It will be observed that no principal was disclosed by the above signatures. It was held the signers were individually liable. In the case of Union Machinery Supply Co. v. Taylor-Morrison Logging Co., 143 Wn. 154, 254 P. 1094, where suit was instituted upon a promissory note signed by "Taylor Morrison Logging Co. J.B. Wood, Pres. J.L. Kahaley, Sec.," we denied recovery against Wood and the estate of Kahaley, holding that the note was the obligation of the logging company only. Parol testimony was admitted to show the intention of the parties. We are of the opinion that the note in question is ambiguous, in that it does not clearly appear whether the note is payable to Winifred Lundberg in her individual capacity, or to Winifred Lundberg for the minor, and, this being true, we are further of the opinion that we may look to the surrounding facts to determine what the parties actually intended.

As such, the parties bound to arbitrate by the Quiggs' signatures on these agreements are the Quiggs' corporate principals, not the Quiggs individually. Union Mach. & Supply Co. v. Taylor-Morrison Logging Co., 143 Wash. 154,157-62, 254 P.2d 1094 (1927) (collecting cases). However, the federal courts have held that, under "'common law principles of contract and agency law,'" a nonsignatory may consent to arbitrate a dispute "under ... five distinct theories."