article 6 would be applicable to the security officers. The Teamsters reason that if that were true, the County would have presented evidence that no provision of Article 6 had ever been applied to the security officers. The Teamsters also point out that an appendix that applies to a different bargaining unit explicitly precludes shift differential: "The provisions of Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 relating to shift differential will not apply to members of this bargaining unit." The Teamsters argue that this provision shows that the County knew how to draft clear language excluding shift differential.
Clerk's Papers at 75.
But even assuming these arguments support the Teamsters' interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, they do not erase the fact that the County has offered a different interpretation. As the trial court concluded, deciding between competing interpretations is a job the parties have agreed to refer to an arbitrator.
The Teamsters next contend that the trial court should not have dismissed their claim that the County violated the Wage Rebate Act.
Under the Wage Rebate Act, an employer commits a misdemeanor if the employer "Willfully and with intent to deprive [an] employee of any part of his wages, shall pay any employee a lower wage than the wage such employer is obligated to pay such employee by any statute, ordinance, or contract". RCW 49.52.050(2). A guilty employer is also liable in a civil action for double damages and other fees. RCW 49.52.070.
The Teamsters contend that the County's refusal to pay shift differential was a willful violation and that they may proceed directly to court with this claim because it is a statutory wage claim independent of the collective bargaining agreement. For this argument they rely on the United State Supreme Court's decision in Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123-125, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 129 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1994).
In that case, Safeway fired Livadas but waited three days to mail her final pay check. The three day delay violated a California law that required payment of all wages immediately upon discharge. The law entitled Livadas to three extra days' wages as a penalty for the late payment. A federal district court held this claim was not subject to a grievance arbitration clause because resolving the statutory claim would not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. The Ninth Circuit reversed, but the Supreme Court reinstated the district court ruling. The Court recognized that the calculation of damages might require reference to the collective bargaining agreement. The Court explained that the need to consult a collective bargaining agreement does not require arbitration when there is no dispute about the meaning of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement:
As the District Court aptly observed, the primary text for deciding whether Livadas was entitled to a penalty was not the Food Store Contract, but a calendar. The only issue raised by Livadas's claim, whether Safeway "willfully failed to pay" her wages promptly upon severance, was a question of state law, entirely independent of any understanding embodied in the collective-bargaining agreement between the union and the employer. There is no indication that there was a "dispute" in this case over the amount of the penalty to which Livadas would be entitled.
Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124-125 (citations omitted).
The Teamsters contend that their statutory claim similarly can be decided entirely independent of any understanding embodied in the collective bargaining agreement. They argue that reference to the terms of the agreement would be merely to ascertain that it entitles them to shift differential pay. Like their first argument, this one depends on the premise that the meaning of Article 6 is undisputed. The Teamsters contend there can be no reasonable dispute about whether the security officers are entitled to shift differential pay.
Under the rationale of the Steelworkers' Trilogy, the question is not whether the parties have a reasonable dispute about the proper interpretation of the agreement. The question is whether the parties have any dispute, even a frivolous one, about what the agreement means. If so, that dispute must be resolved by arbitration.
For the same reason, this case is also unlike the four Washington cases the Teamsters put forward as controlling. Like Livadas, those cases involved alleged violations of rights that exist independent of any collective bargaining agreement. See Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards, 151 Wn.2d 853, 864, 93 P.3d 108 (2004) (suit under Minimum Wage Act not subject to arbitration clause because the statutory right to overtime pay was not subject to negotiation); Ervin v. Columbia Dist., Inc., 84 Wn. App. 882, 930 P.2d 947 (1997) (same); United Food Commer. Workers Union Local 1001 v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 84 Wn. App. 47, 51, 925 P.2d 212 (1996) (same), overruled on other grounds by, Seattle Prof'l Eng'g Employees Ass'n v. Boeing Co., 139 Wn.2d 824, 834, 991 P.2d. 1126, 1 P.3d 578 (2000); Wilson v. City of Monroe, 88 Wn. App. 113, 115, 943 P.2d 1134 (1997) (wrongful termination suit not subject to arbitration clause because the right to be free from wrongful termination is nonnegotiable and "independent of any underlying contractual agreement between employee and employer").
The dispute in this case is about a negotiable right — the right to shift differential — that is entirely dependent on the proper interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. There is no statutory right to shift differential. The trial court properly dismissed the suit for failure to follow the grievance process in the collective bargaining agreement.
Affirmed.