[Counsel reviewed the following cases interpreting the saving clause. The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; The J.E. Rumbell, 148 U.S. 1; The Glide, 167 U.S. 606; Knapp, Stout Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638; Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185; Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry Co., 237 U.S. 303; Johnson v. Westerfield, 143 Ky. 10; Chase v. Steamboat Co., 9 R.I. 419; affd. 16 Wall. 522; The Kalfarli, 277 F. 391. Distinguishing: Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149; Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308; Watts v. Camors, 115 U.S. 353. See Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469.] The uniformity rule is directed toward statutes changing rights and liabilities definitely fixed by maritime rules.

The court held that the federal district court rightly assumed jurisdiction of the proceedings. It said: "In Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 [Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900, L.R.A. 1918C, 451, 61 L.Ed. 1086, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524], Chelentis v. LuckenbackSteamship Co., 247 U.S. 372 [ 62 L.Ed. 1171, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 501], Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308 [ 63 L.Ed. 261, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 112], and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 [11 A. L. R. 1145, 64 L.Ed. 834, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 438], we have recently discussed the theory under which the general maritime law became a part of our national law, and pointed out the inability of the states to change its general features so as to defeat uniformity — but the power of a state to make some modifications or supplements was affirmed. And we further held that rights and liabilities in respect of torts upon the sea ordinarily depend upon the rules accepted and applied in admiralty courts which are controlling wherever suit may be instituted.

While admiralty jurisdiction in tort depends on the locality, in matters of contract it depends on the subject-matter, the nature and character of the contract. North Pacific S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Co., 249 U.S. 119; Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308. The work of unloading a vessel is maritime and a contract to do such work is maritime.

(3) But in this case, since the contract for the construction of the vessel was non-maritime, and since neither the employment of the workman nor his activities at the time of injury had any direct relation to commerce or navigation, the application of the Oregon Compensation Law, with reference to which employer and employee had contracted, could not materially affect any of the rules of the sea whose uniformity is essential, and was therefore permissible. P. 477. Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308; SouthernPacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, and other cases, distinguished. (4) In view of its exclusive features, the Oregon Act abrogated the right of the employee to recover damages in an admiralty court, which otherwise would exist.

" On Page 477 ( 42 S. Ct. 158) the court said: "This conclusion accords with Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 [ 37 S. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L.R.A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900]; Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 [ 38 S. Ct. 501, 62 L. Ed. 1171]; Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308 [ 39 S. Ct. 112, 63 L. Ed. 261]; and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 [ 40 S. Ct. 438, 64 L. Ed. 834, 11 A.L.R. 1145]. In each of them the employment or contract was maritime in nature and the rights and liabilities of the parties were prescribed by general rules of maritime law essential to its proper harmony and uniformity.

There is an entire failure to excuse the commencement of the action by the proper party, viz, the administrator. In Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308, the right of action did not depend upon any state law; there was a maritime contract, and a right of action given by admiralty itself. State statutes fixing the liabilities of parties in tort actions will not be applied in admiralty.

Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552, 557; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215, 216; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558. See also Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308. As between the owners and the charterer, liability for damage caused by negligence of the officers and crew under the dominion of the charterer rests with the charterer.

Spencer Kellogg Sons, Inc. v. Hicks, 1932, 285 U.S. 502, 514, 52 S.Ct. 450, 454, 76 L.Ed. 903. In Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 1919, 248 U.S. 308, 39 S.Ct. 112, 63 L.Ed. 261, it was held that the California Statute of Frauds could not be applied to invalidate an oral maritime contract made in California. On the other hand, state wrongful death acts have been applied, although the fatal impact occurred on navigable waters.

We do not regard the fact that the employee worked at mending nets, performed services in loading and unloading lighters carrying the cargo to the ship, and, part of the time while the vessel was in Alaska, slept on shore, as qualifying in any way the nature of his contract, or rendering it severable. Generally speaking, parties entering into maritime contracts contemplate the system of maritime law, and its well-known rules control their rights and liabilities, to the exclusion of state statutes. ( Union FishCo. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308 [63 L.Ed. 261, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 112, see, also, Rose's U.S. Notes].) But, as to certain local matters, regulation of which will work no material prejudice to the general maritime law, or interfere with the proper harmony or uniformity of that law in its international or interstate relations, the rules of the maritime law may be modified or supplemented by state regulation.

And as both parties had accepted and proceeded under the statute by making payments to the Industrial Accident Fund it cannot properly be said that they consciously contracted with each other in contemplation of the general system of maritime law. Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308. Under such circumstances regulation of the rights, obligations and consequent liabilities of the parties, as between themselves, by a local rule would not necessarily work material prejudice to any characteristic feature of the general maritime law, or interfere with the proper harmony or uniformity of that law in its international or interstate relations. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, ante, 233. 'The general doctrine that in contract matters admiralty jurisdiction depends upon the nature of the transaction and in tort matters upon the locality, has been so frequently asserted by this court that it must now be treated as settled.