See Commercial Investment Trust v. Eskew, 126 Misc. 114, 212 N.Y.S. 718; and Powell v. Sowell, 245 Miss. 53, 145 So.2d 168, 146 So.2d 576. Exacting a covenant to take care of such a contingency and to protect the lender against such costs in order to insure that he will get the interest and charges the law allows him as provided in the contract, is not properly characterized as demanding additional interest. See Peyser v. Cole, 11 Or. 39, 4 P. 520; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. LaFollette, 150 Or. 455, 44 P.2d 165; and Owens v. Conelly, 77 Ariz. 349, 272 P.2d 345. The context of our statutes relating to interest charges corroborates the foregoing conclusion.

However, the majority hold, as above stated, that future interest cannot be collected nor retained either because the future interest notes are discharged by the act of acceleration, or such future interest notes are without consideration. The foregoing annotation is supplemented by another in 100 A.L.R. at page 1431, and the rule is there restated as above quoted, and some cases are there set out which hold that even though the acceleration provision is expressly contained in the interest notes such acceleration does not result in usury, the Court construing the excess interest as a penalty, since interest is a charge for use of money, and after the accelerated foreclosure there is no loaned money for which interest can be charged. Long Realty Co. v. Breedin, 175 S.C. 233, 170 S.E. 47; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. LaFollette, 44 P.2d 165; Tobin v. Holmboe, (Okla.) 45 P.2d 716; Massel Realty Co. v. Hagan, 47 Ga. App. 532, 171 S.E. 239. Later cases follow the stated rule. Supplemental Decisions A.L.R. Blue-Book, Permanent Vols. 1 and 2.

( Central Life Assur. Soc. v. Tiker, (Okla.) 57 P.2d 1182; Winter v. Prudential Ins. Co. (Okla.) 66 P.2d 514; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Whitestone Management Co., 8 Fed. Supp. 516; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Whitestone Management Co., 77 F.2d 255; Bankers Life Co. of Des Moines v. Horsefall (S.D.), 205 N.W. 714; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lookingbill (Iowa) 253 N.W. 604.) In determining whether usurious interest has been charged or collected under particular contract, it is not permissible to consider only portion of term of contract, test being whether lender under contract charged or received profit on investment in excess of maximum rate for full period of loan. ( Easton v. Butterfield Livestock Company, 48 Idaho 153, 279 P. 716; U.S. Building and Loan Association v. Lanzarotti, 47 Idaho 287, 274 P. 630; Eagle Rock Corporation vs. Idamount Hotel Co., 59 Idaho 413, 85 P.2d 242; Union Central Life Insurance Co. vs. La Follette (Ore.), 44 P.2d 165; Musser v. Murphy, 49 Idaho 141, 286 P. 618.) GIVENS, J.

" We find this text supported in Bledsoe v. Nixon, 69 N.C. 89, 12 Am. Rep. 642; Morgan v. Mortgage Discount Co., 100 Fla. 124, 129 So. 589; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. LaFollette, 150 Or. 455, 44 P.2d 165. This so-called "middle course," which is neither strictly simple interest nor strictly compound interest, is the one which is applicable under the rule in this State to the case at bar. Appellants rely upon Stauffer v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 184 Wn. 431, 51 P.2d 390, and Goodwin v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 196 Wn. 391, 83 P.2d 231, as supporting their position that appellant could only charge 6 per cent straight interest on its debt from the date of the original loan agreement.

It also referred by way of equitable analogy to sections 305 and 408 of the New York Personal Property Law, providing for refund credit to borrowers in installment transactions when the article is repossessed upon acceleration prior to maturity by reason of the buyer's default. The rule stated in Illinois Steel Co. v. O'Donnell ( supra) appears to be the rule generally followed in the jurisdictions where the question has been decided in reported cases (see, e.g., Heirs of Williams v. Douglass, 47 La. Ann. 1277; Heller Co. v. Mall, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 343; Burnette v. Realty Trust Co., 74 S.W.2d 536 [Tex.]; Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. LaFollette, 44 P.2d 165 [Oregon]; Sager v. American Investment Co., 170 Ark. 568; Holman v. Hollis, 94 Fla. 614). In Heirs of Williams ( supra, p. 1286) it was stated that "having exercised the option of the covenant in the mortgage to precipitate the maturity of all the premature instalments of the debt, the mortgagee necessarily assumed the corresponding duty of remitting all the capitalized interest that was unearned at the time of the attempted exercise of that right by the seizure and sale of the mortgaged property".