Mid-States insists that by referring to the obligation as being "in dispute," Love was making it clear he denied any liability. On the contrary, we agree with the trial court that this answer constituted an admission of the existence of a potential liability under the note. Love admitted the existence of a note which was due and which on its face obligated him to BR. It is true that the amount of the obligation is contingent on the pending litigation, but just as this contingency is no bar to the writ itself, See C.R.C.P. 103(q); Union Deposit Co. v. Driscoll, 95 Colo. 140, 33 P.2d 251 (1934), neither should it change the procedural character of the garnishee's answer. The debt, once due, was garnishable; and the answer admitting the existence of the note was an admission of potential liability sufficient to support the writ.

Bragdon v. Bradt, supra. See Union Deposit Co. v. Driscoll, 95 Colo. 140, 33 P.2d 251. The garnishment in this case was essentially a mechanism by which the judgment debtor, Hessler, collected from the garnishee, Wood Bros., for the benefit of his creditor, RMA C.R.C.P. 103(j) (z). [2] If a garnishee admits that he has property of the debtor in his possession or under his control, he then is ordered by the court to surrender that property.