Whether proceeding under a strict liability or a negligence theory, "proximate cause" is a necessary element of appellant's case. Center Chemical Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868 ( 218 S.E.2d 580) (1975); Union Carbide Corp. v. Holton, 136 Ga. App. 726 ( 222 S.E.2d 105) (1975). Whether the truck in the instant case is alleged to be "defective" or negligent in design, the proximate causal connection between that design and the death of Mr. Talley has been negated by the evidence.

), Coast Catamaran Corp. v. Mann, 171 Ga. App. 844, 848, 321 S.E.2d 353, 357 (Ga.App. 1984), overruled on other grounds, Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 733-34, 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994) ("In the subject product-design case, only semantics [distinguish] the cause of action for negligence and a cause of action pursuant to [Georgia's strict liability statute].") Further, whether a claim is based on negligence or strict liability, proximate cause is an indispensable element of the claim. See Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 134, 279 S.E.2d 264, 269 (Ga.App. 1981) (citing Center Chemical Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 869, 218 S.E.2d 580, 582 (Ga. 1975), Union Carbide Corp. v. Holton, 136 Ga. App. 726, 728, 222 S.E.2d 105, 108 (Ga.App. 1975)). Finally, both Plaintiffs' negligence claim and strict liability claim allege that identical defects in the belling machine caused Plaintiffs' injuries.

Plaintiff alleged a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability against both Chrysler and Sconyers. He further alleged that Chrysler was negligent in its design, manufacture, fabrication, assembly and inspection of the vehicle and that Sconyers was negligent in the inspection and repair of the automobile. While the issue of proximate cause is generally a question of fact for the jury's determination, it may be decided as a matter of law where the evidence is clear and where it leads to only one reasonable conclusion — that the defendants' acts were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Union Carbide Corp. v. Holton, 136 Ga. App. 726 ( 222 S.E.2d 105); Smith v. Bel-Arbor, Inc., 121 Ga. App. 739 ( 175 S.E.2d 146); Crankshaw v. Piedmont Driving Club, Inc., 151 Ga. App. 820 ( 156 S.E.2d 208). We agree with the trial judge that such a case is presented here.

A manufacturer is not liable for injuries resulting from abnormal use of the product. Union Carbide Corp. v. Holton, 136 Ga. App. 726, 222 S.E.2d 105, 109 (1975); Barnes v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 182 Ga. App. 778, 357 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1987). In the instant case, Thornton's use of Du Pont 3608S to remove glue from the floor of the Giddens' home could not reasonably be foreseen by Du Pont. While it may be foreseeable that employees might use products obtainable at the workplace for their own personal use rather than buying said products at retail prices, it is unlikely that manufacturers would envision the wife of the owner of a business establishment taking a product from the workplace to her home for use by someone unconnected with her husband's business.

(Doc. 54 at 48.) Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-11-7, such a showing would bar Plaintiff's recovery. Defendant cites Union Carbide Corp. v. Holton, 136 Ga. App. 726, 222 S.E.2d 105 (1975), for the proposition that a plaintiff's recovery can be precluded, as a matter of law, by his failure to exercise due care for his own safety, even though he claims that he did not appreciate the danger involved and that he was an employee acting under the direction of his supervisor. (Doc. 54 at 48.)

"While the question of proximate cause is usually submitted to the jury as a question of fact, it may be decided as a matter of law where the evidence shows clearly and palpably that the jury could reasonably draw but one conclusion, that the defendant's acts were not the proximate cause of the injury." Union Carbide v. Holton , 136 Ga. App. 726, 729 (1), 222 S.E.2d 105 (1975). And our Supreme Court has recently recognized it may be appropriate to resolve liability on proximate cause grounds even at the motion to dismiss stage.

To hold otherwise would be to place upon the manufacturer the impossible task of cataloging every conceivable way in which injury might result from the negligent operation or maintenance of a product." (punctuation omitted and emphasis supplied)); see eg.Omark Indus., Inc. v. Alewine , 171 Ga. App. 207, 208, 319 S.E.2d 24 (1984) (holding that a manufacturer of hydraulic lines was not liable for failing to warn another company of certain dangers they posed because any failure to do so was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries when they resulted from, inter alia , a lack of maintenance , misuse, or neglect by a third party); Union Carbide Corp. v. Holton , 136 Ga. App. 726, 729-30 (1), 222 S.E.2d 105 (1975) (holding that the plaintiff's injuries from an explosion was not legally caused by the product (the cylinder and its contents) which left the manufacturer's plant, but by the product being misused by some intervening third party (whoever overpressurized the cylinder before the explosion)).

It is undisputed that Mr. Grant had a respirator in the cab of his truck at the time he began loading the turpentine. In our view, the legal consequence of Mr. Grant's failure to use the safety equipment (respirator) he had the foresight to bring on his own amounts to a failure to exercise ordinary care to avoid the consequences to himself of the risk posed by the pervasive and pungent turpentine. Union Carbide Corporation v. Holton, 136 Ga. App. 726, 730 (2), 731 ( 222 S.E.2d 105). Accord Powell v. Harsco Corporation, 209 Ga. App. 348, 349 (2), 350 ( 433 S.E.2d 608) (Alleged inadequacy of installation instructions cannot be the proximate cause of fatal collapse of the catwalk, where the installer did not read the instructions actually provided). The trial court correctly granted summary judgment, based on the entire record before us.

]" (Emphasis supplied.) Union Carbide Corp. v. Holton, 136 Ga. App. 726, 729 (1) ( 222 S.E.2d 105) (1975). "To hold that an intervening act was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendant's negligent conduct is to say that the defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. [Cit] Although what amounts to proximate cause is undeniably a jury question, it will be determined by the court as a matter of law in plain and undisputed cases.

3. The evidence does not support the conclusion that, as a matter of law, Hillard's actions were the proximate cause of his injury. In Union Carbide Corp. v. Holton, 136 Ga. App. 726, 728 (1) ( 222 S.E.2d 105) (1975), relied on by defendant, the Court held that defendant's act could not be the proximate cause where there had occurred between it and plaintiff's injury an independent, intervening act of someone other than defendant, which act was not foreseeable by defendant, was not triggered by defendant's act, and was sufficient itself to cause the injury. Here, there is no evidence of any intervening act.