Judgment for the claimant was reversed. To like effect, see Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Boulware, Tex.Civ. App., 238 S.W.2d 722; Tichenor v. Little, Tex.Civ.App., 279 S.W.2d 379. Compare Pan American Insurance Co. v. Couch, Tex. Civ.App., 305 S.W.2d 819. The action of the court in excluding the death certificate was not error.

politan Life Ins. Co., 1937, 145 Kan. 858, 67 P.2d 607; Brackman v. National Life Accident Ins. Co., La.App. 1942, 5 So.2d 565; Elbe v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., Mo.App. 1941, 155 S.W.2d 302; Layton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Mo.App. 1936, 89 S.W.2d 576; Farmer v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 1933, 227 Mo.App. 1082, 57 S.W.2d 744; Lower v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1933, 111 N.J.L. 426, 168 A. 592; Gallagher v. Fidelity Casualty Co. of New York, 221 N.Y. 664, 117 N.E. 1067, affirming 1917, 163 App. Div. 556, 148 N.Y.S. 1016; Hammer v. Mutual Benefit Health Accident Ass'n, 1952, 158 Ohio St. 394, 109 N.E.2d 649, 36 A.L.R.2d 1084; Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Chapman, 1941, 189 Okla. 69, 113 P.2d 600; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hazen, 1938, 182 Okla. 623, 79 P.2d 577; Provident Life Accident Ins. Co. v. Green, 1935, 172 Okla. 591, 46 P.2d 372; Goethe v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1937, 183 S.C. 199, 190 S.E. 451; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Boulware, Tex.Civ.App. 1951, 238 S.W.2d 722; American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Fox, Tex.Civ.App. 1944, 184 S.W.2d 937; Hruzek v. Old Line Life Ins. Co. of America, 1936, 221 Wis. 279, 265 N.W. 566; O'Connell v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1936, 220 Wis. 61, 264 N.W. 253; Mitchell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1942, 124 W. Va. 20, 18 S.E.2d 803. We note, parenthetically, that courts generally make no distinction between sunstroke and heat exhaustion.

'In this case it was not shown that the appellant (defendant) was harmed in any respect by the trial court's action, nor was it shown that it was deprived of the right to offer any rebuttal evidence that it might have had in reply thereto' (Emphasis Added). See also Union Central Life Ins. Co., v. Boulware, 238 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1951, no writ). Cases from other jurisdictions support the proposition that when a court reopens a case for one party the opposite party should not be deprived of an opportunity to offer rebuttal testimony in reply thereto and condemns refusal in such instances as reversible error. See: Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co., Inc., 205 S.C. 333, 32 S.E.2d 5 (1944); Pavlis v. Atlas-Imperial Diesel Engine Co., 121 Fla. 185, 163 So. 515 (1935); Davis v. Arkansas Best Freight System, Inc., 393 S.W.2d 237 (Sup.Ct. Arkansas 1965); 88 C.J.S. Trial, §§ 101, 103, 104, 110 and 111.

It has been held that a certificate of death not prepared by the physician is not admissible under this provisional rule, Tichenor v. Little, 279 S.W.2d 379 (Tex .Civ.App.--Galveston 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and that, if prepared by one unskilled in the matters to which it relates and admitted in evidence even under the proper certification required by Rule 54a for it to be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, the certificate of death is incompetent as evidence upon causation and may not be resorted to in determining liability. Service Mut. Ins. Co. of Texas v. Banke, 155 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1941, writ ref'd); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Boulware, 238 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1951, no writ). Article 3731a makes provision for a written instrument, including a certificate, when prepared by a governmental officer in the performance of the functions of his office, so far as relevant, to be admitted in court as evidence of the matters stated therein.

It has been held that a certificate of death not prepared by the physician is not admissible under this provisional rule, Tichenor v. Little, 279 S.W.2d 379 (Tex.Civ.App.--Galveston 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and that, if prepared by one unskilled in the matters to which it relates and admitted in evidence even under the proper certification required by Rule 54a for it to be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, the certificate of death is incompetent as evidence upon causation and may not be resorted to in determining liability. Service Mut. Ins. Co. of Texas v. Banke, 155 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.Civ.App. .--San Antonio 1941, writ ref'd); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Boulware, 238 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1951, no writ). The purpose of an inquest is to detect crime and criminal responsibility, if any.

The question of reopening the case and hearing additional testimony from either or both parties is left to the discretion of the trial court. Rule 270, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Boulware, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 722. We are of the opinion that such action did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

There an official record of the Highway Department was excluded on the ground that it was hearsay and contained conclusions and opinions. The court did not discuss the question but merely cited Roberts and Riviere, supra, and Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Boulware, 238 S.W.2d 722, Beaumont Court of Civil Appeals, to sustain its ruling. This latter case merely holds that a coroner's report is not admissible to show the cause of death it not being shown that the coroner was a physician and qualified to express an opinion on the cause of death.

Appellant's point is therefore without merit and is overruled. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Boulware, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 722; Texas Co. v. Ramsower, Tex.Com.App., 7 S.W.2d 872; Rule 270, T.R.C.P. Finding no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.

The objections were properly sustained. Roberts v. Dallas Ry. Terminal Co., Tex.Civ.App., 276 S.W.2d 575; Smith v. Riviere, Tex.Civ.App., 248 S.W.2d 526, 530; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Boulware, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 722. "

The objections were properly sustained. Roberts v. Dallas Ry. Terminal Co., Tex.Civ.App., 276 S.W.2d 575; Smith v. Riviere, Tex.Civ.App., 248 S.W.2d 526, 530; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Boulware, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 722. Appellant also asserts that the damages are excessive. The jury awarded a total of $76,633.